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SUMMARY 
The primary focus of this research study has been on the develop-
ment, interpretation, and analysis of analytical models for conceptualizing 
the resource allocation decision process in hierarchical decentralized 
organizations. The three main classes of results are: 
(1) The integration under a common framework (from the viewpoint 
of someone interested in structuring information flow in organizations) 
of existing mathematical procedures for characterizing the resource 
allocation process. 
(2) Mathematical decomposition theory is used to develop a 
number of behavioral propositions regarding organizations. 
(3) The development of negotiation models for coordinating 
resource allocation decisions when there exists conflict between levels 
over objectives. 
The integrating framework recognizes that there can exist 
conflict between subordinate decision making units over limited resources 
and between levels over objectives. To overcome these conflicts there 
exists two main classes of coordination mechanisms: coordination through 
goal intervention and coordination through constraint intervention. 
When goal and constraint intervention techniques are applied in 
an organization with no conflict between levels over objectives, they 
are often called pricing and resource budgeting mechanisms. The con-
ditions under which each of these mechanisms work, their economic and 
viii 
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behavioral implications, and representative algorithms for describing 
the coordination procedure are given. 
Some of the behavioral implications inherent in pricing and 
budgeting techniques are studied. Specifically, it is shown that: 
(1) The only conflict is a result of the subordinates competing 
for limited organizational resources. 
(2) The structure of the organization has no effect on the final 
solution reached. 
(3) The subordinate decision making units have no autonomy. 
(4) The allocation decision reflects only the objectives of the 
superordinate. 
It is also shown that neither pricing mechanisms nor budgeting procedures 
are suitable for coordinating in an organization where there exists 
conflict between levels over objectives. 
A set of coordination mechanisms called negotiation models 
which allow the resource allocation decision to be influenced by both 
the superordinate and subordinates is introduced. This model has its 
roots in some work by Ruefli, Kelley, and Benders. The important aspects 
of these models are: 
(1) They allow for informational autonomy on the part of both 
the superordinate and the subordinates. 
(2) The structure of the organization can affect the final 
decision. In other words, the final resource allocation program selected 
may be different under different organization structures. For example, the 
decisions made under a centralized structure may differ from those made 
under a decentralized structure. 
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(3) The goal setting behavior of the superordinate and the 
subordinates explicitly takes into account the "bounded rationality" of 
man, i. e., the decision makers concentrate only on certain aggregate 
measures of performance rather than trying to optimize some grandiose 
utility function. 
(1) The models explicitly allow for both the superordinate and 
the subordinates to have their own set of goals. 
(5) In the case of the goal partitioning procedure the iterative 
information exchange process between superordinate and subordinates 
converges in a finite number of information exchanges to a solution which 
minimizes the total weighted deviation from the goals set by the super-
ordinate and the subordinates. 
(6) The goal partitioning procedure may lead to a resource 
allocation plan being selected which is different from one which would 
be selected by the superordinate or the subordinates acting in 
isolation; however, it will lead to a program which reflects both the 
goals of the superordinate and the goals of the subordinates. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO RESOURCE ALLOCATION DECISION 
MAKING IN HIERARCHICAL DECENTRALIZED ORGANIZATIONS 
Management scientists have traditionally been concerned with the 
strategic problems of management [7,8, 116]. Ackoff [2, p. 21] states 
that management scientists were originally concerned with finding effective 
solutions to specific organizational problems, e. g., how to "optimally" 
schedule production, or where to "optimally" locate warehouses. But 
they found that too many of their solutions were not put into operation, 
and of those that were, too few survived the inclination of organizations 
to return to familiar ways of doing things. A reason suggested by some 
writers [2,6,84,116] is the absence of conceptual models and analysis 
of these models for organizational processes such as decision making, 
connunication, etc. For example, Messarovic, Macko and Takahara 
[84, p. 16] assert that, "at present there may be more researchers 
worrying about how to optimally adjust parameters in feedback control 
systems than there are researchers worrying about the quantitative 
aspects of control and communication processes in organizational-type 
systems." Apparently, there are several professionals (including the 
author) who believe that conceptual models of organizational processes 
can provide insights and knowledge about how the flow of information 
and the organizational structure can affect decision making. This 
research is directed toward that end. The purpose of this dissertation 
1 
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is to present and analyze mathematical models of one organizations' 
process, resource allocation decision making. The study is aimed at 
a specific kind of environment, viz., a hierarchical decentralized 
organization. The results of the research would seem relevant to a 
challenge of the future made by Wagner [116, p. 1277]. Wagner suggested 
that the study and design of structures of management that are appropriate 
to the goals and environments of large scale organizations might lead to 
important laws underlying the science of decision making. 
An important aspect of this research is its integrative nature. 
Professionals in at least four different technical areas have been 
concerned with conceptual models of the resource allocation process in 
hierarchical decentralized organizations. Historically, economists 
studied the resource allocation process in a decentralized setting first. 
Malinvaud [78, p. 179] presents a brief history of the literature on 
decentralized planning in economics and states that the main concern 
of economists has been in showing that under conditions of perfect 
competition a centralized planning agency could do no better (in terms 
of an overall utility function) than a number of entrepreneurs operating 
independently through markets. Thus, since economists assumed that the 
firms within the economy were small enough to be directed by the 
entrepreneur, and were within a purely competitive setting, there was 
no need to concern themselves with the structure or internal control 
mechanisms of the firm [126]. Organizational behavioralists have also 
addressed the problem of decentralized decision making. Their studies 
have nainly been based on extensive personal experiences and empirical 
experiments. Their results have been characterized by suggestions for 
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more decentralized and participative decision making [75, 80] and often 
ignore the economic aspects of organizations [126, p. 51]. With some 
notable exceptions [31, 35, 107, 110] analytical models have not been 
developed to support these results and provide theoretical justification 
for their conclusions. 
The literatures of operations research/management science and 
systems theory have also concerned themselves with decentralized 
structures. Operations researchers, e. g., [37, 72], have studied and 
developed procedures to decompose a large mathematical programming problem 
into subproblems, and then solve these smaller subproblems possibly 
many times in order to get a solution to the large problem. Often after 
the development of such a decomposition technique, someone will note 
that a decentralized economic interpretation can be associated with the 
procedure.
1 
Systems theorists have concerned themselves with problems 
similar to those considered by operations researchers; however, the 
motivation for their studies has generally arisen from some hierarchical 
physical system. For example, Messarovic, Macko and Takahara [84, p. 13] 
have studied multilevel electric power systems. The result was a large 
mathematical problem which must be decomposed in a way that makes sense 
in terms of the physical systems. 
Thus, economists, organizational behavioralists, operations 
researchers, and systems theorists have studied segments of the problem 
of resource allocation in a hierarchical decentralized structure. 
However, the organizational behavioralists have tended to ignore analytical 
1
For example, see Dantzig's footnote [36, p. 462]. 
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models, while the others have either ignored or made restrictive 
assumptions about behavior. The author believes that this dissertation 
makes a significant contribution in integrating this previous work 
within a common framework. 
Conceptual models which would provide insights and theoretical 
justification for many organizational processes have been virtually non-
existent. Several well known professionals are now appealing for research 
in this area. Significant amounts of mathematical theory and behavioral. 
study are available for constructing and analyzing these conceptual 
models. This research develops a mathematical framework for the study 
of resource allocation decision making within decentralized hierarchical 
organizations. 
Decentralized Decision Making in a Hierarchical Organization  
The purpose of this section is to define what is meant by 
resource allocation decision making, hierarchical structure, and de-
centralization. The advantages and disadvantages of decentralized 
decision making are also discussed. 
For purposes of this research, an organization is viewed as a 
goal seeking system consisting of goal seeking subsystems[84]. As 
Simon has said, "large organizations are almost universally hierarchical 
in nature." [106, p. 40] A typical organization chart supports his 
statement. By hierarchical it is meant that the organization is composed 
of a vertical arrangement of subsystems where higher level subsystems 
have some priority of action or right of intervention over lower level sub-
systems, and where higher level subsystems must depend upon the perfor- 
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mance of lower level subsystems [84, p. 34]. The existence of a 
hierarchical structure is not a characteristic that is peculiar to human 
systems. It is common to nearly all complex systems [84, 106]. 
The near universality of hierarchy in complex systems suggests 
that there is something fundamental in this structural principle. 
The reasons often cited for hierarchical structure in organizations are: 
(1) Hierarchical structure allows for efficient accomplishment 
of the objectives of the organization in terms of time and cost, i.e., 
they allow for division of labor and specialization of function [106,126]. 
(2) Among systems of a given size and complexity, hierarchical 
systems require less information transmission between their parts than 
do non-hierarchical systems [106,126]. 
For these reasons Simon concludes that, "an organization will 
tend to assume a hierarchical form whenever the task environment is 
complex relative to the problem solving, communicating powers of the 
organization members and their tools. The organizations of the future, 
then, will be hierarchies, ..." [105, p. 1i.3]. 
Resource allocation decision making within a hierarchical 
structure means that an organization which has a hierarchical structure 
faces the decision of how much of each resource, e. g., money, time, 
manpower, facilities, etc., should be alloted to each project or 
activity currently being considered by the organization. Thus, a hier- 
archical structure does not necessarily imply anything about where in the 
structure this allocation decision is made. However, it is important to 
consider the effects of the hierarchical structure on the amount and 
nature of information available to a decision maker. 
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Throughout this dissertation it is assumed that resource allo-
cation decisions are made at specific identifiable points in the organi-
zation. This assumption is much like Connolly's concept of diffuse 
decision making [34]. Connolly describes a "diffuse" decision process as 
having four characteristics: (1) the decisions cover extended periods 
of time; (2) they are multi-person processes; (3) the participants 
are separated by non-trivial distances; and (4) the processes cover 
several organization levels. In this work the decision process can 
have characteristics (2) through (4). The final program of resource 
allocations are the culmination of decisions made at different points 
in the organization. It is assumed that the decision making process at 
a specific point in the organization can be modelled as the solution of 
a mathematical programming problem in which the constraints represent 
the technological and other restrictions imposed on the decision as 
perceived by the decision making unit. As with all mathematical 
programming problems, the objective function is a maximization or mini-
mization operation, but this does not necessarily imply an unlimited 
search for the "best" solution. As will be shown later it can also 
represent satisficing, a concept usually attributed to Simon [105, p. 
m]. 
This research will also assume that resource allocation decisions 
are made at each level in the organization and by each unit within each 
level (these are the specific identifiable points mentioned earlier). 
This leads one to the term: resource allocation decision making in a 
decentralized hierarchical organization. It is virtually impossible 
to speak in absolute terms as to whether an organization is centralized 
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or decentralized. As Simon states, "An administrative organization is 
centralized to the extent that decisions are made at relatively high 
levels in the organization; decentralized to the extent that discretion 
and authority to make important decisions are delegated by top management 
to lower levels of executive authority."' [104, p. 1] Simon's statement 
implies that the organizational structure is hierarchical in nature. In 
fact, as Zannetos [126, p. 54] has noted, any organization short of 
utopian decentralization is hierarchical. However, the converse is 
not true, i. e., a hierarchical structure does not necessarily imply 
decentralized decision making. It is possible for a completely central-
ized organization to have a hierarchical structure for purposes of 
carrying out the decisions which are made by the central decision maker. 
A totally centralized and a totally decentralized organization 
are myths, i. e., they do not exist in the real world. Instead most 
organizations fall somewhere between the two extremes of completely 
centralized and completely decentralized depending upon the amount of 
delegation of decision making authority [121]. One of the concerns of 
this research is the effect that certain coordination intervention 
mechanisms have on the centralization-decentralization properties of the 
organization. 
Decentralized decision making in a hierarchy does offer some 
desirable attributes. The ones most commonly cited in the literature are: 
(1) There is a saving in the amount of information which must 
be transmitted between decision making units [30, 60, 82, 105]. In a 
centralized structure the central decision making unit must be informed 
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of all alternatives and projects which exist throughout the organization; 
whereas a decentralized structure allows for more informational autonomy. 
In a decentralized setting, not all the data on alternatives and projects 
needs to be communicated. Instead, only certain summary information such 
as profit, cost, etc. is required. Thus, no individual decision unit 
in the organization need have complete information. 
(2) A decentralized organization explicitly takes into account 
the cognitive inability of a large organization to solve their resource 
allocation problem because it is too complex [70, 108]. This is 
reflected by the overall complex problem being replaced by a sequence 
of smaller and less complex problems. These smaller less complex 
problems help to facilitate the decentralized assignment of the smaller 
problems to eliminate undue interunit dependencies [70, p. 545]. 
(3) A decentralized hierarchy may allow a feasible resource 
allocation program to be found rapidly [56, 82, 105]. This feature is 
related to not having to communicate information up to the central 
decision maker and then wait for a decision to be handed down. Sometimes 
the coordination of decision processes is iterative so that summary 
information is passed up and down the hierarchy several times, and the 
final decision may be delayed. The number of iterations may depend upon 
the specific decision to be made, e. g., crisis versus annual budgeting. 
(4) Under a decentralized structure the operating rules of the 
system take the form of "do whatever is necessary to meet some objective" 
[9, p. 400]. Thus decentralization may improve the allocation of respons-
ibility and allow top management to recognize more easily successes and 
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failures [106, p. 44]. 
(5) In a decentralized hierarchy the subordinate units are 
allowed greater participation in the decision making process. This 
participation may result in the subordinate decision making units being 
better motivated and have a deeper commitment to the final decision 
[18, 60]. For example, Tannebaum and Massarik [111] found that a 
decentralized structure for making resource allocation decisions 
increased morale and productivity. 
Often, centralized decision making is impossible because of the 
exorbitant demands it places on the information system in a large, 
complex organization. Therefore, it is essential that any mathematical 
model of a decentralized organization allow the subordinates to have 
informational autonomy. This means that a mathematical model must not 
require the superordinate to have complete information. The other 
attributes such as increased motivation which can result from decentral-
ization are important but not essential from a modelling viewpoint. 
Although a hierarchical decentralized structure in an organization 
offers some desirable characteristics, it also creates coordination 
and control problems. A hierarchical structure tends to break the overall 
organization goals down into subgoals and distribute them over several 
levels and decision making units [35, p. 19]. The specialization of this 
decision making can create some conflicts within the organization. A 
major source of conflict is when limited resources such as capital, 
manpower, etc. must be distributed over several levels and among several 
units within a level. Since each decision making unit requires certain 
resources in order to carry on its activities, it is common for sub- 
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ordinate units to compete with each other for any resources which 
must be shared. In the structures to be studied in this research, 
the competition for scarce organizational resources will be a major 
source of the conflict between decision making units. 
As several writers have noted [80, 105, 108] decentralization 
almost invariably involves some conflict of view between the central 
authority and lower decision making levels. As Simon states, "Decentral-
ization can encourage the formation of and loyalty to subgoals which are 
only partly parallel to the goals of the organization" [106, p. 47]. 
Thus, the organization's objectives will seldom exactly coincide with 
the personal objectives of even those participants whose interest in the 
organization lies in the attainment of its goals [105, p. 114]. This 
statement is supported by empirical studies which are discussed in 
Machlup [77] and Williamson [123]. Furthermore, Smithies [108] has 
pointed out that although organizations may initially establish operating 
rules for subordinates, i. e., select objectives for subordinates to 
facilitate smooth functioning of the organization, in time a subordinate 
may adopt new objectives which reflect his own aspirations and goals. 
For example, Smithies states that, particularly in a bureaucratic 
organization, the desire for power often produces divergence of interest 
between subordinate levels and the organization as a whole. 
An example of this conflict between subordinate decision making 
units has been reported by Simon [105, p. 201]. Simon's example, 
which was an actual incident that occurred in the California state 
government, demonstrates that two independent agencies subordinate to the 
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State Relief Administration (welfare department) could pursue their 
own objectives, but in fact contribute no value to the objectives of the 
State Relief Administration. In a business context Smithies [108, p. 11] 
illustrates conflict by discussing how the manager of the Chevrolet 
division of General Motors could be primarily interested in his own market 
share rather than the overall profit of GM. 
Simon 1103] has noted that one need not postulate conflict in 
personal goals between decision making units in order for conflict to 
arise. Conflicts can arise naturally because different parts of the 
organization are concerned with different activities, but these activities 
may affect other decision making units. To emphasize, Simon obs&rves, 
"these conflicts could and would arise even if organizational decision 
making roles were being enacted by computers" [106]. 
Throughout this dissertation the term cooperative organization 
is applied when there is conflict between decision making units at a 
given level over limited resources, but there is no conflict between 
levels over objectives. Thus, in a two level cooperative organization 
with one superordinate and n subordinates, the objective function of the 
superordinate equals the sum of the subordinates' objective functions. 
The assumption is that each subordinate knows only his portion of the 
overall objective function. The superordinate may know the entire 
objective function, or he may assume the subordinates are using the 
correct objectives. The term non-cooperative organization applies to an 
organization where there also exists conflict between levels of the 
hierarchy over objectives. 
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To overcome these conflicts there appear to be two primary 
strategies: 
(1) Change the organizational structure by decreasing the amount 
of decision making autonomy or by replacing and displacing decision 
making units. 
(2) Develop a set of coordination mechanisms which can resolve 
conflicts and bring about decisions which are satisfactory to both the 
superordinate and to the subordinates. The concern of this dissertation 
is to study mathematically the system of controls which can be used to 
hold conflicts between decision making units within "tolerable" limits. 
To summarize, the typical organization has a hierarchical 
structure. This research is concerned with a hierarchical organization 
whose resource allocation decisions are made at different levels and at 
different points within each level, thus yielding a decentralized 
structure. It is assumed that at specific levels in the organizational 
structure the resource allocation decision making process can be represent-
ed by a mathematical programming problem. The decentralization of 
decision making offers some appealing features, but it also creates 
control and coordination problems. This research mathematically 
explores the interpretation and implications of certain mechanisms 
for coordinating resource allocation decisions in both a cooperative and 
a non-cooperative organization. The next section investigates what 
types of coordination mechanisms exist, and how they function in a 
hierarchical decentralized organization. 
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Coordination Mechanisms  
To facilitate the definition of coordination, consider a two 
level organization with one superordinate and n subordinates. Suppose 
further that each of the n+1 decision making units has certain goals 
and objectives which are mathematically reflected in the objective 
functions and constraint sets of each unit. The superordinate and n 
subordinates are arranged in a hierarchy, and thus the superordinate 
has some priority of action over each subordinate. This priority 
generally implies that the subordinates cannot make resource allocation 
decisions completely independent of the superordinate. 
Given a set of resources available to the organization, the 
superordinate seeks a mechanism or a set of mechanisms through which 
he can influence the subordinates behavior so that they will undertake 
resource allocation programs which do not require more resources than are 
available, and which further his objective function. It is assumed that 
the organization's objectives are composed of the superordinate's 
objectives and the subordinates' objectives. Thus, unless the subordinates 
and the superordinate have the same aims, it is impossible to discuss 
the "organization's objectives" without recognizing the objectives of the 
superordinate and the subordinates. With respect to coordination Simon 
stated, "These mechanisms are aimed at adoption by all subordinates of 
nutually consistent decisions in combination attaining the superordinate's 
established goal," 1105, p. 139]. 	Thus, for purposes of this thesis 
coordination mechanisms are devices by which the superordinate can 
influence the subordinates to seek a resource allocation program that 
furthers the objectives of the superordinate. 
Mesarovic, Macko, and Takahara 184] define coordination in a 
similar manner. In their approach there are three sets of goals: the 
system's goals, the superordinate's goals, and the subordinates' 
goals. The superordinate's goal is to find means of influencing the 
subordinates' decision problems so that when each subordinate solves his 
decision problem, the system's objective function is optimized. Their 
analysis requires consistency among the different goals, i. e., the 
system's objective function must be optimized when the superordinate 
coordinates the subordinates, and each subordinate optimizes his problem 
[84, p. 97]. In this dissertation goal consistency is not required. 
Therefore, the concern is under what circumstances can the superordinate 
find coordination mechanisms which allow an optimal or satisfactory 
solution to be found. 
Two specific characteristics of coordination mechanisms which 
are analyzed in later chapters are absolute and relative coordination. 
Absolute coordination refers to acts which influence the subordinates so 
that they find a resource allocation program which is optimal with 
respect to the superordinate's objective function, i. e., the subordinates 
arrive at the same program that the superordinate would have if he had 
complete information. Relative coordination is the term for acts which 
influence the subordinates to find a solution which is "satisfactory" 
but not necessarily optimal with respect to the objectives of the super-
ordinate. It should be apparent that relative coordination is easier 
to attain than absolute coordination because of the analogy to satisficing 
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versus optimizing. 
The two primary classes of coordination mechanisms which are 
studied are:
2 
(1) goal intervention mechanisms, and 
(2) constraint intervention mechanisms. 
While these classes are distinctly different in the models to be studied, 
in actual organizational settings it is often difficult to identify 
pure forms of these intervention mechanisms. 
Goal intervention methods include ways that a superordinate can 
influence the objective function of a subordinate. In its strongest 
form this might mean that the superordinate imposes a part of his overall 
objective function on the subordinate. In a less forceful form examples 
of goal intervention are incentives, tax allowances, bonuses, etc. 
[108]. Goal intervention methods also encompass the economist's pricing 
mechanism [80, p. 220]. 
Coordination through constraint intervention implies a method 
by which the feasible region of a subordinate is changed. Thus, methods 
which allow the auperordinate to affect the amount of resources available 
to the subordinates (budgeting approaches) and methods which allow the 
superordinate to impose specific restrictions, e. g., you must not spend 
more than X dollars on a particular project, are examples of constraint 
intervention methods. 
Although_ both coordination mechanisms have the same motives, 
2These classes are similar to those mentioned by Sengupta and Ackoff 
197, p. 12]. 
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there are some significant differences in interpretation and application. 
For example, Simon 1103] discusses how the goals of a decision making 
unit should be considered as the whole set of requirements (constraints) 
which are imposed on the unit. However, the final resource allocation 
decision is greatly affected by the subset of the requirements which are 
selected as the objective function. 
Objectives and Overview of the Contents of the Dissertation 
The purpose of this dissertation is to study, to present, and 
to analyze analytical models for resource allocation decision making in 
a hierarchical decentralized organization. The specific objectives 
that are accomplished include: 
(1) The existing literature in economics, operations research, 
systems theory, and organizational behavior concerning models of the 
resource allocation decision making process in hierarchical decentralized 
organizations is integrated under a common framework. This integration 
indicates which analytical models are lacking in supporting empirical 
work. 
(2) By drawing upon results and algorithms for optimization of 
large mathematical programming problems, the theoretical justification 
and validity for the two classes of coordination mechanisms when applied 
in a cooperative organization are studied. The results answer the follow-
ing questions regarding the coordination mechanisms: 
(a) Under what conditions can each of the two main coordination 
mechanisms be expected to work, i. e., bring about coordination with 
respect to the superordinate's goals? 
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(b) What are the economic and behavioral interpretations and 
implications of the different coordination mechanisms? 
(c) What algorithms can be used to describe the coordination 
process? 
(3) Extensions are suggested for certain algorithms to allow for 
more appealing economic and behavioral interpretations. 
(4) An investigation is made of what happens when coordination 
mechanisms which work in a cooperative organization are used in a non-
cooperative organization. 
(5) A negotiation model is developed to demonstrate one feasible 
coordination process for a non-cooperative organization. 
The dissertation is organized in seven chapters. Chapter I 
contains an introduction to the terms resource allocation decision making, 
hierarchical, decentralized, and coordination. The objectives of the 
research are also given. 
Chapter II describes and defines the resource allocation decision 
process in a hierarchical decentralized organization. A mathematical 
model is presented which will be utilized to integrate and analyze 
existing methodology. Examples of applicability and significance of 
the results are given. 
Chapters III and IV are devoted to a complete analysis of coordin-
ation mechanisms in a cooperative organization. Chapter III investigates 
goal intervention methods which are often called pricing methods. The 
existence conditions are stated, and a comparison and interpretation 
of the pricing mechanisms used in economics and systems theory is given. 
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A discussion of algorithms for goal intervention coordination is given, 
and some minor extensions are made for certain techniques. 
Chapter IV treats coordination through constraint intervention 
in a cooperative organization. Geoffrion's treatise [46] on primal 
resource directive approaches is used as a foundation for the discussion. 
The major results of the chapter are the identification of existence 
conditions and an economic interpretation of Geoffrion's three basic 
approaches. 
Chapter V begins by discussing the assumptions and implications 
inherent in coordination mechanisms for cooperative organizations. 
Specifically, it is shown that the structure of the organization has 
no effect on the final solution, the subordinates have no autonomy or 
influence on the final decision, and that relative coordination has no 
meaning in a cooperative organization. Next, it is shown that if 
coordination methods which worked in a cooperative organization are used 
in a non-cooperative organization that resource allocation programs can 
be found that do not use more than the supply of resources available. 
However, these programs will, in general, be non-optimal with respect 
to both the superordinate's and the subordinates' objective functions. 
In fact, programs which have very poor characteristics may be found. 
Chapter VI proposes a negotiation model for conceptualizing the 
coordination of decisions in a non-cooperative organization. The 
coordination mechanism presented, called a goal partitioning procedure, 
finds resource allocation programs which do depend on the organization's 
structure. The procedure, which is interative, is shown to converge 
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finitely to a solution (a set of resource allocation programs) that 
depends upon both the superordinate's and the subordinates' objectives. 
An interpretation for the behavioral implications of the procedure is 
given which demonstrates that the procedure has satisficing and compromis-
ing properties. Particular emphasis is placed on the kind of information 
which must be communicated during the goal partitioning procedure. 
Chapter VII summarized the conclusions of the study by restating 
propositions which evolved in Chapters III to VI. Specific areas for 
future study are identified. 
CHAPTER II 
DESCRIPTION AND MATHEMATICAL REPRESELTATION 
OF THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION DECISION PROCESS 
To assist in the ingegration and analysis of existing work in 
hierarchical decentralized decision making a description of a hypo-
thetical resource allocation decision process is presented. Although 
the description is for a hypothetical process, it does agree with some 
existing verbal descriptions of such processes, e. g., in a socialist 
government's central planning agency [66, 118], in a profit making 
business organization [119], and in a federal government agency [14, 101]. 
Figure 1 depicts an abstraction of the kinds of information flows which 
often take place during the resource allocation decision process in a 
hierarchical decentralized organization. 
Initially, there exists a set of inputs to the superordinate 
level. These inputs represent requirements or goals which are imposed 
on the organization by external forces, e. g., the stockholders may 
require that a certain profit level be achieved, or the federal government 
might require that certain standards be met. Other information known to 
the superordinate includes resources available such as money (possibly 
operating and capital budgets), manpower, facilities, etc. The super-
ordinate also receives or possesses some information about the subordinates 
at the level ummediately below. Given these exogenous inputs, the infor-
mation from the units below, and the superordinate's own expectations, the 
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Figure 1. Information Flow in a Resource Allocation Process for a 
Hierarchical Decentralized Organization. 
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superordinate arrives at an objective (utility) function and a set of 
constraints. Based on the utility function and constraints, the super-
ordinate tentatively selects a program of resource allocations. This 
program generally consists of a set of resource budgets for the sub-
ordinates in level two. These budgets and additional information 
for coordination purposes are communicated to the subordinate units. 
The additional information may be in the form of constraints, incentives, 
or other information about the superordinate's objective function and/or 
constraints. 
A subordinate decision making unit at level two uses these 
inputs to arrive at an allocation plan in light of his own objectives 
and constraints. The entire information gathering, problem solution, 
and information communication process repeats itself for each of the 
subordinates at level two except the input from level one (the super-
ordinate) replaces the exogenous inputs. 
It is assumed, as shown in Figure 1, that there is no interaction 
between the subordinate decision units at a given level. This is typical 
of most existing models of decentralized decision making. However, 
often subordinates do interact with each other. Such interaction or 
interdependency is called a technological or behavioral externality and 
has been treated in the literature for special cases 156, 83, 94, 119]. 
The important aspects of this hypothetical process are: 
(1) A decision unit's objectives and constraints are a function 
of the unit's expectations and capabilities, and information from levels 
above and below. 
(2) The resources available to a decision unit are determined by 
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the next higher level. The superordinate's resources are affected by 
exogeneous factors. 
(3) The evaluation and selection process for a unit is per-
formed through consideration of its objective function and constraints. 
(4) Subordinates at a given level compete for resources. 
(5) In general a higher level unit does not concern itself with 
specific projects or activities which are undertaken by its subordinates, 
but rather concentrates on some aggregate measure of a subordinate's 
activity. 
The resource allocation process is generally depicted as being 
iterative [14, 66, 101, 118]. The process just described is iterative 
in the sense that objectives and constraints may change stepwise as 
new information about alternatives becomes available. The iterative 
process begins with the superordinate selecting a program and then 
relaying the program along with coordination information to each sub-
ordinate at level two. Each subordinate solves its allocation problem 
and sends information about it along with coordination information to 
subordinates at level three. This process continues until the bottom 
levels are reached at which time the information now flows up through 
the hierarchy until it reaches the superordinate at level one. The 
upward flow of information is often called counter planning [66]. At 
each decision unit the upward flow from subordinates is integrated and 
aggregated so that at the very top the superordinate has summary infor-
mation about what would happen if the tentative budgets assigned at the 
beginning of the cycle were actually realized. The superordinate uses 
this information to arrive at a new set of tentative budgets, and the 
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entire process repeats itself. After a finite number of cycles, the 
final allocations are determined, and the final plan is implemented. 
Descriptions of similar such processes can be found in [14, 66, 93, 100, 
118, 119, 122]. 
Framework for Analysis: A Mathematical Model  
To facilitate the accomplishment of the research objectives 
given in Chapter I and to allow a more rigorous analysis and discussion 
of the decision process, a mathematical model is now presented. The 
model is for a hypothetical two level organization. A two level organiz-
ation is used because it is easier to describe and conceptualize, and 
it seems to capture the important characteristics of the resource 
allocation decision process. Suppose the organization is arranged as 
in Figure 2, i. e., there is one superordinate (or supremal) and n 
subordinate (or infimal) decision making units. The superordinate's 
decisionproblemisselectvectors,a.(i = 1, . 	. , n) in order to 
maximize (1)(g/(x1 ), 	gn(x )) 	 (2-1) 
n 
subject to: 	IaI 




I 	Y. (a.) 	< — 
i=1 
(2- 3 ) 









Figure 2. A Two Level Organization Chart. 
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variables x. in order to 
-s 
maximize 	f. (x.) 
subject to: h i ( x.) < ai 
X. E X. 
-1 	1 
Clearly, these problems are not well defined in the usual sense of 
mathematical optimization. The intent at present is to describe or 
represent mathematically a very general process. A major difficulty 
with the above model is the form is murky, i. e., it is unclear (and 
in fact not defined) what the objective for the organization is. 
Throughout this dissertation all vectors are columnar and are 
designated by an underline, e. g., x. Transposes are represented by a 
prime, e. g., x'. The superordinate has a vector, b, of m resources, 
which can be used by the n subordinates. Expression (2-2) indicates 
that the sum of the resources used by all subordinates must not exceed 
the supply. Further, there may exist additional constraints, e. g., like 
expression (2-3), concerning how the subordinates can use the resources, 
e. g., it might be required that the budget for subordinate i be no 
greater than the budget for subordinate j. Given a set of organization 
resources which must be shared by the subordinates and possibly constraints 
on how these resources are to be used (these constraints are imposed 
by forces outside the organization), the superordinate must decide, or 
influence the subordinates to decide, how to allocate these resources 
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to the subordinates in order to maximize or satisfice his objective 
function, expression (2-1). The argument for the superordinate's objective 
is some measure of effectiveness, g i (xi ), for each subordinate. Since 
the subordinates actually carry out the activities which bring benefit 
to the superordinate, the superordinate's objective function value 
depends on "how well" the subordinate does. However, in the general 
case subordinate i tries to attain his goals by maximizing his objective, 
f.(x.), whose value is a function of the vector of activity levels, x.. 
Thus, it is possible for the subordinate to pursue his own objective, 
(2-4), and not further the superordinate's objective. This points up the 
possibility of conflict in the organization. 
While subordinate i pursues his objective, he must choose a 
vector of activity levels, x i , which satisfies certain restrictions, 
(2-5) and (2-6). Constraint (2-5) is a vector function which specifies 
that the subordinate can use no more organizational resources than he 
has available. Constraint (2-6) forces subordinate i to select only 
those x. which are within subordinate i's feasible region. These 
constraints are common only to subordinate i and represent technological.  
restrictions. 
This model is quite general and allows one to represent both 
goal intervention and constraint intervention coordination mechanisms. 
The important points to be noted about the model are: 
(1) Both the superordinate and the subordinates have their 
own set of goals, i. e., objectives functions and constraints. It is 
possible for the superordinate and the subordinates to pursue different 
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objectives because the superordinate's objective function may not be 
related to the subordinate's objective functions. 
(2) Explicitly the model indicates that the superordinate 
impacts on the subordinates through the selection of the a i 's because 
-s 
a. represents the resources available to subordinate i. It will be 
shown that in order to coordinate the activities of the subordinates, 
the superordinate may have to employ other techniques such as influencing 
the form of the objective function or imposing constraints. These 
additional techniques tend to decrease the subordinate's decision 
making autonomy and increase the amount of information which must be 
communicated during the allocation process. 
(3) The subordinate has an impact on the behavior of the super-
ordinate through gi (xi ) because xi is determined by the subordinate. 
(4) The superordinate need not have detailed information about 
the constraints or objective functions of the subordinates. 
There are a number of different strategies that one could 
pursue in analyzing coordination mechanisms with respect to the general 
mathematical model. The ploy used in this dissertation is to first 
consider a very special case of the general model. However, almost all 
previous analytical analysis has dealt with this special case. 
Chapters III and IV treat in detail the case when the superordinate's 
objective function equals the sum of the subordinates' objective 
functions, i. e., 
14e1 (xi ) " . " en (x )) = fl (xl ) 	fn(n). 
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An organization in which this relationship holds is referred to as a 
"cooperative" corganization because there is no conflict between the s .uper-
ordinate's and the subordinates' objectives. In this environment the 
concept of coordination has to do with choosing parameters (prices, 
resources, etc.) such that the overall function is maximized. 
Before beginning the mathematical analysis, it is pertinent 
to indicate what relevance this research has, and to what kinds of 
organizations it is applicable. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter 
addresses these questions. 
Relevance of this Study and Some Examples  
Many organizations have hierarchical structures and a decentralized 
allocation process; consequently, there exists the need to coordinate 
resource allocation decisions. For the most part there has been little 
work on the construction and analysis of conceptual analytical models 
of the coordination process. As Zannetos [126, p. 51] has noted, the 
problems of designing and restructuring an organization are for the most 
part unsolved. Those in organization behavior tend to ignore the economic 
aspects, while those in economics tend to ignore the human element. 
Managers and organizational designers need new tools to study formally 
the effects of structure on the decision process. Ansoff and Brandenberg 
state, "If we knew how to construct analytical models of organizations, 
the objectives of the organization could be used also as a criteria 
of organizational design." [7, p. 709] The analytical models which are 
developed and analyzed in this dissertation are a beginning. 
Specifically, the author feels that the results of the research 
ti 
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are important contributions because 
(1) While the analytical models are theoret:cal, they do lend 
validity to certain kinds of coordination mechanisms in specific 
environments. As Malinvaud states, "As always should be the case, a 
formal theoretical study must bring a better understanding of practical 
questions"[78, p. 171]. 
(2) The framework developed provides a basis whereby various 
coordination mechanisms can be compared, contrasted, and evaluated for 
specific environments. 
(3) The study provides mathematical precision in defining both 
concepts and issues. 
(1k) The results suggest a starting point for some empirical 
studies. 
It is felt that the concepts used in this research have wide 
application: in industry, government, etc. As an indication of the 
generality of applications of coordination mechanise:, in hierarchical 
decentralized organizations consider the following simple examples: 
Example  2.1: Profit Making Organization  
Consider a business which manufactures goods for customers. 
The objective for the organization is to maximize overall corporate 
profit. The organization is divided into three divisions, and each 
division operates independently reporting to the corporate headquarters. 
Thus, the company is organized into three separate profit centers. A 
typical statement about the structure might be similar to the following 
which Whinston 1120, p. 407] cites, "The direct responsibility for 
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managing company line operations rests with the general manager of each 
division. Under our form of organization, each division represents 
a separate profit center for the purpose of management control, and the 
general manager is accountable for earning a satisfactory rate of return 
on the assets employed in his operation." The corporate headquarters 
is primarily interested in long term profit with other objectives being, 
maintaining a certain share of the market, providing a quality product, 
achieving a conservative growth, etc. Each division manager also has 
certain objectives which include division profit, division market share, 
etc. There is not necessarily complete agreement among all divisions 
and the corporate headquarters about the objectives or the relative 
importance of the different objectives. The problem then is, how 
can the corporate headquarters coordinate the activities of the divisions 
so that the corporate's objectives are met, and the division still 
maintains some decision making authority. 
Example 2.2: Educational Institution  
Consider a state university system which is composed of a four 
year non-technical institution, a technical institute, and several two 
year junior colleges. Each of these entities has certain goals and 
objectives, e. g., the junior colleges might be primarily interested in 
providing an "adequate" liberal arts education to every state resident 
who desires one. The non-technical institution might be concerned with 
providing an "adequate" non-technical education to those state residents 
who can meet certain entrance standards, performing research which would 
benefit the state, and maintaining a graduate program. The technical 
institute has such goals as becoming a nationally recognized institution 
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for graduate education and providing a "good" technical education for 
highly qualified students. Clearly, the objectives and priorities of 
these three classes differ. In addition, the state legislature has 
certain objectives which it believes the state schools should accomplish. 
These objectives may not always agree with those of the institutions. 
The state legislature allocates resources to the schools for their 
activities. The problem is how can the legislature influence the 
behavior of the institutions to further the legislature's goals. 
Example 2.3: Federal Government - City Government Revenue Sharing  
Suppose the federal government has decided to decentralize 
some of its support programs. The decision has been made to share with 
the cities a portion of the revenue which is generated by taxes. The 
federal government hopes this will cut out some of the bureaucratic red 
tape, etc. and will allow those officials closer to the problems to utilize 
the money more effectively. However, there are some general goals which 
the federal government would like to have the cities pursue with the 
shared revenue. The problem is, how can the federal government share 
revenue with the cities and still be assured that an attempt is made to 
accomplish the federal government's objectives. 
These three examples from three different environments were given 
to illustrate the general relevance of the research results. The research 
deals with a model which is intentionally very general because results 
are sought which do not depend upon the unique characteristics of any 
one type of organization. While the analytical models and theoretical 
framework developed in this research are probably not applicable at an 
operational level, it is believed that this work can indicate general 
directions and provide useful insights. 
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CHAPTER III 
COORDINATION THROUGH GOAL INTERVENTION IN A 
COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION: PRICING APPROACHES 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyze methods of 
goal intervention for coordination when the superordinate's objective 
function equals the sum of the subordinates' objective functions (a 
cooperative organization). Under this assumption, goal intervention 
methods are often called pricing approaches.
3 Other authors [96, 113] have 
used the term "indirect distribution" to describe the same process. 
Throughout this dissertation a pricing approach implies a goal intervention 
method applied to a cooperative organization. This special case arises 
whenever the superordinate has the power to delegate an objective function 
to which the subordinate must adhere. 4 
It is important to emphasize that the author's interest lies 
primarily in the economic and behavioral interpretations of pricing 
approaches. Particular emphasis is placed on the applicability of pricing 
as a conceptualization of coordination in a decentralized organization. 
31n the mathematical theory of decomposition, procedures which are 
identical to the pricing approaches to be presented are often called 
price directive techniques 146, 54, 119]. The term price directive 
is avoided here because of possible misinterpretations. 
4The concern here is not with how or when such an event is possible,a 
subject which has been discussed by Hertz [57] and Smithies [108]. 
Clearly, in some cases such as example 3 of Chapter II (the revenue 
sharing plan) the superordinate does not have the power to set the 
subordinates' objective functions. 
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This chapter begins by a straightforward derivation of the pricing 
mechanism from the method of Lagrange multipliers. Since in nearly all 
discussions of decentralization through prices in the economic literature 
the classical work of Koopmans and Arrow and Hurwicz is cited, a brief 
discussion of their approaches is given. Next, the economic interpretation 
for pricing is given, and the relationships between the economist's 
pricing, scheme and the balanced pricing scheme from systems theory is 
discussed. Finally, the existence conditions for prices are stated 
and proven, and algorithms for finding the correct prices are discussed. 
Decentralization Through Prices 
In general the existing work treats the problem of subordinate 
i as: 
Maximize 
X. s X. 
f.(x.)-A!h.(x.) 1 —I 11 
where X. is a vector of prices or penalties. These prices serve as a 
means of influencing the relative weight associated with the subordinate's 
objective function without actually fixing an entirely new objective 
function. The superordinate's task is to choose A. for i = 1,...,n so 
that the allocation plans selected by the subordinates are optimal as 
well as feasible for the organization. Thus, the name "price" coordination 
arises from the interpretation of X i as a set of prices associated with 
organizational resources. 
To'see how prices are used as a means of coordination for the 
36 
general formulation given in Chapter II under the assumption 
gn(x )) = fl(xi ) 	fn(x ) 
notice that the superordinate's and the subordinates' problems can be 
expressed as: 
Problem P  
n 











E 	T.(h.(x.)) 	< —3_ —1 	— — 
i=1 
( 3-3 ) 
x. c X.1 
 for i=1,...,n 
-a  
and x. (i=1,...,n) is an element of 
the positive orthant of Euclidean p i space. 
Note that it has been implicitly assumed that a i = hi (x.). With respect 
to interpretation and theoretical validity, nothing is lost by such an 
assumption. Thus, with price coordination it is no longer necessary to 
consider a. as a decision variable. It should be clear that under the 
assumption of a cooperative organization the problem given in (2-1) to 
(2-6) is well defined, i. e., (2-1) is the objective function and (2-2), 
(2-3), (2-5), and (2.6) are constraints. Also, it is clear that if 
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x.* (i=1,...,n) is optimal for problem P, then x.* and a.* = h.(x.*) is 
optimal for the problem given in Chapter II. 
In order to solve problem P by having subordinate i solve the part 
of problem P which depends only on his decision variables, the coupling 
constraints 5 (3-2) and (3-3) must be suppressed. However, the final 
solution must satisfy these constraints, and therefore it is the super-
ordinate's task to ensure that this is accomplished. The ploy used for 
doing this is to move (3-2) and (3-3) into the objective function. This 
scheme is simply the Lagrangian approach in classical optimization. 
Assuming for the present that there exists a coordinating set of prices, 
X' -2  X ' 
 the result is another problem which can be written as: 





) - X! 	1 
[ I h.(x.
-1
) - 	X'[ I T.(h.(x.))-- - 	-1 . 	- -2 . 
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maximize 	I (f.1 (x.) - 
	h (
—± 	-2 x ) - A' -1 
(h (x ))) + ,alb + x , n (3-4) - -2 - 
x. s X. 1 
i=1,...,n 
where A and -2 
 A are pricing vectors. For a given Al 	- 
and A2 
 the problem 
given in (3-4) can be solved by having subordinate i solve the following 
problem:  
5 So called because, they link the subordinates together. 
i=1 
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Problem S.( X) 1 
maximize 	 - X114(xi ) - j4T. (Li (xi )) 6 
x. e X. 1 
One can associate an iterative scheme for arriving at a set of 
prices, which when communicated to a subordinate allows him to find his 
portion of the optimal solution to problem P (assuming for the moment 
that such prices exist) with an information exchange scheme between 
superordinate and subordinates. Such an iterative process would begin by 
having the superordinate choose a X i and 	and announce them to the 
subordinates. Subordinate i solves problem S i (X) and communicates some 
information, usually f.(x.), 	 W. (h.(x.)) h.(x.), and T (h.( to the superordinate. 1 	-s -s 	-s -a 
The superordinate uses this information in some way to arrive at a new 
set of prices which he announces to the subordinates. After some number 
(possibly infinite) of these information exchanges, the subordinates 
find the optimal solution to problem P. 
Notice the savings in the amount of information which must be 
communicated under this scheme versus a centralized process. In a 
centralized process all information about h.(x.) and T i (hi (x.)) for 
all x. t 1 
 (i=1,...,n) must be communicated to the superordinate who 
then solves problem P by himself. In the decentralized scheme using 
6
Notice that X'b + -2  X' can be dropped because it is a constant for fixed 
al 	
--1-  
and X . -2 
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prices only summary information need be transmitted. For example, it is 
normally not necessary for subordinate i to transmit x i to the super-
ordinate at each iteration. 
A brief summary is now given for the famous works of Koopmans and 
Arrow and Hurwicz. Their work was among the first to analytically 
consider decentralization through prices. 
Koopmans [64,65]  
This work is often cited [38, 90] as the first definitive work 
on mathematical analysis of decentralized decision making. Koopmans work 
was concerned with activity analysis of an entire economic system. His 
work is related to general equilibrium theory and welfare economics and 
is rooted in some famous works in classical economics [17, 71, 74, 87]. 
The essential strategy is to develop the concept of a "proper" set of 
prices through which functions of delegated management may be performed. 
Given an input output matrix, A = [Ap i AI ! Ap ] which relates 
the activity level vector, x, to the commodity vector y:= [4, LI, 4] 
where 4 = final commodity components, 	= intermediate commodity 
components and 4 = primary commodity components, one seeks x so 
that 4 > 0, 	= 0, and -yp < ...LI). Assuming such a L exists, a point 2. 
is said to be "efficient" in the sense of Koopmans if and only if there 
does not exist any other point 2:with the property 
and 
7It is assumed that primary commodities are supplies, thus 	< 0, 
and therefore S
P 
 represents the amounts of primary commodities available. 
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If an efficient 2. exists then from linear programming theory there exists 
a dual price vector 1: = (4, 4, 	Koopmans then shows that a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the efficiency of a vector 
is that there exist a vector E such that 
= 0 
P'A < 0 
One can interpret each column of the A matrix, 1 K as being controlled 
by a manager. Thus, when E:24( > 0 the manager in charge of activity K 
should expand because in terms of opportunity costs this expansion 
will lead to a better 4. On the other hand, whenever 2:a2 < 0 the cost 
of expanding this activity exceeds the benefits it can produce. 
Charnes and Cooper [29, p. 296] have written Koopman's model 
in a slightly different way which illuminates Koopmans' reasoning. 
The model is: 




AIL = 	= 
r. 
Aix = y_F >0, x> 0 • 




	 Ap 21A, 24,AF < 0 
Here the dual variables appear as prices for the commodities 
Conditions (3-5) to (3-7) are derived by observing the complementary 
slackness conditions in the above pair of linear programs. 
The decentralized process imagined by Koopmans for finding an 
efficient state involves a "helmsman" who sets the value for each final 
commodity; a custodian for each intermediate or primary commodity who 
sets tentative prices for them and changes the prices to attain 
equilibrium between supply and demand, and then buys or sells all that 
is asked for at this price; and a manager for each activity who tries 
to maximize his profit with the given prices. 
Koopmans argues that this process has only one solution which 
is the optimal solution. He also implies that these dynamic rules could 
lead to convergence. However, the dynamic aspect of the rules is 
vague, and no convergence proof is given [10]. 
This work was very significant in that it recognized how a 
decentralized scheme could be used to do planning for an entire economic 
r. 
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system in which each firm in the economy tries to maximize its own 
profit. As Koopmans says, "the decentralization utilizes incentives 
that are naturally operative in the market system." [64, p. 22] His 
work also points up the remarkable feature of a purely competitive 
economic system which is: a completely centralized control mechanism 
cannot do better in terms of an overall utility function than a decentral-
ized competitive system. 
However, as March and Simon [80, p. 202] point out, this result 
has little relevance for decentralization through pricing within the 
firm because in a firm the conditions for perfect competition are 
not met. In the absence of external markets to provide prices, the 
organization suffers all the problems associated with monopoly and 
imperfect competition [80, p. 202]. 
Arrow and Hurwicz' [10]  
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where U = the utility function of the organization, 
y.= amount of final product i to be . produced, 
E.=amount of product i available initially, 
x. = scale of division j's production, and 
g.. = amount of product i produced by the jth division. 
ij 
If one writes the Lagrangian function associated with this problem and 
then rearranges the terms, the results are: 
n 	m 
L(y,x:p) = u(y
1" . "-v 
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i=1 	j=1 i=1 1=1 
Given a value for p i (i=1,...,5), the maximization of L(y,x;p) which is 
a sum of functions each depending on a different set of variables, 
involves maximizing each of the functions separately. This suggests the 
decentralization concept. 
S 
Each division is instructed to maximize E p.g..(x.) for a 
i=1 
given p i where pi is interpreted as the price of commodity i. At the 
same time the central authority determines the level of final demands 
by maximizing the difference between utility, U(y i ,...,yn ) and costs 
E piyi . As Arrow and Hurwicz state, "The elements of decentralization 
i=1 
are clear. For a given set of prices, a process (division) manager 
need know only the prices and the technology of his own process. The 
helmsman (central authority) need only know the prices of desired 
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commodities (products) and the utility function." [10, p. 77]. 
Of course, it must be shown that there in fact does exist some 
set of prices, pi (i=1,...,n) which when the Lagrangian is maximized 
yields the optimal 
Yi 
 and x . Arrow and Hurwicz suggest but do not 
prove existence conditions. These conditions are that U(y i ,...,yn ) be 
a strictly concave function, and that the constraints are concave and 
satisfy a constraint qualification. 
Arrow and Hurwicz also devise a price adjustment mechanism 
based on a gradient method and show that under the conditions given 
above, their procedure converges to an optimal solution. Thus, they 
were among the first to propose an algorithm for conceptualizing the 
resource planning process from a decentralized point of view. 
Economic Interpretations  
There is an interesting economic interpretation which can be 
given to the coordination through pricing scheme. Suppose problem P 
represents an organization's resource allocation decision problem 
where the objective is to maximize profit. Thus, f i (xi ) is the con-
tribution to organizational profit by division (subordinate) i by 
undertaking activities xi . The restriction x. c Xi represents the 
requirements and restrictions which are common only to division i. 
n 
The constraints, I h.(x.) < b, are restrictions on the amounts 
--o_ — — 
i=1 
of organizational resources available. These resources are to be shared 
n 
between the divisions. The constraints, 	I Wi (h.(xi )) < n, are 
i=1 
restrictions on the way the organizational sources can be allocated, e. g., 
exogeneous forces might specify that division one should never receive 
1[5 
a higher budget than division two. 
The components of X. and X 2 used in coordinating the divisions 
are frequently called Lagrange multipliers, dual variables, shadow 
prices, or imputed costs. These components have the effect of giving 
an imputed cost to the coupling constraints. For example, Zangwill 
[125, p. 66] shows that the kth component of X1 yields a measure 
of how valuable a small increase of the k
th resource would be to the 
organization. Furthermore, the components of 1 1 can be thought of as 
prices. If the supply of the k
th resource is not exceeded, i. e., 
n k „ n , 
E —3_ — 
h. (x.) < b
k
, then its price X
k
1 
 = O. On the other hand if E h.(x.)= 
3_ 
i=1 	 i=1 
bk., then Ak may be non-zero which can be interpreted as a charge or 
bonus made by the organization against any division which uses the k
th 
resource. Therefore, the organization accomplishes coordination by 
having a superordinate charge subordinates (and thus affect the 
attractiveness of certain activities) for use of a resource if the demand 
for that resource exceeds the supply. 
The components of X 2 are also prices. They are concerned with 
the constraining effect of the constraints dealing with the manner in 
which resources are used. For example, suppose an organization consists 
oft7dosubordinatedecisionunits.Letxij 
 be the dollar support allo- 
cated to project j under the control of subordinate i. Because of 
extraneous factors there is a restriction imposed on the organization 
which specifies that subordinate 1 should never have more dollar support 
for his projects than subordinate 2. In addition, suppose there is only 
a limited supply of dollar support for the use of the subordinates. Thus, 
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- E x 
j=1 	j=1 
< 0 (3-9) 
Let X1 be the price associated with (3-8) and X 2 be the price 
associated with (3-9). Suppose at some iteration of the information 
exchange process, the superordinate specifies that A l = .1 and X2 = .8. 
Each superordinate is charged .10 for every dollar he uses in resources 
(this can be interpreted as a cost of capital). In addition, subordinate 
1 is charged $.8 more for every dollar used because of the additional 
constraint (3-9). Likewise subordinate 2 is rewarded $.8 per dollar 
spent. Although a subordinate may not explicitly know about the 
constraints dealing with how resources must be used, the existence of 
additional prices like X 2 = .8 in the above example do convey information 
about these constraints. For instance, in the above example subordinate 
1 would have an indication that there are restrictions at a higher level 
relating to the amount of resources he can use. Therefore, the com-
ponents of X1 
 and X can be viewed as incentives (both positive and 
negative) for increasing or decreasing the amounts of resources allocated 
to an activity. 
In terms of information, the central unit supplies only a vector 
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of prices which is the same for each division. Hence, there is a great 
savings in the amount of information which must be transmitted between 
divisions of the organization over what would be required in a centralized 
organization. However, in some cases (in particular when the overall 
objective is linear) it can be shown that this price information alone 
is insufficient for coordination to be achieved. In the next section a 
slightly different method is proposed which supplies additional 
information for coordination purposes. 
The primary application of price coordination mechanisms has 
been in the determination of transfer prices for goods which are sold 
between divisions in the same company. For a detailed discussion, see 
[30, 39, 53, 58, 86, 100]. 
Balanced Pricing  
This pricing mechanism has been suggested in the literature of 
systems theory [84, 96, 99] as a way to solve a large optimization problem. 
It is often referred to in the literature as the interaction balance 
principle, and it has been particularly useful in applying decentralized 
control procedures to large industrial processes such as chemical and 
steel processes. 
The logic of the balanced pricing mechanism is similar to the 
pricing scheme discussed earlier; however, there are some differences, 
particularly in terms of economic interpretation. In problem P it was 
noted that (3-2) and (3-3) are the links between the subordinates. To 
simplify notation it is assumed that the only coupling constraints are 
included in (3-2). Suppose the linking connections between the sub-
ordinates are cut by introducing additional variables and constraints, 
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i. e., (3-2) can be written as 
h.(x.) + z. < b - 
for 
(3- 10 ) 
n 
z. = E h,( 	) (3-1 1 ) 
j=1 
j ai 
z. is now a vector of decision variables under the control of subordinate 
-a 
i, and the links between the subordinates are expressed in (3-11). As 
before a vector of Lagrange multipliers, p i , is assigned to the 
constraints in (3-11), and these constraints are moved from the constraint 
set into the objective function. Thus, the overall objective function is: 
n 	 n 	n 
maximize 	E f.(x.) - E p.' ( E h (x ) - z.) 
. 
	
1-a 	. 	-1 	j=1 -,1 - 	-i 
1=1 1=1 
,Ii- 
x. e X. (i=1,...,n) 
-a 
One can separate this objective function into n parts where the ith 
part depends only on x. and z . The resulting decision problem for 




f.(x.) + 	- E 31.'h.(x.) 	(3-12) 1 -a -s 	-a -a j=1 
jOi 
subject to: 	 h.1
(x.) 	z. -a < b — — 
(3-13) 
)49 
x. e X. 
-1 
The following remark which is really a statement of the interaction 
balance principle given as a definition of coordinatability by Mesarovic, 
Macko and Takahara [84, p. 100] shows the relationship between the 
optimal solutions to the subordinate's problem (problem SB i (p)) and 
the optimal solutions for problem P.
8 
Remark 3.1  
If an optimal solution for problems SB i (p) (1=1,...,n) has the 
property that z. = j1 E h.(xj
) (i=1,...,n) then that solution is optimal 
=   
jOi 
for problem P. 
The proof is trivial. Remark 3.1 implies that if a vector, p i , 
i=1,...,n could be found so that the optimal solutions to SB i , i=1,...,n, 
satisfy (3-11) then the organization's decision problem is solved. The 
superordinate's task is to choose p i for i=1,...,n. Thus, the is 
serve as coordination mechanisms which the superordinate is free to 
manipulate. 
For a general two level organization with n subordinates, the 
balance principle results in an increase in the number of decision 
variables of an amount equal to the number of coupling constraints for 
each subordinate's problem. 
The procedure for finding the optimal prices, p i , (assuming 
8The assumption is that constraints like (3-3) are not present. 
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of course that they exist) could be iterative, and a procedure similar 
to the information exchange given in the previous section could be used. 
Thus, the superordinate passes down prices, and receives some information 
about the solution to each of the subordinates' problems. Although the 
iterative procedure for finding the "balanced" prices is much the same as 
before, the economic interpretation for them is different. Lasdon and 
Schoeffler [73] allude to the interpretation of prices using the inter-
action balance principle, however to the author's knowledge no one has 
pointed out their difference from the economist's prices and the 
significance of the difference. 
Suppose that an organization's objective function is to maximize 
profit. As Mesarovic, Macko and Takahara [84] point out, under balanced 
pricingthesubordinate'sproblem(problemS13.(0) has constraint 
(3-13) whereas the subordinate's problem (problem S i (X)) before did not. 
In effect, the superordinate is allowing the subordinate to share in 
making the organization's resource allocation decision. For example, 
subordinate i has decision variables x. and z.. x. is a vector of -a 	-a -a 
activity levels while z represents the vector of organizational resources 
which are to be made available to the other subordinates. The objective 
function for subordinate i, (3-12) is composed of three components. 
f.(x.) is again the contribution of subordinate its activities to 
organizational profit. The component .E 	u t h.(x.) is the charge 
,1=4-j -a -a 
made against subordinate i for consuming organizational resources. 
This component is exactly like the term X 1 'h.(x.) with the pricing - -a -a 
scheme discussed earlier. The third component, 14.'z i 
 represents the 
-a - 
contribution by the rest of the organization to organizational profit. 
Thus, the Kth component of 21 represents the contribution to profit 
per unit of the Kth resource used by the other n-1 subordinates. 
Therefore, subordinate i's objective is to maximize the contribution to 
profit from all subordinates minus a penalty for using organizational 
resources to pursue his own activities. 
In terms of information, the superordinate communicates to each 
subordinate two vectors of prices. One vector,E E. 	represents 
-  
the prices to be paid by subordinate i for the use of organizational 
resources. The other vector, p., represents a measure of the aggregate 
profit per unit of resource allocated to the rest of the organization. 
In balanced pricing the pricing vectors communicated to each subordinate 
may be different, whereas with the other pricing mechanism, the 
information communicated to each subordinate was the same. Also, the 
subordinate has available more information for his decision, i. e., 
he now knows something about how his efficiency compares to that of the 
rest of the organization. This additional information can provide a 
method of "alternative testing" [103, p. 7] because it allows the sub-
ordinate to compare his contribution to profit against the contribution 
to profit of the rest of the organization. Thus, such information 
could serve as an impetus for the subordinate's improvement. 
Coordination through balanced pricing seems much like load-type 
coordination as described by Messarovic, Macko and Takahara [84, p. 59]. 
They describe load-type coordination as the case when subordinate units 
explicitly recognize the existence of other decision units on the same 
level and the superordinate unit provides the subordinate units with a 
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model of the relationship between its action and the response of the system. 
The information communicated upward from the subordinate to 
the superordinate consists only of an aggregate allocation for itself 
and for the rest of the organization. For example, subordinate i 
could send to the superordinate values of f.(x.), h.(x.) and z.. 
1 --9_ 	—1 —1 
Thus, the subordinate is not specifying how the resources to be allocated 
to the other subordinates, z i , is to be divided between them. 
In comparison to the pricing scheme described in the previous 
section, balanced pricing provides and, in fact, requires that more 
information be communicated both upward and downward. Also, balanced 
pricing results in a larger (in terms of the number of variables and 
constraints) subordinate's problem than the other pricing scheme. 
Other than the possible behavioral advantages associated with a 
balanced pricing scheme, the question remains as to whether coordination 
through balanced pricing works under more general conditions. Unfor-
tunately, it does not appear that the additional communication required 
in balanced pricing does not make the existence conditions more general 
as the next section will show. 
Existence Conditions for Pricing  
This section answers the question of, under what mathematical 
conditions can one guarantee that a set of prices exists which allow 
the superordinate to coordinate the activities of the subordinates. 
In other words, when can one be assured that there exists 	and 
k.,* such that when these prices are announced to the subordinates, the 
subordinates will solve problem S i (A*) and find an optimal solution to 
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problem P with no additional information from the superordinate. The 
strategy taken is to briefly sketch the historical developments with 
respect to the existence conditions and to provide some motivation, 
through examples, for the discussion. The theoretical development is 
restricted to the pricing scheme given initially on pages 36 - 38. 
However, analogous results can be given for the case of balanced pricing. 
The reader should recognize that the concern is with existence 
conditions for pricing for decentralization. The discussion is not 
intended to focus on issues of price directive approaches for solving 
mathematical programming problems, e. g., see [20, 54]. 
Koopmans [65], Arrow and Hurwicz [10], Uzawa [114], and Whinston 
1119] have all suggested that in problem P if the objective function 
(3-1) is strictly concave, and the constraints are convex and satisfy a 
constraint qualification, then coordinating prices do exist. However, 
the author has been unable to find a formal proof given to support 
this hypothesis in their work. Recently, Moeseke and Ghellinck [85] 
and tenKate [113] have given formal proofs for similar existence state-
ments. The proofs rely heavily on the Kuhn-Tucker saddlepoint and 
stationary point conditions. 9 
The first rigorous analysis of the price existence question 
seems to have been given by Charnes, Clower, and Kortanek [30]. They 
proposed the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.2 (Charnes, Clower, and Kortanek [30])  
Suppose an optimal solution x.* (i=1,...,n) exists for problem 
P, and suppose the following conditions are met 
9See Mangasarian [79] for a detailed discussion. 
n 
E T.(h.(x.*)) 	< . -a -a -a 
1=1 
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(a) f.(x.) is strictly concave on X. 
(b) constraints (3-2) and (3-3) are linear, 
then there exists al* and 	such * that when the subordinate solves 
problem S.(A*), an optimal solution is x.*. The proof given by Charnes,  
et al. [30, p. 304] uses arguments from semi-infinite programming. The 
assumption in theorem 3.2 of linearity avoids certain problems which can 
occur and which require satisfaction of a constraint qualification.
10 
Theorem 3.3 allows one to ascertain whether some solution, x. 
(i=1,...,n) is optimal with respect to the organization's objective fun-
ction, (3-4). 
Theorem 3.3 (Lasdon [72, p. 84])  
If given some X
1 
 * > 0, X 	> 0, x
1 
 *: i=1,...,n is optimal for 
- - -2   
..,n and if 
n 
E h.(x.*) < b, 
. - - 
1=1 
problem S i : 1 
n 
X *' ( E 	h
1 
 (x *) - b) = 0, and 









See Mangasarian 179, p. 94]. 
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then x.*, i=1,...,n is optimal for problem P. 
Proof: By hypothesis xi*, i=1,...,n is feasible for problem P. Since 
x.* is optimal for problem S. then -s 	 1' 
fi ( lci* ) - 	 4" (1-4 ( 1.'i* )) 	fi(4 )- 211*'( -11.1. (4 ))- 
- 2,r(Ii (12,( Li )) 
for all x. e X. 
-a 
Thus, summing over all i and using (3-14) and (3-15) gives 
n 	 n 	 n 	 n 
E f.(x.*) > 	
. 




1 1 1 - -2 -a -a 1 - 1=1 
	
	 =1 
for all x. s X. -a 	1 
but 
n 	 n 
E h.(x.) < b 	and 	E 	.(h.(x.)) < a 1 	— — i=1 i=1 T-1 -1  
must be satisfied, therefore 
n 	 n 
E f.(x.*) > 	E 	f.(x.) 1 	- 1. i=1 1=1 
for all x.
s 
 feasible to problem P. Thus, 
- 
for problem P. 
i=1 5 ...,n must be optimal 
The converse of the theorem is false as demonstrated by tenKate 
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[113, p. 7' 1 1]. The reason related to the possibility of non-convexities 
in the PR space which is the cartesian product of the objective function 
value and the constraint function space. These problems have been 
analyzed in detail by Falk [44]. 
Theorem 3.3 provides a mechanism for ensuring that an optimal 
solution has been found. The result is appealing because no convexity 
requirements are needed. However, since in general the converse is 
false, if the superordinate was to use the conditions in theorem 3.3 as a 
basis for stopping the information exchange procedure, the iterative 
process might never end. This is true because without additional 
restrictions the conditions of theorem 3.3 are sufficient but not 
necessary for an optimal solution to problem P. 
The converse of theorem 3.3 can be proven if the hypothesis is 
strengthened. 
Theorem 3. 1 (Mangasarian [79])  
If xi* (i=1,...,n) is an optimal solution to problem P and if the 
following conditions hold 
(a) f.(x.) is concave for x.1
s X. (i=1,...,n), 
 1 
(b) h.(x.) and T.(h.(x.)) are convex vector functions on -1 -1 	-s -s -s 
X., (i=1,...,n) 
(c) and (3-2) and (3-3) satisfy a constraint qualification, 
then conditions (3-14) and (3-15) hold. 
The proof is a direct result of the Kuhn-Tucker saddle -point 
necessary optimality theorem [79, P. 79]. The results of theorems 
3.3 and 3.4 can provide for the superordinate a mechanism for deter- 
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mining whether a solution, x. (i=l,...,n), found by the subordinates, 
is optimal for the organization's resource allocation problem. The 
only information that the superordinate needs is h i (x.*) and 
T. 	
-s
(h.(x.*)) for i=1,...,n, and an assurance that subordinate i 
-s -s  
maximized his portion of the objective function. Thus, it is not 
necessary that the superordinate know the objective function of each 
subordinate. 
So far, no assertions have been made about when the prices X i* 
and An* actually exist. One might suspect that the existence of 
coordinating prices is tied directly to the Kuhn Tucker saddle point 
necessary conditions, i. e., concavity of objective, convexity of con-
straints, and satisfaction of a constraint qualification. However, 
as Baimiol and Fabian [19], and Charnes, Clower, and Kortanek [30] 
have pointed out if problem P is linear, it may be impossible to 
coordinate using prices. Remember that being able to coordinate means 
that if a subordinate is given pricing vectors, X 1 and 12 , he can find 
his portion of the optimal solution without any additional information. 
The failure in linear problems can be attributed to the existence of 
multiple solutions to the subordinate's problem. In mathematical  
decomposition theory this is not a problem because additional procedures 
such as taking convex combinations can beused. However, from a 
decentralization interpretation this is a problem. Theorem 3.5 rules 
out these alternative optima. 
Theorem 3.5 (Moeseke and Ghellinck [85, p. 75]  
Suppose an optimal solution xi* (i=1,...,n) for problem P 
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exists. If the following conditions hold 
(a) f.(x.) is strictly concave on x., 
(b) (3.2) and (3.3) satisfy a constraint qualification, 11 and 
(c) h.(x.) and W.(h.(x.)) are convex on the convex set X.. —1 
Then there exists vectors of prices, X
1 	X * and *' such that if subordinate  
i solves problem S i (X*) he finds x.*. 
The existence of multiple alternative optima to the subordinate's 
problem, S.(X*) for the optimal coordinating price can be a problem 
when only some of the optima are optimal for problem P. Theorem 3.5 
avoids this difficulty by requiring f i to be strictly concave, and thus 
have a unique maximum. As it is shown shortly a linear form for problem 
P often results in multiple optima. 
Obviously, the above theorems prove only the existence of prices 




 However, the conditions in the theorem's hypothesis do say 
something about when decentralized resource allocation decision making 
in a hierarchy can be coordinated by the pricing mechanism. First, 
condition (a) in theorem 3.5 requires that the objective function 
of each subordinate have decreasing returns to scale. Thus, constant 
returns to scale (linear) do not qualify. Condition (c) requires that 
as the decision variables for a subordinate change, the change in a 
constraint function must take place at least as rapidly as a constant 
liNote that problems S i (X) are not subject to a constraint qualification 
[85, p. 75]. 
12
It should be clear that these optimal prices are the dual variables 
associated with the dual of problem P. 
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times the decision variable. 
In an actual organization one could get some idea of whether 
coordination through pricing might have hope of succeeding by examining 
the form of its objectives and technological restrictions. Although 
it is likely that most organizations do not explicitly quantify the 
objective function and constraints and treat their resource allocation 
problem as an optimization problem, the results of this section indicate 
that only under quite restrictive conditions can coordination through 
prices be achieved. Perhaps this explains why there appear to be 
few examples of where a "real world" organization coordinates through the 
pricing mechanism. 
The hypothesis of theorem 3.5 clearly rules out an interesting 
class of problems, viz., linear problems, because linear functions are 
not strictly concave. However, since the optimal coordinating prices 
are simply the optimal dual variables, and since optimal dual variables 
for linear problems are well understood, one might wonder what the 
difficulty is. The following example shows that in a linear problem 
if the optimal dual variables are used as prices, the subordinates' 
problems can have multiple alternative optimal solutions. 
Example 3.2  






subject to: X1 
 + X2 







x ' x2 
 < 0 
The optimal solution to this problem is X i* = 1, X2* = 0. The usual 










subject to: 	X1 





The subordinates problems are now 
maximize 2X1-1X1 and maximize X2-XX2 
6o 
subject to: Xi < 2 
Xl  > 0 
subject to: X2 
 < 3 
X
2 
 > 0 
From duality theory it can be shown that X* = 2. However, from the 
decentralization viewpoint X* = 2 causes subordinate l's objective 
function to vanish. Therefore, given X* = 2 subordinate 1 is in-
different toward any feasible solution, i.e., 0 < X i < 2. 	In terms 
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of mathematical decomposition subordinate 1 can be forced to select 
Xi = 2. However, in order to do so some additional information other 
than a price must be communicated. This additional information 
violates the thesis's assumption regarding decentralization through 
pricing. 
In example 3.2 the reason that both subordinates cannot find 
the overall optimal solution by prices alone is because of the linearity 
in the problem. In general, it is impossible to achieve coordination 
with respect to the superordinate's objective function for a linear 
problem. 
Recall that the balanced pricing scheme appeared to provide for 
the communication of more information than the other pricing scheme. 
This might lead one to suspect that balanced prices might exist under 
more general conditions. The author has found no statement concerning 
existence conditions for balanced prices, but it can be easily shown 
that the results in theorem 3.5 also hold for balanced pricing. In 
addition the author has been unable to show that balanced pricing does 
work under more general conditions.
13 
Algorithms for Finding Coordinating Prices  
As it was mentioned in the previous section the coordinating 
prices are really the dual variables associated with the coupling 
constraints in problem P. The theory of mathematical programming also 
is concerned with finding these prices because there is a strong 
analogy between solving the organization's problems by 
13
In particular) linear models have been extensively investigated and 
the conclusions are the same as with the other pricing scheme. 
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breaking it into n parts, assigning a subordinate to each one, and 
decomposing a large mathematical programming problem. In fact, the 
development of decomposition approaches has supplied most of the 
algorithms which can be interpreted as procedures for describing the 
coordination process in hierarchical decentralized organizations. 
It is not the purpose of this reaearch to discuss at length 
all or even most of the decomposition algorithms which have been 
proposed. There exist excellent discussions from a mathematical 
standpoint in [5)f, 72]. However, to demonstrate that procedures 
exist by which a superordinate can coordinate the activities of subor-
dinates in certain cases, some representative algorithms are discussed. 
With each of the algorithms to be mentioned, close attention is paid 
to the economic interpretation for the procedure. 
Dantzig-Wolfe [37, 38]  
Dantzig and Wolfe were the first to propose an algorithm which 
could be interpreted as representing decision making in a decentralized 
structure for a linear problem. Although a linear problem does not 
satisfy the existence conditions a pricing approach can be used to find 
the optimal solution. However, the subordinate decision makers cannot 
make the final decision. To show this and to illustrate the algorithm, 
consider the problem facing an organization comprised of two divisions. 
Division 1 can produce any of p 1 products while division 2 can produce 
any of p2 commodities. In order to produce a product a division requires 
organizational resources, e. g., money, manpower, etc. 	In addition, 
there may exist constraints on the way organizational resources are 
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used. The constraints on the supply of organizational resources and 
the way they are used can be expressed via 
+ "22se rb . 
In addition, each division has technological and other restrictions 
on its production capacity which are expressed as: A ix. < C.. 
The linear programming problem for this situation is: 
maximize 	P = 	+ f:2
T x - -2 
subject to: Hx +Hx < b 
1-1 2-2 -- 
A x C 
11 
A212 	< - -2 
x-
1' x > 0 2  
where'f.= 
Pi  x 1 vector of profit coefficients -a  
H.1  =mx Pi  matrix 
x. =P
i  . x 1 vector of outputs for division i 
LetS.1  ={x.IA1 
 .x:<C.,x;>01andsupposeS.is bounded. 14 Any -a 	-1 - 	- 	 1 
point in S i can be written as a convex combination of extreme points 
i  [72], i. e., if x. c S.
1  then x.a  = E X.
J xJ., X.i  > 0, E X.
J 	 i = 1, and x is an  1-1    
J 	 J 
extreme point of Si . Thus, the above problem can be written as: 
maximize E ( 'xJ )A J + E (f 'xiC ) XK  1 1 1 K -2 -2 2
14 
This assumption can be relaxed 138, p. 773], but it is made here to 
simplify developments. 
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subject to: (H1x1j)Xj, 	(H x K)A2K b  K 
(3-16) 
1 





X 1i, 	2 
X 	> 0 
= 1 (3-18) 
This problem is the coordinator's problem and has decision variables, 
Ai and X2 . Using a column generating procedure, the xi and x2 
vectors are generated as needed. The usual simplex optimality criterion 
requires that 
min (H xi )' 	7 - f tx11 > 0 11 -0 	1 	1 -71 — 
and 
min (H X 	7 4' 7
2 
- 	> 0 
2-2 -o 	 2 -2 K 
where 	' 7 u 
and 7
2 
are the dual variables associated with (3-16), 
-o 
(3-17), and (3-18), respectively. Thus, in order to choose X i 1 
to enter the basis, the subproblem 
maximize' 	- (H1x1 ) 1 20 = (f1 - H 10 -I 
subject to: Li 
x1  > 0 -- - 
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are solved by the division one. The economic interpretation is 
that the divisions are charged by the central unit for usage of the 
organizational resources; rr o being a vector of prices. 
Figure 3 illustrates the iterative information exchange which 
takes place between the coordinator (the superordinate) and the divisions 
(subordinates). Initially, the coordinator assigns a price to each 
coupling constraint. Each subordinate uses these prices to solve its 
divisional problem, and then transmits to the coordinator two pieces 
of information: the current objective function value excluding the 
penalty term n 'HK , and HKxic . It is not necessary to transmit xic . The 
coordinator uses this information to arrive at a new pricing vector, 
—o7 , 
and the process begins anew. It can be guaranteed that at each 
stage the overall solution's objective function value increases and 
that the process converges in a finite number of iterations. The 
algorithm proceeds like the two phase simplex procedure. In phase I 
an overall feasible solution is sought via penalties for infeasibilities 
[38, p. 772-773]. As soon as a feasible solution is found in the master 
problem, phase II begins. 	In phase II the algorithm is primal feasible, 
so that if the iterative process stops, the organization has a feasible 
but not necessarily optimal solution. As it can be shown this feature 
distinguishes the Dantzig-Wolfe approach from most other pricing 
mechanisms which are dual feasible methods. 
As it was demonstrated in the previous section, often there 
does not exist a set of prices, n , which allow each division to find 
its part of the optimal solution on its own. Hence, the Dantzig-Wolfe 


















Superordinate: Determine if an improving solution can be found. If so, assign 







Superordinate: If no improving solution can be found, communicate optimal 
weighting factors for the subordinates' proposals. 
Stage n 
Subordinate 1: Implement solution. 	Subordinate 2: Implement solution. 
Figure 3. Information Exchange Process Associated the 
Dantzig-Wolfe Procedure. 
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algorithm cannot be conceptualized as decentralized because in the 
end the superordinate unit makes the final decisions by assigning optimal 
weights, Xi and 	to the divisional proposals. Dantzig [36] refers 
to this scheme as centralized planning without complete information. 
This situation is behavorially distressing because the subor-
dinate is not allowed to make the final decision himself. Although 
he provides information to the decision process, i. e., he sends pro-
posals to the superordinate, he is not allowed to choose the final 
allocation plan. Thus, the Dantzig-Wolfe process does not take advantage 
of the motivational potential of a decentralized structure. The super-
ordinate treats the subordinates as if they were information processors. 
This philosophy would seem to correspond with Taylor's idea of scientific 
management [80]. 
To alleviate this drawback Charnes, Clower and Kortanek [30] 
have proposed what they call "pre-emptive goals". This scheme allows 
the superordinate to supply the subordinates with additional infor-
mation, viz, a pre-emptive goal. In their work a division's problem 
is given by: 
maximize 	14 14 - ( H.x.)'ff - M 11 /4. * - H.x. II -o ( 3-19) 
subject to: 	A.x. < C. 1-1 - 
x . > 0 
where M = a large positive number, and 
= a vector of organizational resources which would be used by 
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division i under the optimal overall solution. 
The pre-emptive goal formulation forces each division to get as close 
as possible to a solution which has 11/, - H.x.I1 = 0. Hence, the 
1-1 
pre-emptive goal is to have the j
th 
component of H.x. equal to the j 
th 
1-1 
component of 14_ *. Of all solutions which satisfy this requirement, 
the subordinate attempts to choose that one which maximizes 
f: l x. - (H.x.)I7 . It is not clear why the term (H.x.)'7 is required 
-a. -1 	1-s -0 	 1-1 -o 
because the method can work without it. Unfortunately, such a scheme 
implies that the superordinate knows the solution to the overall 
problem, i. e., he must know how much resource each subordinate should 
get. [33, p. 52]. 
Although Collomb [33] feels that this requirement is too 
restrictive to be useful, the optimal pre-emptive goal / i* can be found 
easily via the Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm. Instead of delegating the 
optimal weights to divisional proposals as the final step in the 
Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm, one can assign the pre-emptive goal y.* = 
H.x.*, where x.* is the overall optimum found by using the optimum 
1-1 	-a 
weights. In effect the superordinate knows what decision the subor-
dinate will make, but he allows the subordinate to calculate it on his 
own. One should also recognize that (3-19) is not linear. This 
problem can be converted to a linear one by using a simple goal 
 formulation, i. e., make y 	= Hix. a constraint and assign large 
penalties for positive and negative deviations for not meeting this 
constraint. Viewed in this way, pre-emptive goals are no longer pricing 
coordination mechanisms, but they are a form of coordination through 
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constraints, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
Balas [15]  
Balas has also proposed an algorithm for finding coordinating 
prices when problem P is linear. The algorithm has been discussed 
elsewhere [20, 54]. His approach is similar to the Dantzig-Wolfe 
algorithm, but he chooses the pricing vector differently. Specifically, 
Balas begins with the optimal solution to each division's problem 
ignoring the coupling constraints. If this solution is feasible for 
the coupling constraints, then it is optimal overall. 
If it is not, then a "linking program" is solved which minimizes 
the amount of infeasibility while still maintaining optimality in the 
sense of the simplex optimality criterion, i. e., dual feasibility is 
maintained. Thus, unlike phase I of the Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm which 
moves toward feasibility as rapidly as possible, Balas constrains the 
move to ensure overall optimality. Thus, the approach is somewhat 
analogous to the primal dual algorithm in linear programming. 
Balas presents two versions of an algorithm for accomplishing 
his purpose. Although in his article he purports that his algorithm 
can be used to bring about decentralized planning, both versions of his 
approach require the superordinate to have much more information than 
is required by other coordination procedures. It is necessary for the 
superordinate to know the current optimal basis for each division 
when he chooses a new pricing vector. Thus, while Balas's algorithm 
may offer computational advantages in solving large linear programming 
problems, it is not an appealing procedure for conceptualizing the 
coordination process in a decentralized hierarchical organization 
because it assumes that the superordinate has extensive information 
about the activities of the subordinates. 
Other AlgOrithtS [14, 19, 55, 56, 72, 119]  
A number of modifications and extensions have been made in the 
Dantzig-Wolfe approach. Whinston [119] and Baumol and Fabian [19] 
relaxed the assumption that all relationships must be linear. They 
show that as long as the divisional constraints yield bounded convex 
regions, then non-linearities are allowed in the divisional constraints. 
Whinston also shows the limitation of a price system when the overall 
problem is not separable. In this conjunction Whinston generalizes 
division K's constraints to the forM 
(3-2 0 ) 
where x
t 
 is under the control of division t. Thus, the division's 
activities are interdependent. This is called an externality and can 
be handled by introducing an additional variable, Et so that (3-20) is 
now 
st ) LEK 
An additional constraint x = st 
 is added to the coordinator's problem 
and treated as a coupling constraint. However, as Ruefli points out 
[90, p. 56] this can result in multiple prices being generated. 
Using Wolfe's simplex method for quadratic programming [124] and 
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Dorn's duality theory for quadratic programming [40], Hass [55,56] has 
developed a decomposition approach for problem P when the objective 
function is quadratic and the constraints are convex. He also allows 
a simple kind of externality in the objective function. Hass's 
algorithm can be used as a step by step process description of 
coordination through pricing when the objective function is quadratic. 
It is well understood that the pricing mechanism derived earlier 
using the Lagrangian is a dual approach because the prices are the dual 
variables. Lasdon [72, pp. 396, 458] and Grinold [54] present an 
excellent discussion of the theory and algorithms for these methods. 
Their discussion is not repeated here; however, it is useful for 
later work (in Chapter V) to present a very rudimentary algorithm due to 
Uzawa [114] and discussed by Jennergren [60]. 
Suppose the organization's problem is given by problem P. 
Uzawa's price adjustment rule searches for an optimal price vector 
through the following two step procedure: 
(1) The superordinate announces a tentative set of pricing 
vectors, 4
t 
and 	 For a given alt and 2.2t subordinate i solves its 
problem(problemS.(Xt )). Subordinate i then communicates to the 
superordinate the vectors, h.(c.
t 
 ) and T.(h.(c.
t 




-a -a 	-a -a -a 	 -a 
, optimal for problem 	/ t). 
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)) = the j component of .(h.k.x.
t ))) at iteration t, and 
13 -a 	 1 
B = a "sufficiently small" [113, p. 156] positive scaler. 
t+1 
Iteration t+1 is initiated by the superordinate announcing X i and 
+1 Given that the hypothesis of theorem 3.5 is satisfied, it can be 
shown that this algorithm converges to the optimal set of coordinating 
prices and hence to the optimal solution to problem P. 
It should be noted that the information flows required for 
execution of the above price adjustment rule are nominal. The super-
ordinate announces a set of prices for use by all the subordinates. 
Each subordinate then communicates information about h.(x.) and -a -a 
T.(h.(x.)). It is not necessary to send information about the current 
a 
objective function value. Thus, the superordinate need not concern 
himself with the objective function. 
Recently, Jennergren [60, 61] has presented an algorithm which 
can be used to conceptualize the coordination procedure for a linear 
problem. The method uses price schedules instead of pricing vectors. 
Since it is known that in a decentralized setting, a pricing coordin-
ation mechanism by itself cannot work for a linear program, Jennergren 
used duality theory to show how a set of coordinating price schedules 
could work. In effect these pricing schedules cause a subordinate's 
problem to be quadratic, and thus can eliminate the difficulties of 
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multiple optima. The contribution is that using Jennergren's scheme, 
coordination through pricing alone can allow each subordinate to find 
the optimal solution. 
In presenting a limited number of algorithms as has been done, 
an attempt has been made to demonstrate that most computational solution 
procedures can be interpreted as an iterative exchange of information 
between the superordinate and the subordinates. The information 
communicated downward is in the form of a price for each coupling 
constraint. The information communicated upward is a solution, 
or some characteristics of a solution such as the profit or amount of 
organizational resources used by the solution. Table 1 summarizes the 
relevant features of the algorithms which have been discussed. 
Conclusions  
This chapter has attempted to present a thorough discussion and 
synthesis for coordination through goal intervention when the super-
ordinate's objective function is equal to the sum of the subordinates' 
objective functions. These coordination mechanisms are called pricing 
approaches because they can be interpreted as assigning prices to 
constraints which couple the subordinates together. It was shown how 
the pricing schemes are derived from the general model given in Chapter 
II. The existence conditions for coordinating prices were stated, 
and several algorithms were discussed for conceptualizing the infor-
mation exchange between superordinate and subordinates. 
Historically, economists have applied pricing approaches to 
model decentralization in a competitive economic system. The value of 
Table 1. Summary of Some Representative Pricing Algorithms. 
Type of Model 	Algorithm 	 Features 
Linear 	 Dantzig-Wolfe (1958) 	1. Primal feasible after a 
[37,38] 	 certain point. 
2. Converges finitely 
Complications  
1. Behavioral Disadvantage: 
Superordinate must make 
final decision for 
subordinates. 
Balas (1 966) 115] 1. Prices are based on amount 1. 
of infeasibility in primal 
problem. 
2. Finite Convergence. 
3. Dual feasible (but not 	2. 
primal feasible until final 
iteration). 
Behavioral Disadvantage: 
Superordinate must make 
final decision for 
subordinates. 
The superordinate must 
know the subordinates 




1. Uses a price schedule for 1. 
each subordinate instead 
of a single price. 
2. Converges finitely. 
3. Primal feasible. 
4. Subordinate's objective 
function is quadratic. 
The optimal dual 






Hass (1967) [56] 1. Can handle simple exter-
nalities in the objective 
function. 
2. Primal feasible. 
3. If objective function has 
no externalities and is 
strictly concave, then 
the optimal prices can 
be found. 
1. Not necessarily finite. 
2. With externalities the 
superordinate must make 
final decision for 
subordinates. 
Table 1. (Continued) 
















Lasdon and Schoeffler 
(1966) 	173] 




Dual Feasible (but not 
primal feasible). 
Not necessarily finite. 
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such models in the context of decentralized hierarchical resource 
allocation decision making processes is limited by such properties as: 
(1) Most pricing approaches are not primal feasible (with 
some exceptions, e.g., Dantzig-Wolfe) which means that if the 
iterative process of information exchange between superordinate and 
subordinates terminates before an optimal solution has been found, 
then the current plan of resource allocations may be infeasible with 
respect to the coupling constraints. 
(2) The conditions under which one can guarantee that there 
exists a set of prices which when communicated to the subordinates will  
allow them to find an overall optimum solution without any additional 
information, are quite restrictive and difficult to check, i.e., the 
objective function must be strictly concave, and the constraints must 
be convex and satisfy a constraint qualification. Several methods 
including the Dantzig-Wolfe procedure are often called pricing 
approaches, but they require that the superordinate communicate additional 
information to the subordinates other than just prices. 
(3) The author has yet to find a description of a "real world" 
organization which uses a pricing approach for coordinating resource 
allocation decisions except under very special circumstances. 15 
The conclusions are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1  
A hierarchical decentralized (cooperative) organization which 
uses a pricing procedure to coordinate resource allocation decisions may 
15
These special circumstances refer to the use of transfer pricing which 
applies only when a multi-division organization sells products between 
divisions. 
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not arrive at an optimal solution with respect to the overall utility 
function if any of the following conditions are present 
(1) there exist nonlinear dependencies (externalities) 
between decision making units at the same level; 
(2) the overall utility function does not display strict 
decreasing returns to scale; or 
(3) the constraint functions are not convex. 
CHAPTER IV 
COORDINATION THROUGH CONSTRAINT ilITTANENTION IN A 
COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION: RESOURCE BUDGETiNG APPROACHES 
This chapter presents and analyzes models of constraint inter-
vention when the superordinate's objective function is equal to the sum 
 of the subordinates' objective functions. Such techniques are often 
called resource budgeting methods because the superordinate coordinates 
the activities of the subordinates by specifying how much of each organ-
izational resource is available for a subordinate 16 . Thus, in a resource 
budgeting method the superordinate sets a resource budget for each sub- 
ordinate. 
There is a direct relationship between resource budgeting and 
pricing approaches [46, p. 376]. The distinction between the two 
amounts to resource budgeting approaches being primal methods while 
pricing methods are usually dual methods. As it will be shown it is 
quite easy to guarantee that throughout a resource budgeting coordination 
process, a feasible solution to the organization's problem is maintained. 
In the opinion of the author resource budgeting coordination 
mechanisms are used in the budgeting process of many organizations and 
economic systems. For example, Kornai and Liptak describe the current 
16In the literature of mathematical programming the resource budgeting 
methods are often called resource directive approaches [46, 102] and 
coordination through direct means [96, 113]. These terms are purposely 
avoided to minimize possible misinterpretations and to emphasize interest 
with the conceptual decentralized allocation process. 
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planning practice for a socialist economic system in the following way: 17 
"The National Planning Bureau, acting on the basis of the require-
ments of economic policies and of general information about the 
various sectors, works out a preliminary draft plan which contains 
general targets (quota figures) for the sectors. The centre makes 
a provisional distribution of the available resources, material, 
manpower, etc. among the sectors, and at the same time also allocates 
their output targets. The sectors then proceed, through their own 
detailed calculations made on the basis of their concrete conditions, 
to give "substance" to the quotas and to lend concrete meaning to 
the central targets. In so doing, they also make recommendations 
for changes to the Planning Bureau. This is what is in economic 
usage called "counter-planning". On the basis of the counter-plans 
the National Planning Bureau modifies its original targets and again 
sends them down to the sectors. The method proposed here is an 
attempt to aid this process of planning and counter-planning by means 
of objective criteria. 
The procedure recommended also simulates the usual practice of 
planning in another respect. It repeatedly happens that the centre 
gives the sectors certain directives and asks them to report on 
the degree of economic efficiency with which the task can be carried 
out. The sectors express the efficiency of their activities through 
various "indices of economic efficiency", whose structure is pre-
scribed by the centre." [66, p. 143] 
In many organizations resource allocation budgeting decisions are made 
via an iterative process whereby a superordinate sets tentative resource 
budgets for subordinates. Given a tentative budget a subordinate decision 
unit decides how it would use the budget and what value would result 
from its plan. Using this information the superordinate may adjust the 
budget and the process starts over. This simplified description repre-
sents the major aspects of how a resource budgeting approach works. 
In this chapter the resource budgeting mechanism will be derived 
from the general model given in chapter II. Next, the existence 
17Recall that an organization is viewed as a goal seeking system, and 
hence an economic system can be thought of as an organization [78]. 
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conditions under which resource budgeting techniques coordinate in a 
cooperative organization are stated. Using a framework suggested by 
Geoffrion [46] three basic strategies for the development of resource 
directive algorithms (an algorithm can be used to describe the coordination 
through budgeting process) are discussed from the viewpoint of what 
information must be communicated between superordinate and the sub-
ordinates. As Geoffrion states, 
"The economic interpretations and implications of information flows 
and the resource directive and price directive mechanisms are quite 
interesting from the point of view of the decentralized organization. 
Many aspects of the resource directive approaches mentioned here 
have yet to be systematically studied from the economic viewpoint." 
[46, p. 400] 
The main result in this chapter is to study and discuss the economic 
and behavorial interpretations and implications of coordination via 
a resource budgeting method for each of Geoffrion's three strategies. 
Derivation of the Resource Budgeting Mechanism  
Given that the superordinate's objective function is equal to the 
sum of the subordinate's objective functions, the general model expressed 
in (2-1) to (2-6) can be written as a single optimization problem: 
Problem R  
maximize 
n 
E 	f. (X.) 
i=1 1 -1 
n 







E 	(gi ) < 
i=1 
(4-2) 
_hi (_ix ) _< 2,1 	for i = 1 , . • 	5 n 	 (4-3) 
x. e X. 
-1 	1 
Problem R can be partitioned up into n parts and the resulting decision 
problem for subordinate i is: 
Problem R.(a.) 
1 	2. 
maximize 	 f. (x,) 
1 —2 
Subject to: 	h. (x.) < a. 
- -1  
X. 6 X. 
-1 
The superordinate's task is to iteratively choose ai for i = 1, . 
n, such that 
n 







E T.(a.) < 
- 
i=1 
until an optimal solution is found. 
An important distinction should be made concerning problem R 
and the overall problems studied by others [46, 72, 102, 113]. The 
constraint (4-2) is not included in these other studies. In this 
chapter the Ti(ai) functions are not divided -up and assigned to sub-
ordinate i as they would be in the other studies. Here the Ti(a.) 
functions remain as part of the constraints in the superordinate's 
problem. Hence, it is not required that the subordinates know or be 
concerned with constraint (4-2). In addition, even though (4-2) is 
written in a separable way, it is not necessary that it be separable. 
Therefore, (4-2) could be given by 1.(al , . • *) 	< ILand the theorems 
which are developed later still hold. 
If one considers problem R as the resource allocation problem 
facing a two level profit maximizing organization, the resource 
budgeting coordination mechanism can be interpreted in the following 
way. The superordinate allocates a vector of resources, a., to sub- 
n 
ordinate i. The selection of 21 is performed so that E a i < b and 
n 	 i=1 
E 1i(21 ) La. Upon receiving the vector of resources, a i , sub-
i=1 
ordinate i solves his decision problem, Ri(a i ). This is much like the 
subordinate getting a tentative budget to be used in carrying on his 
activities. The solution to R.(ad  )' x4 ' represents a potential profit 
to the organization of f i (xi ). Each subordinate communicates to the 
superordinate his contribution to organizational profit and some 
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summary information about his his profit would change if changes were 
made in the components of 22 . Using this information the superordinate 
determined if a choice of a new set of a.'s could improve the total -s 
profit, if such a set of 	exists he communicates to the superordinate 
his contribution to organizational profit and some summary information 
about how his profit would change if changes were made in the components 
of a.. Using this information the superordinate determines if a 
-a 
choice of a new set of a.'s could improve the total profit. If such a 
-a 
set of a.'s exists he communicates them to the subordinates who resolve 
their problem, etc. The process iterates until the superordinate can 
find no way to further improve total profit. 
All three strategies for algorithms suggested by Geoffrion can 
be interpreted in the above manner. However, from the viewpoint of a 
decentralized organization, all three strategies differ in the type and 
amount of information which a subordinate must communicate to the super - 
ordinate. It is important to understand if these three strategies make 
assumptions about what information must be communicated which is 
unrealistic from a behavioral viewpoint. 
The next two sections will address the following two questions 
about the iterative process described above: (1) Under what conditions 
does there exist a set of a.'s which when assigned to the subordinates 
generate an overall optimal solution? (2) Given this optimal set of a.'s 
exist, what algorithms are available for finding them? 
Existence Conditions  
No as No assumptions are required in order to prove that a set of 
coordinating allocations exist as the following theorem demonstrates 
Theorem 4.1  
* 	. 
Suppose there exists an optimal solution x i (a. = 1, . . . , n) 
to problem R, then there exists a set of al
*  (i = 1, . . . , n) which 
when allocated to subordinate i, generates an optimal solution to 
problem R. 
Proof: 




 ) and solve problem R
i  ka ) to get i (x*) -4 





x. Thus, f.( 	 1 i.) > f.(x.) for all x.e X. and E f(x.) > E f (x.). 
i=1 -s 1 -a 	
1 	 — — 
i=1 
i -a 
Therefore, since x i* was optimal, it must be true that 
n 
E 	f.(7c..) = 	f.(x. ). 1 	 1 -1 i=1 i=1 
In spite of the simplicity of this result, the ramifications 
of Theorem 4.1 are remarkable. It means that a resource budgeting 
approach can work under any circumstances. Unfortunately, the pro-
cedure for finding the optimal a i 's by the iterative interplay 
between superordinate and subordinate cannot be guaranteed to work 
under all conditions. 
Recently, ten Kate [11]] has proposed necessary conditions 
for an optimal solution when using a resource budgeting procedure. 
18Both Silverman [102, p. 61] and Geoffrion [4o, p. 380] state a some-




The conditions which are stated in his "direct distribution" theorem 
are theoretically valid, but of little use from an applications view-
point. In order to indicate why, his result is given in Theorem 4.2. 
Theorem 4.2 (ten Kate [113])  
Suppose problem R satisfies a constraint qualification and the 
constraints represent in (4-2) are not present. If f i (x.) and h.(x.) 
are differentiable and x.
1
*, a.* is optimal for problem R, then Tr.*, the 
- -s 
vector of optimal dual variables for (4-3), is also an optimal dual  
variable for (4-4) in problem Ri (ai *). 
The proof as given by ten Kate [113, p. 737] depends on the Kuhn 
Tucker stationary point conditions. The significance of the theorem 
would seen to be that if during the iterative exchange between super-
ordinate and subordinates, a solution is generated by the subordinates, 
and the shadow prices of each subordinate are not equal, then the 
superordinate knows that this solution is not optimal. Unfortun- 
ately, in terms of practical application this theorem is of 
little value for three reasons: 
(1) Having all the shadow prices for the subordinates 
equal is a necessary but not sufficient condition for overall 
optimality, i.e., if the superordinate chooses this condition as a 
stopping rule for the iterative process he may not get an optimal 
solution, e.g., tenKate [113, p. 740] gives a numerical example. 
(2) If the subordinate's problem has multiple dual optimal 
solutions, i.e., the optimal problem solution is degenerate, then 
even though overall optimality is present the shadow prices for each 
subordinate may be unequal. 
Example 4,1  
Suppose the overall problem is given by: 
maximize 	10X11 + 143(12 + 19X21 + 13X22 
subject to: 	 2X11 3X12 < al 
14X21 3X22 	a2 
a 	a 	< 7 
1 2 
11' Xl2' X21, X22 < 1 
















Using the ai* above the subordinate's problems are: 
Subordinate 1  
maximize 
	 10X11 + 14X12 
86 
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subject to: 	2X11 3X12 3 6 1 ) 
0 < X11, X12 1 11 , 12  
Subordinate 2  
maximize 	 19X21 + 13X22 
subject to: 	4x21 + 3x22 < 	(ir2 ) 
0 < 	X22 5- 1 
The solution to the subordinates problems yields the correct solution. 
However, the dual of subordinate 2 has multiple optimal solutions 19 . 
The extreme point dual optima are u 21 = 13/3 and u 22 = 19/4. The dual 
variable for subordinate 1 is it1 = 14/3. Clearly, u l # u2 unless one 
selects a particular convex combination of u 21 and u22 . In particular, 
if w = 1/5, then 11: 2 = wu2 1 + (1-w) u22 = 14/3, but during the solution 
processit is unlikely that the subordinate would report such a non extreme 
point of value. 
(3) If constraints like (4-2) are present, then tenKate's 
theorem does not hold. Intuitively, the reason is that restrictions 
19The multiplicity of dual solutions indicates that the function vi(a i ) 
= maximum fi (xi ) Subject to: hi (xi ) Lai 
x.a  c X. 
is not differentiable at that value of 24_ which caused the multiple dual 
solutions. [72, p. 471] 
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like (4-2) are not portitioned up and assigned to the subordinates as 
with (4-1). Therefore, whenever there are restrictions on the manner 
in which a budget can be allocated between subordinates, e.g., if the 
defense budget cannot exceed the health, education, and welfare budget, 
then overall optimality is not necessarily confirmed or denied if the 
change in value per unit change in budget for every subordinate is 
equivalent. 
To summarize, the existence conditions for resource directive 
coordination are very general. However, without making additional 
assumptions it is very difficult to ascertain when an optimal solution 
has been reached. 
Resource Budgeting Algorithms  
The section summarizes the key points about the three strategies 
for solving problem R through resource budgeting. It is necessary to 
give a brief mathematical explanation of each strategy so that the 
behavorial implications can be analyzed. The reader who wants more 
mathematical details should see Geoffrion [46] or Lasdon [72]. 
Through the use of a mechanism known as projection 20 problem 
R can be shown to yield the following equivalent problem: 
Problem R'  
maximize 
n 
E v.(a.) -s 
i=1 
  
20For a rigorous discussion of this mechanism see Geoffrion [47]. 
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n 
subject to: 	 E a. < b 
1=1 
n 
E() < n 
— i=1 
a.cr.= 	a. E Em (/1.(x.) < a. for some 	x. e X.1 (4_5) 
- 	 1 
where v.(a.
-1 	 1 
) is the supremal value of problem R.(a.), i.e., 
1 -a v
i  (a.) = sup 
s.t. h.(x.) < a., x.c X. -a —1 '--1 
If -f., h., and T. are convex functions on the convex set X., 
1 -1 	 1 
then it can be established that problem R' is a concave program and 
that r
i is a convex set [46, p. 380]. Therefore, in the context of 
a decentralized organization the superordinate's coordination problem 
can be represented by problem R', and subordinate i's problem can be 
expressed as problem Ri (ai ). However, solving problem R' presents some 
serious difficulties. First, v.(a.), which is a characterization of 1 L 
subordinate i's optimal response as a function of his resource budget, 
is not known explicitly. Secondly, even if vi (ai ) is known, it is not 
differentiable, e.g., see Geoffrion [47], and thus gradient methods 
are not immediately applicable. Finally, without information about 
each subordinate's constraint set, the superordinate cannot guarantee 
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that (4-5) is satisfied. To overcome these difficulties the strategies 
which Geoffrion chose to name as tangential approximation, large step 
subgradient and piecewise approaches can be utilized. Throughout the 
following discussion it is assumed that -f i , hd (x.), and T. are convex 
differentiable functions on the convex set X.. 
1 
Tangential Approximation  
Tangential approximation methods seek to build up a piecewise 
linear approximation or representation to v i () by evaluating the 
tangent of vi (ai ) at various points. If one assumes that the vector 
of dual variables, 7 . associated with (4-4) exists for a given a. , _, 	 --a. 
it can be shown that Tr. is the normal of the tangent to v (a. 	-a ) at a. -a  
[46, p. 381]. Given a = a ,
- 
 the function 
-1 -1 
f.a (x.a ) - 7a a  0.(a. - a.) — ---1 
is a tangent to v.1 (a.a ) at a .a  where x.a  is the optimal solution to 
problem Ri (4 ). In fact with the additional assumptions that f i (xi ) 
andh.1 (x.a )areuppersemicontinuousfunctionsandthat X






v.(a.) = minimum [v.(a.) 1 - .' la. -s - a.)] - 	-s 
a. e P. 
1 
for all a.c r 	[46, p. 381]. -a 
91 
These results suggest that problem R' can be solved by building up a 
better and better approximation of vi in terms of its tangents. In 
Figure 47r. has been evaluated at three points: a. ° , a.1, and a.
2
- 
(The first tangent has slope 7 , the second 7. ° , and the third 7 2 .) 
-1 	 -1 
The resulting approximation for v'(a ) is the piecewise linear function 
formed by taking the minimum of the three supports. Using this approxi- 
mation in place of v, in problem R' might yield a . The evaluation 
1 
of v at a would result in another tangent whose use would improve 
the approximation. Thus, given enough iterations one can get as close 
as desired to the optimal solution. 
Geofrion [46, p. 382] suggests the following solution procedure: 
1.Startingwithasetofeesr.(i = 1, . . . , n) which is 
feasible to the superordinate's constraints (4-1) and (4-2) subordinate 
i solves problem Ri (ai ) to find fi (xi ) and r. Set v = 0. 
2. Solve the following problem which is equivalent to the 
current tangential approximation of problem R'. 
Problem R"  
maximize 	 I a. 
i=1 
subject to: ai < fi (xel ) - Li i '(21J - ai) 
j = 1, . • • 
i = 1, . . • , n 
n 











Figure 4. Construction of Piecewise Linear Approximation 
to v. usipg Tangential Approximation. 
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n 
Ea.) < fl 
—1 —a. 1=1 
a.c 	r. 	1, . . . , n. 
—1 1 
Let a.
v+1 be the optimal solution. 
—1 
3. Subordinate i resolves problem R. (a. 	to find f.(x v+1 ) i 	 1 
and Tr. 1.41 • —a 
4. If a. 1 is sufficiently near optimal in problem R' terminate. 
Otherwise, increase IT by 1 and return to step 2. 
Geoffrion does not prove that such a procedure converges to an 
optimal solution but indicates that "each approach here should converge 
to an optimal solution, if one properly attains to the tactical questions." 
[46, p. 377] In Chapter VI of this dissertation a specific algorithm 
for conceptualizing a coordination procedure is presented and shown to 
converge finitely. This algorithm can be derived using Geoffrion's 
strategy although another development is given there. 
Information concerning upper and lower bounds for the optimal 
objective function value is generated at each iteration of the above 
procedure. Geoffrion [46] shows that at iterationv of the tangential 
. 
approximation procedure the value E a i
v* 
 (where a i
v*  is optimal in 
i=1 
* 
problem R") is an upper bound on E fox i ) the optimal objective 
i=1 - n 





*  ). Therefore at each iteration the superordinate has 
i=1 
some idea of how for from the optimum the current solution is. Another,  
appealing feature of tangential approximation is that the solution, 
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= 1, . . . , n) at each iteration, v , is feasible in terms of 
problem R. Therefore, if the solution algorithm is terminated before 
an optimal solution is found, at least the organization has a solution 
which can be implemented and an indication of how far that solution is 
from being optimal. 
To the author's knowledge no economic interpretation has appeared 
for the tangential approximation procedure. However, there is a very 
straightforward (and probably well known to those in mathematical pro-
gramming) and appealing interpretation available. In step 1 the super-
ordinate is establishing a preliminary tentative resource budget for 
each subordinate i who decides on a resource allocation plan. Sub-
ordinate i then informs the superordinate of the maximum value he 
could attain for that budget. In addition, he informs the superordinate 
of how this value might change if his resource budget were increased 
or decreased. The information communicated to the superordinate corre-
sponds to fi (xi ) and 4. The superordinate uses this information to 
determine if a reapportionment of the resource budget could bring about 
an overall increase in value. If so, he communicates the new budget 
and the process continues. In terms of information flows and the 
iterative nature of the process, the above procedure seems descriptive 
for many organizations. Of course, in actuAl application the procedure 
would iterate only a few times. 
Computationally, the greatest difficulty of the tangential 
approximation mehtod is in handling the restriction expressed in (4-5). 
In the context of a decentralized organization this means that the super- 
ordinate must never assign a resource budget to a subordinate for which 
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he has no feasible solution. Explicitly, such a restriction implies 
that the superordinate knows r i , i.e., he knows the constraint set of 
each subordinate. This violates the informational automony assumption. 
In certain situations the superordinate need not concern himself with 
F.. For example, if subordinate i's problem possesses a feasible 
solution for any non-zero resource budget, then ri = {(1. 6 Era lai 
Often, this is a satisfactory assumption because if subordinate i is 
allocated none of a particular resource, then projects which require 
this resource cannot be undertaken, and thus no value is obtained,from 
the project. In cases, where subordinate i must support a certain pro-
ject, then if subordinate i can communicate to the superordinate, the 
minimum resource budget for which he can attain a feasible solution, 
min then the superordinate can explicitly set Ti = {ai c 0  a 	b. 
where b min  is the minimum budget. It is felt that for most organizations 
either of these two assumptions can be carried out. 
If problem R is linear it is possible to generate r i explicitly. 
Kohler [63] shows that r. can be expressed as a finite collection of 
linear equalities. Kohler [63] and Zschau [127] have presented 
algorithms for generating r i . In fact Zschau shows how r i can be 
generated during the information exchange between superordinate and 
the subordinate. However, to accomplish this the subordinate must 
communicate all extreme points of his constraint set. Therefore, such 
a method involves a substantial increase in the amount of information 
which must be communicated, and as Geoffrion states, "the computational 
burden is likely to be excessive." [46, p. 385] Geoffrion suggests using 
relaxation [47] whereby one temporarily ignores all but a subset of the 
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constraintsdefirlingeachr-Ifaa.1  Vr.is generated then a constraint 
is generated which dissallows this. ten Kate [112] presents a formal 
method for accomplishing the relaxation strategy. The main difficulty 
with using a relaxation strategy is that there does not appear to be 
any meaningful interpretation associated with the information which 
must be communicated to generate the violated constraint. 
Geoffrion [46] also suggests two schemes for generating an 
approximation or representation for r i by: 
(1) Building up an "adequate" outer (containing) polyhedral 
representation as needed based on supporting hyperplanes. 
(2) Building up an adequate inner (contained) polyhedral 
representation as needed based on points in r i . 
However, both these schemes and the relaxation strategy discussed in 
the previous paragraph may be computationally plausible, but they have 
little value in conceptualizing a decentralized planning procedure 
because they either violate the informational autonomy assumption, or 
they require the transmission of information which has no meaningful 
behavorial interpretation. 
Tangential approximation methods can be used to build up a 
piecewise linear representation of the overall objective function as 
a function of the amounts of resources allocated to the subordinates. 
For purposes of describing coordination through budgeting in a decentral-
ized organization tangential approximation strategies are appealing 
only when r i can be described easily. However, it many organizations 
this may be the case. 
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Large Step Subgradient Methods  
Given an initial resource allocation for the subordinates which 
satisfies the constraints of problem R', large step subgradient approaches 
use gradient like procedures to determine a new set of feasible reallo-
cations for the subordinates which improve the overall solution. The 
difficulty of this approach is that v i (ai ) is not differentiable every 
where, and thus a gradient approach cannot be used. However, a method 
which utilizes subgradients is applicable. Geoffrion suggests the 
following procedure: 
(1) Let a.1° , i=1, . . . , n, staisfy the constraints 
n 	 n 
E et° < b and E 	(g.°) 	4 
i=1 	 i=1 i 
Given 	subordinate i solves problem R i (k). 
(2) Determine a "good" improving feasible direction z i at ai ; 
if no improving feasible direction exists, then a. is optimal. 





E v.(a. ° + ez. ° ) 1 1=1 
n 
E ( a. ° + 6 z .°) < b 
i=1 —1 	 — — 
n 
	
E 	a. ° + e z. ° ) < a - 	-- i=1 1 
until the formula changes. 
Denote 	° -1- 00  z by a.3-, and resolve problem R (a.1 ). Return to step 
1 	
0 	
—1 	 i —1 
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(2) with a i° replaced by a i '. 
The primary difficulty is how to carry out step (2). It can 
be shown [46, 102, 127] that the positive directional derivatives of 
v.(a 4) determine the set of all feasible improving directions. The 
1=1 
essential difference between various algorithms is the criteria used to 
select an improving direction. For example, Geoffrion [46] chooses an 
improving feasible direction which maximizes the initial rate of 
improvement. His direction finding problem can be written as a block 
diagonal linear programming problem [46, p. 394] which has coefficients 
representing the gradients of fi , hi , T i , and the gradients of the 
functions defining the set Xi evaluated at the most recent solution 
of problem Ri ai ). 
The interpretation of such a procedure in a resource allocation 
process is that the superordinate fixes a resource budget for each 
subordinate. Each subordinate then solves its problem R i (ai ) for the 
given budget and reports back the gradient of f i , hi , i and the gradient 
of functions defining the set Xi evaluated at the solution found to 
problem P ( ). It is well known that a gradient represents the direction 
i i 
of the greatest local increase in a function evaluated at a given point. 
In the context of a decentralized organization there does not appear to 
be a suitable behavorial interpretation associated with the information 
which must be transmitted from subordinate to superordinate, i.e., the 
gradients of fi , hi , 	 and the functions defining Xi evaluated at the 
current solution. The superordinate uses this information to determine 
a direction z
1
, i = 1, . . . , n to move in changing the previous 
allocations. Finally, if it is desired to find the optimal distance to 
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move along the direction found, the problem in step (3) is solved. To 
solve this problem optimally it is necessary to parametrically solve 
each subordinate's problem, parameterizing over all feasible step sizes, 
e [46, p. 390]. This can be accomplished by each subordinate reporting 
the maximum amount the current budget could be increased before the 
subordinate's objective function ceases to increase. It is not 
necessary to select the optimal step size, but only that the step size 









K + 	) < 
— -1 
i=1 
However, if the optimal step size is not chosen, it would appear that 
the process would converge less rapidly than if it were. 
After choice of a direction and a step size, a new set of budgets 
for the subordinates is chosen, and the process begins over. Thus, one 
can interpret the large step subgradient approach for resource allocation 
in a decentralized hierarchical organization as a process by which 
tentative budgets are iteratively set for subordinates by using certain 
information supplied by the subordinates. However, in terms of a 
decentralized organization the information which is communicated up-
ward does not seem to be a realistic description for the kind of infor-
mation flow which might actually take place. Also, when choosing the 
step size it is necessary to know how large e can be made before 
(a K + Oz ) X 	This requires additional interactions between the 
--1 	--1 
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superordinate and the subordinates. Therefore, large step subgradient 
methods must be considered primarily as computational devices, and not 
as a descriptive model of the budgeting process in a decentralized 
hierarchical organization. 
Examples of algorithms based on the large step subgradient approach 
are given by Brosilow, Lasdon, and Pearson [23], Abadie and Sakorvitch 
[1], Zschau [127] and Silverman [102]. 21 With the exception of Zschau's 
method, these algorithms were developed as a way to solve large mathe-
matical programming problems, and thus their originators were not con-
cerned with any economic interpretations. Zschau's algorithm "did not 
arise out of algebraic concepts, nor was it developed primarily as a 
computational tool. Rather it was developed as a way of formalizing 
an apparently common decision making procedure for decentralized 
organizations," [127, p. 1]. Zschau's procedure is confined to a 
linear problem with the result being that the procedure given earlier 
can be simplified. An important simplification comes in step (2) where 
the superordinate no longer must find the "best" direction for a 
reallocation. In effect, the subordinate no longer need communicate 
the gradients of the functions in his problem but instead reports 
how much he would be willing to pay or how much he would be willing 
to sell a portion of his resources for. This amount depends upon 
the change in the subordinate's objective function. Specifically, 
the subordinate must communicate all "basic" proposals (extreme points 
21Geoffrion [48] and Geoffrion and Hogan [50] have also presented a 
subgradient approach for the general model given in (2-1) to (2-6) 
with the assumption that the superordinate's objective function is a 
concave funtion of v.(a.), the subordinate's optimal response. 
1 —a_ 
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of his constraint set) for each tentative resource budget set by the 
superordinate. The superordinate uses this information to arrive at 
a new allocation [127, p. 63]. Zschau's algorithm converges finitely 
but appears to be computationally inefficient [60, p. 52]. 
Piecewise Approach  
This strategy attempts to use the observation that the functions 
vi have a significantly simpler structure over certain regions of Em 
 because different subsets of the constraints in problem Ri (ai ) are 
active for different values of ai . Thus, if one can subdivide Em 
into regions for which vi has a relatively simple structure and then 
seek an optimal solution to problem R' in piecemeal fashion each time 
restricting ai to one of the regions, the problem can be simplified. 
This approach has been developed for linear and quadratic problems. 
The procedure given below is illustrative of a linear problem. 
(1) Starting with a ai° which satisfies 
n 	 n 
E a.° < b—  and E T. 1.(a. ° ) < n —1 — 	 —1 — -- 
i=1 	 i=1 
problemR.(a.9issolved.DenotebYR-°the region (convex polyhedral) 
of Em on which the current optimal basis for R i (ai ° ) remains optimal, 
and let w.1° 'a.a° be the value of vi 
on this region. 
 
(2)SolveprobleralOwith r.={ a 1EEm l 24_ 6 Ti c) } . 	Let ai ', 
= 1, . . . , n be an optimal solution. 
(3) If a' is optimal in problem R', terminate. Otherwise, 
identify and change to an alternate optimal basis in some of the 
subproblems, Ri (ap, so that ai ' is free to move in an improving 
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feasible direction for problem R' without requiring a further basis 
change in any of the subproblems. Determine the corresponding new 
regions R i 
and functions w.' and return to step (2) with a. ° , 	° and i 
0 w . replaced by a.' PE.' and w 
-1 -1 ' —1 ' -1 
For a linear problem, the set Ri can be identified. For example, 
if B-1 is the optimal basis inverse and is the original right side 
except the numberical values which correspond to a i are replaced by 
theunknownsa.,thenr.is given by r. ={ a.el 	> 0). In a --a 	 —a 	—1 — 
similar way it is easy to get an expression for wi in terms of ai by 
using the dual objective function. 
In step 3, to ascertain whether a particular a i is optimal 
in problem R' it is necessary to determine whether an improving direction 
exists. This determination can be made by solving the direction finding 
problem given in the previous section (which means the subordinate must 
communicate his constraint matrix to the superordinate) or by making 
use of the theory of linear programming [46, p. 396]. In either case, 
if an improving direction is found, the superordinate must cause at least 
one subordinate to find an alternative optimal dual solution. This 
resultsintheconstructionofanewregionR.and a new function w.. a 
The economic interpretation of this approach is that as in all 
resource budgeting methods, the superordinate iteratively communicates 
tentative resource budgets to each subordinate. Each subordinate solves 
his problem and communicates to the superordinate the value of the 
optimal dual variable associated with the organizational resource con-
straints, and the set R i which defines the ranges for the resource 
budgets over which the current basis does not change. In a sense this 
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set defines the maximum and minimum amounts of resources for which the 
set of currently funded projects will be undertaken. The dual multipliers 
demonstrate how the subordinate's objective function will change over this 
set. The superordinate uses this information to determine if a new budget 
sould improve the overall objective function. If one exists, he communi-
cates it to certain subordinates. These are the subordinates whose new 
et.isontheboundaryofthesetior these subordinates there will be 
1 
multiple dual solutions. The subordinate communicates one of the dual 
solutions which is different from the previous one communicated. The 
superordinates uses this information to adjust the budgets and the process 
begins anew. 
Examples of algorithms using the piecewise approach include Rosen 
[89] and Varaiya [115]. Geoffrion shows how the piecewise approach could 
be used for linear and quadratic problems, however, it would appear 
that for general nonlinear problems the piecewise approach cannot be used 
because there is no easy way to subdivide E m into regions over which vi 
 has a simple structure. 
Other Approaches  
Kornai and Liptak [66] and Weitzman [118] have proposed resource 
budgeting approaches for the problem of economic planning for a socialist 
country from a decentralized viewpoint. However, theor procedures have 
some relevance to resource allocation in a hierarchical decentralized 
organization. 
Kornai and Liptak [66] appear to have been the first to propose 
a budgeting approach for decentralized planning. Their method is much 
like tangential approximation. Their algorithm for describing the 
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coordinating procedure for a linear problem where the divisional 
restrictions x.e X. are not present assumes that the superordinate's 
--1 
objective function can be approximated by: 
maxi  ze 
n 	 n 
Z v.(a.) = max E min. 
a. -a 	 -K i=1 	 K=1 
The difficulty of their approach is that the optimal dual multiplier, 
IIK' is only valid for a certain range of a. values. The range of a. 
- 	 -a 	 -a 
can be divided into a number of regions each having its own dual 
variable, but the superordinate knows only TrK which is valid only in 
a neighborhood of a.. To alleviate this difficulty, Kornai and Liptak 
use an averaging procedure for computing new budgets, a., which converges, 
but not finitely. In addition, ten Kate says that in practice the 
convergence is very slow [112, p. 2]. 
Weitzman's approach is much like the tangential approximation 
strategy where an outer approximation to r i is developed, however, a 
different economic interpretation can be associated with the algorithm 
which is somewhat like the goal partitioning algorithm developed in 
Chapter VI. 
In Weitzman's algroithm it is assumed that only the super-
ordinate knows the overall objective function of the organization, 
and therefore, this function need not be separable in terms of the sub-
ordinates. Each subordinate (or sector of the economy) has a set Yk 
 which represents the production and resource capabilities and limitations. 
It is assumed that the superordinate has an estimate (possibly acquired 
from previous experience) of Yk , say Yk with v.: Yk , i.e., the 
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superordinate has an overly optimistic idea of the production possibilities. 
Using Yk the superordinate maximizes his utility function and arrives 
at a tentative budget and performance goals for each subordinate. Sub-
ordinate k attempts to find a feasible allocation of its budgeted 
resources to activities so as to satisfy the performance goals set by 
the superordinate. Thus, the subordinate does not maximize but instead 
tries only to find a feasible solution. However, since the super-
ordinate's estimate of Yk was overly optimistic, it is likely that the 
subordinate has no feasible solution. The subordinate then communicates 
information which will cause the superordinate to out off part of Y k 
so that its new estimate, Yk is such that Ykk?Yk . This is done 
by informing the superordinate of the characteristics of a plan which 
is feasible in regards to available resources and comes as close as 
possible "to achieving the performance goals that had been assigned. 
Weitzman shows how this information can be used to construct a hyper-
plane which cuts off part of the superordinate's estimate" of Y k [118, 
p. 54]. 
Based on the latest estimate of the subordinates feasible region, 
the superordinate chooses new performance goals and resource budgets 
for the subordinates, and the process continues until a feasible solution 
is found by each subordinate. Under certain restrictions such as 
convexity and compactness, this approach can be proven to converge to 
an optimal solution. In practice, the superordinate could call a halt 
to the iterative procedure whenever performance goals are not too tight 
or too loose. 
1O6 
One should note the slight generalization with respect to inter-
pretation that results from Kornaiand Liptak and Weitaman's work. In 
addition to setting resource budgets, the possibility of specifying 
performance targets is also suggested. This is very similar to the 
technique suggested in Chapter VI. However, Kornai and Liptak and 
Weitzman assume that the organization is cooperative, and thus sub-
ordinates honestly try to meet the targets (both resource and perfor-
mance) which have been set by the superordinate. 
In the literature of systems theory Mesarovic, Macko and 
Takahara [84] have proposed the "interaction prediction principle" 
which appears to be a resource directive technique. Their principle 
allows the superordinate to predict what the interaction between sub-
ordinates will be, i.e., the superordinate predicts what each sub-
ordinate's resource budget will be. As Mesarovic, et al. state, "The 
principle simply states that the overall decision problem is solved . . 
whenever infimal decision problems are solved by X and the interactions 
are correctly predicted". [84, p. 99] It would seem that the definition 
of interaction balance principle is just a statement Theroem 	How- 
ever, Mesarovic et al. do not propose any algorithms for finding the 
correct interactions. 
Summary of Algorithms  
The basis mathematical logic underlying the three main strategies 
for resource budgeting methods has been explained. Table 2 summarizes 
these strategies. An economic interpretation of the information com-
municated between superordinate and subordinates has also been associated 
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1. Tangential Approximation: Problem R 
is solved by iteratively building up 
a tangential approximation for the 
objective function of R. The tan-
gential approximation is automatically 
available from the optimal multipliers 
of problem R i (ai ) for a given a i . 
2. Large - Step Subgradient: Because of 
the non-differentiability of Problem 
R's objective function, large step 
gradient algorithms cannot be used. 
However, the optimal multipliers of 
R.(a.) can be used to characterize 
v. via subgradients, thereby 
enabling an optimal or near optimal 
choice of an improving a i . 
3. Piece- Vise Approach: This approach 
capitalizes on the simple structure 
of v. over certain regions of Em. 
It Jtempts to subdivide Em into 
regions on which the vi have a 
relatively simple structure and then 
solve Problem R' in piecemeal 
fashion, each time with ai restricted 
to one of these regions.  
1. It is sometimes hard to find 
feasible a. t s because of (4-5). 
2. Most methoas of handling (4-5) 
would require the superordinate 
to know something about the 
constraint sets of the sub-
ordinates. 
1. Algorithms for the non-
linear case require the 
superordinate to know some-
thing about the constraints 
of the subordinates. 
1. For any problems which are 
not linear or quadratic, 
this approach becomes 
unwieldly. 
2. The subordinates transmit 
its current solution and 
information about how it 













with each of the three strategies. In all three strategies the super-
ordinate iteratively sets budgets for the subordinates by solving an 
optimization problem. The problem solved is different depending on the 
strategy used. With all three strategies each subordinate decides what 
activities are to be supported by solving problem R i (ai ). The primary 
distinction between the strategies concerns the nature of the information 
which is communicated by a subordinate to a superordinate. Tangential 
approximation requires the communication of the least amount of infor-
mation, in that only the subordinate's objective function value and the 
vector of shadow prices, "R , , which indicates the change in the objective 
function value as the resource budget is changed, is transmitted. The 
piecewise approach requires transmission of shadow prices and an indi-
cation of over what range of resource budgets, the subordinate's current 
set of chosen activities would not change. The subgradient method 
requires that the subordinate communicate the gradient of its objective 
function and all the constraint function gradients including those con-
straints common only to the subordinate. Because of the behavoripl 
interpretations associated with the subgradient approach, it would 
seem to have little intuitive appeal as a mechanism for explaining 
what goes on during the resource allocation process. 
From the viewpoint of descriptive value the tangential approxi-
mation procedure and the piecewise procedure are more appealing. Both 
would seem to have merit in certain environments. Empirical support 
for this assertion may be found in the description of the resource 
allocation process in Baker et al. [14], Shumway et al. [107], Kornai 
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and Liptak [66], Weitzman [118, and Wildaysky [113]. 
From a computational standpoint as Geoffrion states, "the central 
unresolved issue is the relative efficiency of the three methods". [46, 
p. 400] He suggests that tangential approximation may be the best when 
the ri sets are simple, but to date there is no substantiating test 
results. 
Summary  
This chapter has shown that the problem represented in Chapter ,I, 
(2-1) to (2-6), can be expressed as two related problems, problem P. 
and problem Ri (a i ), when the assumption is made that the superordinate's 
objective function is equal to the sum of the subordinates' objective 
functions. The solution to these two problems is accomplished through 
an iterative exchange of information between the superordinate and the 
subordinate by which the superordinate learns how the value of each sub-
ordinate's objective function changes as a function of the resources 
which are allocated to him. 
It was shown that the conditions under which the superordinate 
can coordinate the activities of the subordinates by allocating resources 
to them for their use are very general. However, when trying to show 
that an algorithm can be used to iteratively find the optimal resource 
budget for the subordinates, it is necessary to make assumptions about 
the forms of the functions. The three general strategies as developed 
by Geoffrion for coordination through resource budgeting were presented. 
No general stopping rules for the strategies were given, but Grinold 
[54] does discuss this subject. 
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The economic interpretation of all resource budgeting methods is 
that the superordinate iteratively communicates a resource budget for 
each subordinate. Each subordinate decides how to use the resource 
budget and communicates certain information to the superordinate who 
readjusts the budget, etc. Usually included in the subordinate's 
communication is information about the shadow prices associated with 
the constraints on organizational resources. 
In general, budgeting methods are preferable to pricing methods 
because they are primal feasible. This means that at each iteration of 
the allocation reallocation process the current plan of how to use the 
resources and which activities to support meets all the constraints 
imposed on the superordinate and the subordinates. Therefore, if any 
procedure for finding the optimal solution via a budgeting is stopped 
before an optimal solution is identified, the current solution can be 
implemented. This is unlike pricing methods which are generally dual 
feasible, but not primal feasible except at optimality. This is espe-
cially important in modelling organizations which iterate only a few 
times before implementing a program. Resource budgeting methods can 
accomplish coordination under very general conditions, at least in 
theory. In addition, they are used extensively by many organizations. 
One can summarize this by the following proposition: 
Proposition 2  
In a cooperative organization resource budgeting methods are 
preferable to pricing methods for coordinating resource allocation 
decisions. However, as this chapter pointed out the procedures for 
describing the step by step coordination process to find an optimal 
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solution are realistic from a behavorial veiwpoint only in certain cases. 
The discussion of the coordinating procedures in this chapter 
also suggest that it is very unlikely that the superordinate will select 
the optimal subordinate budgets in one iteration. This suggests pro-
position 3. 
Proposition 3  
Top management (the superordinate) must receive information about 
the effects of its allocation of resources on the subordinate's perfor-
mance if an optimal objective solution is to be found. In other words, 
if management allocates resources based on information about just one 
alternative, e.g., its allocation last period, an optimal solution is 
unlikely to be found. 
CHAPTER V 
INTRODUCTION TO NON-COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 
In this chapter the concept of a non-cooperative system in 
hierarchical decentralized organizations is introduced. By studying and 
critically analyzing the behavioral assumptions embodied in coordination 
mechanisms for a cooperative system, an argument is set forth for 
mechanisms which do not embody the limitations inherent in cooperative 
coordination mechanisms. Chapters III and IV reviewed the state of 
the art for pricing and resource budgeting coordination mechanisms. 
In this chapter it is demonstrated that if either one of these mechanisms 
is used for coordination in a non-cooperative hierarchical decentralized 
organization, "poor" resource allocation decisions may result. Finally, 
the underlying logic of goal and constraint intervention coordination 
mechanisms for non-cooperative organizations is discussed, and a case 
is made for a negotiation approach which explicitly recognizes that 
resource allocation decisions are dependent upon the actions of both 
the superordinate and the subordinates. 
Analysis of Cooperative Organizations  
In a cooperative system there does exist conflict within the 
organization; however, this conflict is between subordinates for 
limited resources. Each subordinate recognizes that his decisions are 
only a subset of all decisions which are made in the organization. He 
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believes that what is good for the organization as a whole is good 
for him. Hence, his behavior is directed at doing the best he can 
with whatever resources he is budgeted. He believes that the share 
of the organizational resources allotted to him is commensurate with 
his contribution to the overall objective function. 
There is no conflict between objective functions in a cooper-
ative system. The superordinate's utility is reflected in the sub-
ordinate's objective function, or he assumes that his utility is 
reflected in the subordinates' objective functions. The important 
observation is the lack of conflict between superordinate and sub-
ordinate's objective functions. Pricing and budgeting mechanisms 
are designed for resolving only the conflict among subordinates over 
resources. 
In Chapter I the concepts of absolute and relative coordination 
were introduced. Absolute coordination implies a mechanism by which 
the superordinate's objective function is maximized, while relative 
coordination refers to a mechanism for ensuring that a resource 
allocation plan is found which is satisfactory to the superordinate. 
Both pricing and resource budgeting approaches aim at the same 
objective: to maximize the overall objective function. As such 
these techniques imply that the only satisfactory alternative is the 
optimization of the overall criterion function. Thus, pricing and 
resource budgeting methods have been designed to accomplish only absolute 
coordination. This assertion is not surprising since the algorithms for 
the case were generally designed as methods for decomposing a large 
LiJ4 
mathematical programming problem into smaller parts. Mathematical 
problems are usually considered as maximization and minimization 
problems, and thus assume that the decision maker whose problem is 
represented by the mathematical program is an economic man, e. g., 
see March and Simon [80, p. 137]. 
In order to extend the pricing and resource budgeting methods 
to allow relative coordination, one could redefine the overall 
objective so that it represents a satisficing problem. A way of doing 
this is given in Chapter VI. Another way to handle relative coordin-
ation is to proceed as in Chapter III and IV in maximizing an objective 
and to terminate the iterative procedure whenever a satisfactory 
objective function level is attained. Such an approach necessitates 
that the algorithm for coordination be primal feasible. Thus, resource 
budgeting algorithms would work, but most pricing algorithms would 
not because they are not primal feasible. An exception, of course, 
would be the Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm because it can be a primal 
feasible procedure. 
Since the motivation underlying most price directive and 
resource directive algorithms is largely a computational one, i. e., 
how can one solve a large mathematical problem efficiently, the 
behavioral implications are not necessarily appealing. In fact, one 
can interpret pricing and resource budgeting mechanisms as merely 
schemes by which the subordinate decision makers can be manipulated to 
attain the same decision at which the superordinate would have 
arrived, had he known all the constraints. Thus, a subordinate exists 
r 
115 
as a tool for carrying out the desires of the superordinate.
22 The 
subordinate in effect has no autonomy and no impact on the final 
allocation decision. His purpose is to process information and solve 
problems. Under these circumstances pricing and resource budgeting 
methods certainly do not enhance the motivational aspects of decentralized 
decision making. The superordinate's task is really to create an 
environment in which the subordinate believes he is participating in 
the decision making process. The conclusion of this discussion is that 
because of the manipulative intent pricing and resource budgeting 
mechanisms are not as appealing from a behavioral viewpoint as the 
literature might indicate. 
Another pertinent observation regarding models of coordination 
for a cooperative system is that the structure of the organization has 
no effect on the final set of decisions. Thus, regardless of the 
organizational structure the final solution is the same. The subordinate 
decision making units can be combined with no effect on the solution. 
Again, this result is due to the fact that pricing and resource 
budgeting methods were designed for decomposing large mathematical 
problems. The following proposition is suggested. 
Proposition 4  
Suppose an organization is cooperative. If a pricing or 
resource budgeting coordination mechanism is used, the final resource 
allocation program selected for implementation is unaffected by the 
structure of the organization. 
Empirical studies such as those discussed by Machlup [77] add 
22This would agree with Taylor's concept of scientific management [80,p.13]. 
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validity to the assertion that the actual decisions made in a 
hierarchical decentralized organization are not necessarily the 
decisions which would advance the objectives of the superordinate the 
most. However, according to the coordination models of Chapters III 
and IV the final decision should represent the objectives of the super-
ordinate. One possible reason for this discrepancy between practice 
and theory is that most organizations are not cooperative, but instead 
can be described as non-cooperative systems. 
Since the assumptions embodied in cooperative systems are not 
totally satisfactory and not totally realistic, an analysis of more 
general situations, viz., non-cooperative systems, seems justified. 
These more general cases should imply that the form and structure of 
the organization is a determining factor in the organization's 
decision behavior. 
Before discussing coordination methods for non-cooperative 
systems, the next two sections indicate what the results can be if 
pricing or resource budgeting approaches are used in a non-cooperative 
system. The reader interested primarily in the mathematical aspects 
of the resource allocation coordination process in a decentralized 
organization may find the following two sections disconcerting. For 
example, it may be apparent that if some procedure for coordinating is 
used by the subordinate with respect to his utility function, but the 
subordinate uses a different utility function, then a suboptimal 
solution is reached. However, in the context of organizations this 
is not obvious. The language of mathematics brings to bear a certain 
clarity which can facilitate  the statement of propositions which make 
contributions in the area of organizational structure and design. 
Failure of Pricing Methods  
To the author's knowledge no published work has appeared which 
uses a pricing like mechanism for coordination when the superordinate's 
objective function is (lifferent from that of the subordinates. This 
section indicates that except under very strong assumptions, the 
pricing approach will lead to a feasible solution, but the solution will 
not be optimal with respect to the superordinate's or the subordinate's 
objective function. 
Consider a general model for two divisions. The superordinate 
perceives the resource allocation problem to be of the form: 
maximize 	g1  (x 1  ) + g2  (x2  ) 
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Suppose the objective function, (5-1), is composed of two strictly 
concave differentiable functions and is determined by the superordinate. 
The constraints concerning organizational resources are given by (5-2) 
where h.(x.) is a vector of convex differentiable functions. The 
-s -s 
constraints in (5-3) are local restrictions concerning each subordinate's 
activities and are assumed to be convex differentiable functions. 
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Finally, it is assumed that the constraints (5-2) and (5-3) satisfy a 
constraint qualification. Part of these assumptions are made to 
ensure that coordinating prices exist. In the problem above the 
variable, 	is a vector of decision variables; however, it may be 
that the superordinate is only concerned with some aggregate function 
of xic , e. g., the profit associated with xK. It is not assumed that 
the constraints expressed in (5-3) are known explicitly by the 
superordinate, but only that the superordinate realizes there are 
certain local restrictions for each subordinate. 
On the other hand each subordinate perceives the overall 
problem differently. He perceives (5-2) and (5-3) just as the super-
ordinate but he has his own objective function. The sum of the sub-
ordinates' objectives if: 
maximize 	f1 (x12-2  ) + f'(x ) 
	 (5_ 1 ) 
of course, subordinate K knows his local constraints explicitly, i. e., 
2.K(xic ) 
One might inquire under what conditions would the superordinate's 
solution be the same as the subordinates' solution. Such a question 
can be investigated using the optimality conditions for mathematical 
programming. Since the constraint sets of the superordinate's and the 
sum of the superordinates' problems are the same, any feasible solution 
to one is also feasible to the other. Hence, one need only worry about 
optimality. 
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Remark 5.1  
If EK(1k) = a fi -t( K ) for all K where a is a positive scaler, 
then the optimal solutions to the superordinate's problem and the 
subordinates' problems are equivalent. 
This result is obvious since the optimal solution to any 
mathematical programming problem is unchanged if the objective function 
is multiplied by a positive scaler. This result implies that if the 
superordinate consistently overestimates or underestimates the value 
of projects, then a pricing approach can bring about absolute 
coordination. 
A prime difficulty in a pricing approach for a situation such 
as that in (5-1) to (5 J ) is how can the superordinate determine when 
to stop communicating prices, X, to the subordinates, i. e., when has 
an optimal solution with respect to the superordinate's objective been 
found? The Lagrangian form of the superordinate's problem is: 
min max [g1 	- X'h ( 1 
2sic 
)] + max [g2 (2) - 2011..(x )] + X'13 
x eX 2 2 
(5-5) 
where XK = -Lc K 12K(X,r ) < _11C )x> 0 } for K=1,2. The inner maximization 
operations in (5-5) are supposedly performed by the subordinates. 




since he perceives the problem differently than the superordinate. Thus, 
if subordinate K arrives at solution 	for a given x0 the super- 








To determine this the superordinate can use Kuhn Tucker conditions 
and compute 
D ( a 0 ) = vgK ( °) — lot 7II(24(1 ) — 
where EK° ' is the vector of optimal dual variable values associated 
with subordinate K's local constraints, 2(xic ) < EK . If xic° 'D(2)=0, 
then the superordinate can conclude that x ic° does maximize (5-6). 
However, if 	'D(X° ) 	0, then xic° does not maximize (5-6). The 
important conclusion is that for the superordinate to determine whether 
a solution is optimal with respect to his objective function, he must 
have information about the gradients of the subordinates' constraints 
and the dual variable values for the subordinates. There is no way to 
attach any meaningful interpretation in terms of decentralized planning 
to such a requirement. One must conclude in agreement with Arrow that, 
"The top management can never, strictly speaking, know if the activity 
manager's objective function has been maximized." [9, p. 400]. 
Even more serious than the requirement that the superordinate 
have additional information about the subordinate's problems is that 
even if the superordinate has complete information about the subordinates' 
constraints, it may be impossible to achieve absolute coordination. 
While this may be intuitively obvious, a simple example problem is 
given to demonstrate this fact. 
Example 5.1  
Superordinate's objective function : - (xi-,4) 2-(x2-1) 2 











xi ,x2 _< 0 
The solution xl = 2, x2* = 1 is optimal with respect to the super-
ordinate's objective function. Thus, the superordinate seeks a price, 
X, so that subordinate 1 and 2 will find the superordinate's optimal 
solution. Subordinate 2's problem is: 




= 1 is to be optimal then (5-7) must have a stationary point at 
x2 = 1. Therefore, 
-2(x2-4)-_ A = 0 
A = -2(x2-4) = -2(-3) = 6. 
Thus, if X = 6 subordinate 2 finds x.2 = 1. On the other hand, if 
x = 6 subordinate l's problem is 
maximize -(x1-1)
2-6x1 
subject to 	xZ < 2 
x"
1 
 > 0 
The solution is x
1 = 0 which is not the superordinate's optimum. Thus, 
for this example it is not possible to find a price which will cause 
each subordinate to find the superordinate's optimum. 
This discussion can be summarized in the following propositions. 
Preposition 5  
In a non-cooperative organization where pricing mechanisms are 
used, the superordinate may be unable to identify when an optimal 
solution has been reached. Except when a subordinate's utility function 
is a multiple of the superordinate's utility function, the superordinate 
requires additional information about the subordinate's constraint set 
in order to ascertain whether a solution is optimal. 
Proposition 6  
Even if the superordinate has complete information, it may be 
Impossible to use pricing approaches for accomplishing absolute coordin-
ation in a non-cooperative organization. 
It is interesting to note what would happen if a pricing 
algorithm is used in an organization where the superordinate's 
objective differs from the sum of the subordinates' objectives. Such 
a situation is of interest because it is quite conceivable that in a 
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hierarchical decentralized organization the superordinate might believe 
that his subordinates have the same objective functions that he does, 
i. e., the superordinate might believe the organization is 
cooperative". 23 For example, suppose a coordination mechanism is used 
which uses information flows in a similar way as the Dantzig-Wolfe 
algorithm. That is, the superordinate passes down prices to the sub-
ordinates. Given a pricing vector, subordinate K solves his problem 
using his utility function rather than the superordinate's utility 
function. The subordinate then communicates the solution he found or 
information about the effect of the solution on the superordinate's 
objective function. The superordinate assumes that subordinate K has 
found the communicated solution using the supremal's utility function. 
Therefore, he treats the communicated information in the same way 
that was done in the Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm. 
Mathematically, it is clear that the solution found may not 
be optimal with respect to either the superordinate's utility function 
or the subordinate's utility functions. Suppose the overall problem 
is given by relationships (5-1) to (5-4) where all relationships are 
linear if the pricing algorithm discussed in the previous page is 
used, the overall problem which is really being solved is: 
maximize E"' 	 (5-8) 
K=1 
For example, a cooperative organization assumes that the superordinate 
and the subordinates have the same attitude toward risk. Studies 
where decision makers at different levels have different attitudes 
toward risk are currently being pursued. [109, 117] 
n 









is the set of extreme points generated by subordinate K solving 
the problem: 
maximize - (fic t 	Plik)4K 
subject to: AK 
 LCK 
Therefore, the claim that the use of a Dantzig-Wolfe like approach for 
coordinating in a non-cooperative organization does not work is not 
because of any mathematical or theoretical shortcomings, but simply 
because the "wrong" problem is being solved. This mathematical 
triviality is organizationally significant because often objective 
functions at different levels are different. 
If a pricing scheme whereby new prices are generated by solving 
a master problem like (5-8) is used, it will converge, i. e., after a 
finite number of interations the superordinate will stop communicating 
prices and conclude that an optimal solution has been found. Unfortunately, 
the solution found is for the problem in (5-8). 
Theorem 5.2  
Suppose the resource allocation problem facing a non-cooperative 
organization is linear. If a pricing mechanism which utilizes information 
12 4 
flow in a manner analogous to the Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm,
24 
the 
iterative procedure will converge. 
Proof: At iteration t of the procedure (analogous to Dantzig-Wolfe 
algorithm) subordinate K's problem is: 
t' 
maximize f .K t x.:. 	HK) xK 
subject to: 
AKx4C < C 
0 
The solution to the above problem yields extreme point x K
t . The 
superordinate's problem at step t+1 is: 
2 
maximize 	E 	E [ZK , Ks] A s 
K=1 K=1 
2 
subject to 	E 	E [ll-K s]7`K-t < b K=1 s=1 
( 5-9) 




 > 0 
— 
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The actual information is different in the proposed scheme. In 
the proposed method the subordinate generates extreme points using 
his own utility function while in Dantzig -Wolfe the subordinate 




The solution of the superordinate's problem yields the dual variables 
-0 
t+1 	t+1 and IrK , K=1,2, corresponding to constraints (5-9) and (5-10). 
To show that this process converges, it is only necessary to verify 





K 	 > 0 	for K=1,2 	(5 -11) 
If (5-11) does not hold for some K at iteration t, then the current 
value of the superordinate's objective function can be improved by 
bringing XK , into the basis, this generating a new pricing vector 
-o
t+1 
Since there exist only a finite number of extreme point solutions 
to each subordinate's problem, 25 for any pricing vector only a finite 
number of solutions can be generated. If the variable in the super - 
ordinate's problem corresponding to a subordinate's extreme point 
enters the basis, then it will never again be a candidate to enter the 
basis. Thus, in a finite number of steps, there will be no candidate 
subordinate solutions which can improve the superordinate's objective 
function, and therefore, (5 -11) will be satisfied. 
Theorem 5.2 demonstrates that a Dantzig-Wolfe like pricing 
coordination process will converge finitely when applied in a non-
cooperative organization. However, the final solution may be non-
optimal with respect to both the superordinate's objective function and 
the sum of the subordinates' objective functions. In fact it may 
converge to a.solution which apriori of the solution process, the super - 
25
If a subordinate's constraint set is unbounded, then one must consider 
the extreme points and the extreme rays. 
127 
ordinate would feel is not satisfactory [60, p. 62]. Thus, in the 
event that the Dantzig-Wolfe approach is used where the superordinate's 
and the subordinates' objectives are not the same, it will often 
"appear" that the allocation process has converged; however, the 
final solution may be far from optimal. 
If a price adjustment rule such as Uzawa'S [I14] is used 
(see Chapter III) for coordination in a non-cooperative organization, 
then the optimal solution for the sum of the subordinates / objective 
functions is found. Clearly, this solution is feasible for the 
superordinate, but it is seldom optimal. The reason that the super-
ordinate's objective function has no influence is because the price 
adjustment rule administered by the superordinate depends only on the 
current solution generated by the subordinates, i. e., a new pricing 
vector, At+1 is determined by 
n t+1 
A. 	= max[0 A 	+a ( E 
1 1 i=1 
. where At+1   is the j
th 
component of X
t+1 . Thus, if a price adjustment 
rule is used when the superordinate's objective function differs from 
the sum of the subordinates' objectives, the superordinate has no 
influence on the solution process or on the final solution. 
Proposition 7 summarizes the conclusions regarding use of a 
pricing coordination mechanisms. 
Proposition 7  
Pricing approaches are not suitable mechanisms for coordination 
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in a non-cooperative organization. Since in Chapters I and II an 
agrument was made that differing goals between decision units in an 
organization is a common occurrence, pricing approaches would seem 
to offer little help in achieving coordination in most organizations. 
Failure of Resource Budgeting Mechanisms  
As with pricing approaches, resource budgeting methods can 
accomplish absolute coordination only when the set of optimal 
solutions to the organizations problem using the superordinate's 
objective function is the same as the set of optimal solutions using 
the sum of the subordinates' objective functions. No longer are the 
results of Chapter IV relevant, i. e., the superordinate's problem 
cannot be stated as problem R'. Clearly, the superordinate is not 
interested in the function v:
1 (a.s ) because this function represents - 
the change in subordinate i's objective function as the resources 
are varied. Instead, the superordinate is interested in wi(ft i ) 
which is the part of his objective controlled by subordinate i as a 
function of the resources given to subordinate i. The difficulty 
is that w:(a.) is not known explicitly, and there is no apparent way to 1 -s 
build up on approximation to the superordinate's objective function. 
The shadow prices associated with the subordinates' problems are of no 
benefit since they represent the change in the subordinate's objective 
function. 
As with pricing techniques it is interesting to understand 
what would happen if a resource budgeting algorithm is used to coordinate 
activities when the superordinate's objective differs from the sum of 
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the subordinates! objectives. To facilitate this study the following 
resource budgeting scheme is utilized. The.superordinate establishes 
resource budgets for each subordinate. In light of his budget, 
subordinate i solves the following problem: 
Problem.R.(a.) 1 a. 
maximize f.(x.) 1 -s 
subject to 11:(x.) 	a. 	 (5-12) 
x. 	c X. -s 1 
He then communicates, the vector of dual variables associated with 
(5-12) and information about how the subordinate's current solution 
relates to the superordinate's objective. For example, if the super-
ordinate is interested in maximizing g i (x.), then subordinate i might 
communicate gia) where E. is the solution found by solving problem 
R:(a.). The superordinate uses this information to adjust the sub- 
s 
ordinate's budgets; a.. 	Since it has 	been shown in Chapter IV 
that a tangential approximation procedure requires only information 
about the subordinates' dual variables and information about the 
objective function value, this procedure is used. Using this scheme the 
following remarks can be made: 
(1) It is no longer true that lower bounds exist on the 
optimal overall objective function value. Therefore, the information 
concerning how far from optimality a current solution is, has been lost. 
n K 
(2) The sequence { E a. 	K=0,1,2,... v is still monotonically 
K=1 1 
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decreasing because each time a subordinate's problem is solved a 
constraint is added to the superordinate's problem. Thus, as the 
procedure iterates the value of the superordinate's objective function, 
E a., must decrease or stay the same. 
1=1 
(3) For a linear problem the above scheme will converge in 
the sense that at some point it is impossible to find a new set of 
a.'s which is feasible and can improve the superordinate's objective 
function value. However, this solution may not be optimal with respect 
to either the superordinate or the subordinates. The reason for the 
apparent convergence is that a linear problem has only a finite 
number of extreme points or rays, and therefore only a finite number of 
constraints will be generated in the superordinate's problem. 
(4) For a nonlinear problem the above scheme will not, in 
general, find the optimal solution. 
These points should be mathematically obvious because a 
coordination procedure which was developed for a single problem is 
being used on two different problems. However, to further illustrate 
consider the following example: 
Example 5.2  
Superordinate's objective function: 
maximize gi(x) + g 2 (x) 
or maximize 4x1 + 3x2 + y1 + y2 
Superordinate's constraints: a + a2 < 6 
a 	> 0 
l' 2 7' 
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Subordinate l's objective: maximize 	= 	+ 2x
2 
Subordinate l's constraints: x1 + x2  a — a1 
5-x
1
+ 3x2 < 15 
3x1+ 5x
2 
 < 15 
x
2  < 2 
xl ,x2 > 0 
Subordinate 2's objective: maximize f2 = 4y1 + 3y2 




2Y1 4. Y2 
Y2 < 2  
Y1  ,y 	0 1 2 




 * = 1.875 	 g1* = 13.125 
x2* = 1.875 	 al* = 3.75 
y1* = 1 	 * = 5 ' 
= 2 Y2
*  - 	 a2* = 2.25 





71 = 1 
72 = 2 
f1* = 5 
- 
a = 3 
f2* = 10 
a2 = 3 
Table 3 illustrates the results of using a tangential approximation 
approach. The scheme terminates with the solution: xi = 1.67, x2 = 2, 
Table 3. Summry of Example 5.2's Solution. 
Iteration al a2 al a2 
+- 
- 1 f2 gl g2 1T1 1T2 Constraints Derived 




a2 	< 	4a2 
2 0 24 0 6 0 10 0 5 2 0 a1 	< 	2a1 
a
2 	
< 	5 - 
3 9.5 5 4.75 1.25 5.67 5 12.67 1.25 0 4 a
1 < 
	12.67 
02 1 	-3.75 4- 4a2 
4 7.625 5 3.8125 2.1875 5.67 8.315 12.67 3.562 0 2 a
1 < 	12.67 
a2  < -1.8124 - + 2a2 
5 10.0625 .1250 5.0312 .9688 5.67 3.8752 12.67 .9688 (5 4 a
1 < 
	12.67 
a2  < -2.9064 - + 4a2 




= .9688 , y2 = 0. The procedure is carried out in the following 
way. The superordinate initially chooses an a l and 22 which satisfies 
his constraints. Using a
K 
 subordinate K solves his problem using his 
own utility function. He then communicates to the superordinate the 
solution found or the value (in terms of the superordinate's objective 
function) of the solution and the value of the dual variable associated 
with the resource constraints. This dual variable represents the 
change in the subordinate's objective function value per unit change 
in the available resource. For the example, the solution's value in 
terms of the objective functions of the superordinate and the subordinates 
is 9.5419 and 12.6355 respectively. Clearly, this solution is far from 
optimal for either the superordinate or the subordinates. In fact, if 
a1  = 3 and a2  = 3, the subordinates will find a solution which represents 
a value of 10 to the superordinate and a value of 15 to the subordinates 
which is better for both the superordinate and the subordinates than 
the solution found. In practice the superordinate would be likely 
to settle on al = 3.8125, a2 = 2.1875 (the solution at iteration 4) 
because it generates the greatest payoff in terms of the superordinate's 
objective function. 
This example supports assertions (1), (2), and (3) made 
earlier. The mechanics of the example would be puzzling to the super—
ordinate because the solution process terminated with a solution which 
yielded a value less than an earlier feasible solution. Such a 
happening might alert the superordinate to the fact that the subordinate 
is not optimizing with respect to the superordinate's objective 
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function. 
Figures 5 and 6 show the superordinate's and the subordinate's 
objective function as a function of the resource budget. Also, the 
approximation to the objective function as derived via the tangential 
approximation scheme is shown. Clearly, the approximating function 
represents neither the superordinate's nor the subordinate's response. 
In fact, the approximating function is not a convex combination 
of the superordinate's response and the subordinate's response. 
Examples of nonlinear problems seem to suffer the same difficulties. 
The conclusion can be stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 8  
Resource budgeting approaches are not suitable mechanisms for 
coordination in a non-cooperative organization. 
In a non-cooperative organization the iterative resource 
budgeting process maintains a solution which is feasible, but it may 
lead to a solution which is non-optimal with respect to the super-
ordinate's objective. In fact, the process may find a solution 
which is dominated by another solution with respect to both the 
subordinates' and the superordinate's objective function. This 
suggests that a resource budgeting process may find "poor" solutions. 
Basic Ideas of Goal and Constraint Intervention Methods  
When the superordinate's and the subordinates' objective 
functions differ, a conflict often occurs because the subordinate 
wishes to select a decision from his constraint set which is not 
optimal for the superordinate. The superordinate wishes the subordinate 
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Figure 5. Subordinate l's yal ) 
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Figure 6. Subordinate 2's v 2 (a2) 
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to select a decision which is located at some other point in the 
subordinate's constraint set. For example, in Figure 7 the optimal 
solution with respect to the superordinate's objective function is x* 
while the subordinate's optimum is y*. In general, the superordinate 
does not know explicitly the subordinate's constraint set. 
Goal intervention methods allow the superordinate to alter the 
form of a subordinate's objective function. For example, in a non-
cooperative organization pricing methods attempt to accomplish this 
by charging a price for an organizational resource, thus changing the 
subordinate's objective function. In general, the intent of goal 
intervention is to use meaningful incentives and other means to cause the 
subordinate to arrive at a solution (on his own) which is closer to 
the superordinate's optimum. Clearly, one means of accomplishing this 
is to "demand" that the subordinate use a specific objective function. 
There are other more subtle means such as tax incentives, profit 
sharing and salary compensation plans which still allow the subordinate 
some autonomy. For example, Kriebel and Lave [67] have investigated 
the effect of salary compensation plans and profit sharing when the 
superordinate seeks to maximize profit and the subordinate seeks to 
maximize utility which is a function of salary and output. 
On the other hand, constraint intervention methods allow the 
subordinate to alter the subordinate's constraint set. For example, in 
a non-cooperative organization resource budgeting methods attempt to 
force the subordinate to select x* in Figure 7 by controlling the 





Figure 7. Subordinate's Set of Feasible Solutions. 
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alter the feasible region of a subordinate. However, as the previous 
section demonstrated, it is not always possible to ensure that this 
manipulation will cause the subordinate to select x*. Constraint 
intervention techniques allow the superordinate to impose meaningful 
constraints on the subordinate's constraint set which results in the 
subordinate finding x* or some solution which is satisfactory to the 
superordinate. Thus, constraint intervention methods provide the 
superordinate with more freedom in changing a subordinate's feasible 
set of decisions. Obviously, if the superordinate knew his optimal 
solution, x*, it would be possible to impose restrictions on the 
subordinate to force him to arrive at x*. As Simon says, "If you 
allow me to set the constraints, I don't care who determines the 
objectives," [103, p. 6]. This case would represent the extreme where 
the superordinate practically dictates the solution. More realistically, 
the superordinate does not know his optimum x*, and he wishes to use 
constraints as a means of ensuring the subordinate finds a solution which 
is "near" x*. 
An example of a constraint intervention method which assumes 
particular objective function forms for the superordinate and the 
subordinates is the model presented by Cassidy, Kirby, and Raike [2 1 ]. 
They propose a model for determining how a central government can 
most efficiently allocate resources among other levels of government. 
The model assumes that once a superordinate allocates resources to the 
subordinates, then decisions about resource usage at the subordinate 
level cannot be controlled. The objective function of the subordinates 
140 
is to maximize the value of undertaking projects while the super-
ordinate tries to minimize the "relative regret" of the subordinates. 
In a sense the relative regret of a subordinate is a measure of how 
displeased the subordinate is with the funding he receives. The 
relative regret is measured as the difference between the value of a 
given budget and the value he would attain if given an unlimited 
budget. In this sense the minimization of relative regret does achieve 
the "best" distribution of resources. Dynamic programming is used 
to solve the problem 124, p. 467]. 
Summary  
As a prelude to discussion of non-cooperative hierarchical 
decentralized organizations the assumptions inherent in a cooperative 
system were discussed. The important points were: 
(1) The only conflict in the organization is a result of 
subordinates competing for limited resources. 
(2) The structure of the organization has no effect on the 
final solution reached. 
(3) The subordinates have no autonomy. 
(4) The allocation decisions which are generated by a coordination 
procedure reflect only the objectives of the superordinate. 
Each of these points limits the descriptive value of the models (e. g., 
177, 123] present empirical evidence which indicates that point (4) 
above does not hold). 
Next, it was shown that in a non-cooperative system where 
conflict also exists between the objectives of the superordinate and the 
subordinates that pricing and resource budgeting approaches fail to 
bring about coordination. In fact, if these approaches are used by 
a superordinate who assumes that the organization is cooperative, the 
iterative allocation process may appear to converge. However, the 
procedure may lead to a poor decision with respect to both the objectives 
of the superordinate and the subordinates. These arguments were made 
by reducing the superordinate's and the subordinates' problems to 
mathematical programming problems. From a mathematical standpoint the 
analysis is very simple and may appear trivial; however, from the 
viewpoint of someone interested in structuring information flow and 
coordinating allocation decisions in an organization the analysis and 
results are quite significant. Specifically, if an organization 
is non-cooperative there is little hope of finding "good" resource 
allocation plans through the use of pricing or budgeting techniques. 
The basic intent of goal intervention and constraint inter-
vention methods for non-cooperative systems was presented. Rather 
than attempt an exhaustive treatment of these coordination mechanisms, 
the next chapter will present and analyze a model for coordination in 
a non-cooperative organization. The model is referred to as a 
negotiation method because it results in a final decision which is 
influenced by the objectives of the superordinate and the subordinates. 
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CHAPTER VI 
NEGOTIATION MODELS FOR COORDINATION IN NON-COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 
The term negotiation model is borrowed from game theory, (see 
Luce and Raiffa 176, p. 118]) and is used because the processes for 
arriving at a resource allocation program are affected by both the 
superordinate and the subordinates. As March and Simon [80, p. 156] 
noted when the decision units participating in the organization's 
decision making process have different goals, then the decisions are 
reached by a predominately bargaining process. Thus, the super-
ordinate and the subordinates influence the behavior of each other, 
and the final solution exhibits this. This is in contrast to pricing 
and resource budgeting approaches where both the superordinate and 
subordinates participate, but each works toward its own objective 
ignoring the other participants in the process. 
In this chapter a "goal decomposition" approach suggested by 
Ruefli is reviewed. Although Ruefli's model significantly extends the 
state of art in coordination for non-cooperative organizations, there 
are some weaknesses in the interpretations associated with the iterative 
process. Using a procedure which is related to work by Kelley [62], 
Benders 121], Dantzig [37], and Zangwill [125], a goal partitioning 
procedure is presented. The theoretical and behavioral properties of the 
goal partitioning procedure model are discussed and shown to provide a 
description of the resource allocation process in hierarchical decentral- 
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ized organizations. 
A Goal Decomposition Method  
Ruefli in his doctoral dissertation [90] developed a powerful 
analytical approach for representing the resource allocation decision 
process in a three level organization. The decisions at the levels 
are respectively: generation of resource budgets and performance 
targets, evaluation and selection of alternatives, and the generation 
of alternatives. Figure 8 depicts Ruefli's three level process. In 
keeping with the previous strategy of investigating two level structure c7, 
the following discussion is limited to the decisions of generatl 	- .L" 
resource budgets and performance targets and the evaluation and selection 
of alternatives. Ruefli's model is significant because it is the first 
approach in which the nature of the resource allocation decision is 
dependent upon the structure of the organization. 
Ruefli's approach seems to incorporate many of the significant 
characteristics of the resource allocation process in the "real world". 
Utilizing Ruefli's model results in the allocation problem being expressed 
as an optimization problem. Ruefli proposes the use of generalized 
linear programming to solve this problem. [91, p. 509] 
In studying Ruefli's model and solution procedures, this author 
discovered a serious limitation (from a behavioral viewpoint) associated 
with the use of generalized linear programming for solution of the 
allocation problem posed by Ruefli. Although generalized linear 
Programming can be used to solve the overall problem posed by Ruefli, the 
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Figure 8. Ruefli's Three Level Organization. 
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function independently of each other, i. e., subordinate i cannot solve 
his allocation program without considering the resource allocation 
problems facing the other subordinates. This difficulty can be 
overcome by using a partitioning method rather than generalized linear 
programming. In the following paragraphs Ruefli's generalized goal  
decomposition model is described, and then an example is used to 
demonstrate the undesirability of using generalized linear programming. 
In his development [90, 91] Ruefli first introduces the 
subordinate's problems, and then the superordinates problem is 
discussed. However, it is possible to state the overall problem of the 
organization first, and then derive the superordinate's and subordinates' 
problems. The overall problem can be stated as: 
minimize 
+' + 
Lw 	+ w -K -K -K 
K=1 
subject to: 	E PYarK < G 
K=1 
xiK 	 < 1 	for j=1,... ,mK 
K=1,...,n 
xjK > 0, clK
+
, 1K > 0 
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where 	ae PK x 1 vector of goals for subordinate K, 
x
jK= activity level of project jK, 
hjK = PK  x 1 vector of project attributes, 
= PK x 1 vectors of positive and negative deviations 




K x 1 vectors of weights associated with the positive 
and negative deviations. 






K matrix which relates subordinate K's goal 
vectors to the fixed goals, G. 
The above overall problem can be decomposed in a straightforward 
manner. Notice that the constraints represented in (6-1) could be 
written equivalently as: 
mK 





Now, the overall problem may be separated into two parts: 
subordinate's portion 
minimize n 









- j=1 	- 
Z = 1 
x
jK 	 <1 
mK 
11+7 
xiK 	S+c, c > 0 
The other portion, the superordinatets part, is to select vectors, 
2K , such that KL1PK 2 <20 . The motivation for the superordinate's 
choice can be shown by letting the dual variables associated with (6-2) 
and (6-3) be irk and y respectively. The usual simplex criterion to 
determine if a variable should enter the basis is: enter variable j 
if z. 	c. > 0. In terms of the above problem this condition 
corresponds to - liKt2K  + y>0. Therefore, if one seeks to maximize 
lik t 2K + y or equivalently minimize LIK 1 LO 8 new values for Lic 
 can be generated. However, only certain 2K values are permissible 
because of the constraints, KEPK a <G
o . Thus the superordinate can K - -1 
generate new 2K 's by solving the problem 
n 
minimize 	




K 	< G . -  K=1 -o 
represents a P
K x 1 vector of prices whose j
th 
element corresponds 
to the change in subordinate K's objective function per unit change in 
the j
th 
goal. Since the 'TT vector corresponds to the vector of equality 
constraints, (6-2), it can assume positive or negative values. The 
interpretation associated with the kinds of information flows for the iter- 
ative solution procedure is similar to that of resource budgeting 
approaches.  
280nce y is determined, it can be treated as a constant. 
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A verbal description for Ruefli's model in the context of a 
decentralized organization is now given. The subordinates seek to 
determine what project levels should be undertaken in order to 
minimize the weighted deviation from the goals which have been set 
for them by the superordinate. Since the superordinate specifies the 
ad 's in the subordinate's portion of the overall problem, he has the 
ability to alter the subordinates' set of feasible solutions. The 
weights, 17k
+ 
and 	are assumed to be fixed throughout the solution 
process; however, Ruefli is not clear on who (superordinate, subordinate, 
or both) sets the weights. 
If the j
th project is not undertaken by subordinate K, then 
xjK = 0. On the other hand, 	= 1 implies that subordinate K fully 
implements project j. The formulation allows for fractional xjK 
values which corresponds to undertaking only portions of a project. 
IfxjK were required to be either zero or one, there is no satisfactory 
interpretation of the dual variables (see Balas [16], Gomory [52], 
and Alcaly [5]),and it will be shown that the solution algorithm depends 
on the usual dual variable interpretation. However, in many cases 
fractional xjK values can have meaning, e. g., x jK = 1/2 could mean 
that project jK is funded at one-half its maximum level. (See [4, 14] 
for illustrations of how such schemes can be incorporated) The fixed 
vector hoK relates the characteristics of project jK to the goals 1K. 
Generally, the goal vector, 2K , is composed of resources and requirements. 
For example, aK could equal a2K' a3K' .a4K)' where a1K 
= budget 
in dollars, a2K 
budgeted manpower, a3K = profit, and a iiK = share 
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of the market. 
The superordinate's task is to select the vectors 2K , K = 
1,...,n from some convex polyhedral set. Thus, the superordinate seeks 





P 	< G K —K — 0 = 
where the values of the components of G are often fixed by exogeneous 
factors such as government regulations, stockholders, union contracts, 
etc. There is a close relationship between this model and those models 
discussed in conjunction with resource budgeting mechanisms. Resource 
budgeting methods are concerned only with partitioning the resources 
among the subordinates in such a way so that supply is not exceeded, 
and the overall objective function is maximized. Ruefli's model can 
accomplish this, but, in addition, it is concerned with partitioning 
performance targets among the subordinates. Thus, a main extension 
made by Ruefli is to actually make explicit the consideration of both 
performance targets and resource budgets. AS Malinvaud points out the 
main distinction between most models and reality is that models usually 
do not allow the planning bureau (superordinate) to fix production 
targets [78, p. 205]. 
In Ruefli's model the superordinate sets target levels or 
goals for each subordinate. These goals consist of resource budgets 
and performance requirements. In the mathematical formulation the target 
levels for a subordinate appear as the right hand side of constraint 
subject to: 	I hoeiK - 	+  
J=1 
mic 
z = 0 
	
( 6-2 ) 
< 1 
z = 1 
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(6-1). Therefore, the act of fixing the target level influences 
the set of solutions which the subordinate can undertake, assuming 
he does not deviate from the target levels. In effect, the super-
ordinate is changing the subordinate's constraint set. Therefore, 
Ruefli's model is related to coordination through constraint intervention. 
Given an overall organizational resource allocation problem Ruefli 
proposes that an iterative information exchange take place between the 
superordinate and the subordinates. During the exchange the superordinate 
selects goals 5 aK , by solving his problem and communicates them to the 
subordinates. He advocates that each subordinate then solve the problem: 
minimize 
	+ 1 	_ 
z , x 
L05 21( 5 .k 
Upon solution of this problem subordinate K communicates the dual 
multipliers associated with (6-2) to the superordinate, and the process 
continues. The process described above may not converge to the 
correct solution and is not the correct way to apply generalized linear 
programming to the overall problem. 
The correct interpretation is for the superordinate to select 
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goals by solving his problem and then communicate them to the subordinaL3. 
The subordinates then, as a group; must solve their portion of the over-
all problem given by (6-it). In addition the subordinates must provide 
for taking a convex combination of the goals assigned iteratively by 
the superordinate. This is done by associating z t with 21(t and 
replacing z = 1 by t= 1. Thus, the subordinates' problem at iteration 
r of the iterative solution procedure is: 






subject to: 	E h. K ' 
j=1 -73 J 
r 














xik >0, 	dic • > 0 
This discussion illustrates that the interpretation associated 
with the solution of the problem represented by Ruefli's model does 
not allow the subordinates to operate independently, and the actual 
choice of the final goals is no longer decided by the superordinate. 
The behavorial implication is just the opposite of the Dantzig-Wolfe 
algorithm. Here the authority to make the final decision concerning the 
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goal levels assigned to each subordinate is made by all the 
subordinates acting as a coalition. The superordinate communicates a 
new goal vector, 2K , to each subordinate at stage t of an iterative 
process. Each subordinate then considers this new goal vector 
along with all previous ones in determining what vector of goals 
will actually be assigned at iteration t. Thus, the superordinate 
participates in the decision process, but the final decision and the 
decision of which goals will be assigned to each subordinate is made by 
the subordinates acting as a group. In light of this interpretation, 
Ruefli's procedure is unappealing because it destroys the subordinates' 
independence. Fortunately, these problems can be overcome by another 
solution scheme which maintains the independence of the subordinates. 
The solution procedure is really nothing more than an appli-
cation of the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition principle to the overall 
problem. However, the interpretation of superordinate's and subordinates' 
problem is simply reversed, i. e., the master problem in Dantzig-Wolfe 
is the subordinates' problem and the subproblem in Dantzig-Wolfe is the 
superordinate's problem. This reverse Dantzig-Wolfe process eliminates 
the behavioral drawback of the superordinate having to take convex 
combinations to arrive at a final solution. However, if an overall 
optimum is desired, it is necessary for the subordinates as a group to 
choose the convex combination. Ruefli never points out the serious 
drawback associated with this although he does indicate that the 
optimal goal vector, 2K*, may lie in the interior of the superordinate's 
constraint set [91, p. 510]. Thus it is possible that 
where E at = 1, at 10, and a
K  is the goal vector actually found by t=1 
solving the superordinate's problem at iteration t, i. e.,
t 





(K=1,...,n) is an extreme point of the set given by 
n 
E P a 	< G . —K — K1
K 
  
Despite these limitations Ruefli's model is a contribution in 
the area of analytical techniques for modelling the decision process 
in a hierarchical decentralized organization. The reasons for this 
statement include: 
(1) The model is among the first to combine concepts of 
organizational behavior and economic theory. For example, the idea of 
goal seeking behavior as displayed by the superordinate and the subordina+es 
corresponds fairly well to the behavioral theory discussed by March and 
Simon [80]. 
(2) The solution methodology is based on the theory of linear 
programming for which simple and efficient solution procedures exist. 
(3) The model was developed for a three level organization, 
but it can easily be extended to consider an n level organization. 
(1) The model allows one to consider both technological and 
behavorial externalities. It has been noted [90, p. 56] that most 
pricing coordination mechanisms cannot handle externalities because they 
result in multiple prices for activities. Both behavioral and tech- 
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nological externalities imply some relationship between subordinate 
decision making units. An example of a technological externality 
might be if subordinate j implements a particular project, then 
subordinate K must implement a specific project. Ruefli would handle 
this difficulty by having the decision of whether to implement the 
project made by a unit which is superordinate to both subordinates. 
Thus, a technological externality tends to reduce the subordinates' 
decision making authority, and hence increase the amount of central-
ization of decision making. The concept of submitting the imple-
mentation decision to a higher authority is well known in management 
theory [105, p. 142]. 
Behavorial externalities arise when the goal seeking behavior 
of a subordinate is affected by the goal seeking behavior of another 
subordinate. For example, subordinate j might have as an objective 
to make a profit greater than subordinate K. Such dependencies 
create problems in proving that the goal decomposition procedure 
converges, e. g., see Ruefli [94] for a complete discussion. 
(5) The solution for the resource allocation decision problem 
depends on the structure of the organization. This can be attributed 
to the use of a goal programming formulation. Ruefli illustrates this 
by considering allocation plans selected under two different structures: 
a PPBS structure and a bureacratic structure [93]. The allocation 
plan selected under each structure differed significantly. This 
supports the hypothesis that the formal structure of the information 
system and its relationship to the organizational structure is a 
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a determining factor for the behavior of the organization. 
As further evidence Ruefli shows that the overall objective 
function and constraints will be different for a centralized and a 
decentralized structure [91, p. 514]. Thus, the resource allocation 
decision may differ under each structure. 
To summarize, Ruefli has proposed an interesting model which 
would seem to represent some important aspects of the resource 
allocation process in hierarchical decentralized organizations; 
however, there are several difficulties which limit the effectiveness 
of his approach. In the next section these difficulties will be 
overcome. 
Extensions to Ruefli's Model: A Goal Partitioning Procedure  
To overcome the difficulties associated with the interpretation of 
the solution procedure for Ruefli's problem, a different approach is 
now given. This extension has its roots in the works of Kelley [62], 
Benders [21], Dantzig [36], Zangwill [125], and Geoffrion [46]. 
Consider the following as the problem facing the organization: 
Organization's Problem  






+ w 	+ + u_ -K
e 




subject to: H- 1K 	1K 	 - 
GKlcK 	 f-K 4- 2K 	
= LK 
156 





5 -K - 
It is shown in the next paragraphs that the overall problem above can 
be decomposed into n subordinate problems and one superordinate 
problem. Subordinate K's decision problem is expressed as: 
Problem SK 




= minimize 	K 
) W 	IK 1K 4- f-K 









This problem statement differs from Ruefli's in the following ways: 
(1) The subordinate has two types of goals, 2 K and SK . 2K 
 represents those resource budgets and performance targets which are 
set by the superordinate. 	represents those goals which the sub- 
ordinate has set for himself. The (3 goals remain fixed throughout 
the planning procedure, but the 2 K goals may be iteratively adjusted 
by the superordinate. 
(2) HK is a pK x mK  matrix which relates the activities of 
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subordinate K to the goals included in ate , and GK is a rK x mK 
 matrix relating the activities to the fiK goals. 
(3) The constraints, AKxK < CK , represent technological and 
other restrictions on subordinate K that must be satisfied. These 
constraints correspond to the "hard" constraints as discussed by 
Chamberlain 125] and Krouse [70]. In contrast to these constraints 
the restrictions in (6-5) and (6-6) are policy targets which may be 
internally adaptable. These changes are meant to improve the model's 
realism. They explicitly allow for the subordinate to have his 
awn set of goals in addition to those set by the suporordinate. In 
addition, the concept of two kinds of constraints: technical and 
adaptable, is included 135]. 
There are several interpretations that one may associate with 
the objective function for the subordinate. These interpretations 
are discussed later; however, for the present it is assumed that the 
value of a subordinate's objective function represents his discrepancy 
+ 	- 	+ 	- 
dissatisfaction. In this light the weights, EK , , 2K , uK , 
represent the means for transforming the deviations which could be 
measured in dollars or man-hours, etc., into units of dissatisfaction. 
Thus, the weights represent the subordinate's priorities for the 
targets. This technique also handles the problem of multiple objectives. 
The development for the goal partitioning procedure is now 
given. The dual of problem SK 
is 
Problem DK 
maximize vK(aK ) = 	2K + ic '. 1K - 
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subject to: 	+ GK ' ■K - AK 'LK < 





The superordinate's task is to divide up the resource and 
performance requirements among the subordinates in order to meet 
the overall restrictions imposed upon the organization, i. e., he 
must choose 2K , K=1,...,n so that 
EP
Ka <  K=1 
(6-7) 
These overall restrictions can represent several different kinds of 
considerations. For example, limited resource supplies, desired 
profit levels, and requirements concerning the relationships between 
subordinates' resource budgets or performance levels, can all be 
handled via (6-7). 
Since problem D
K is a linear programming problem, some opt imum 
solution must occur at an extreme point. Notice that the extreme 
points do not depend on 2K . Thus, for any choice of 2K , the set of 






N 7.1K , 24c , 	) represent extreme points SK = 1,...,EK for problem DK. 
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One might worry about whether problem D K possesses a feasible bounded 
optimal solution. The following remarks address these questions. 
Remark 6.1  
If there exists an lcK such that AK < CK , then problem DK 
has a bounded optimum for any choice of 2 K < co. 
Proof: By hypothesis problem S K possesses a feasible solution and thus 
according to linear programming duality theory, problem D K cannot have 
an unbounded optimum. 
Remark 6.2  
If the organization's problem possesses a feasible bounded 
optimum solution, then problem DK has a feasible solution for any 
choice of IK < 00 such that E PK2 La. 
K=1 
Proof: Infeasibility in problem D K implies infeasibility or unbounded- 
ness in problem S
K. 
By hypothesis problem S
K 
cannot be infeasible 
because there is some xK such that A__x_ <CK . Problem SK cannot have 
an unbounded optimum because this would imply that the organization's 
problem is unbounded. 
From duality theory for a givet 2 any feasible solution, 
xK , 21K
+





	_I 	+ 1 + 	- 1 - 	
S
K 
'Tr 	+ 13 ' X -C tp 	for -K -K -K - K -K 
given a < cc , the optimal 
HK 4-.11K LK 2K -I- LK 2K L 
,EK where E PK2K <A1L. Also, 
K=1 
to problems SK and DK have the property that zK*(aK )=vK*(ad. 
for a given a 
aK* =z(a ) >a/ S
K 	K 	K 
Tr + 1 X -C  K K - --K -K -K -K 
i6o 
The organization's problem can then be written as 
Problem 0  
n 






K = 1, '
..,E







Theorem 6.3 (Benders, [21])  
Problem 0 and the organization's problem are equivalent. 
The proof is given by Benders [21, p. 240] and is an immediate 
consequence of the dual representation of the problem. Thus, if problem 
0 could be solved, the organization's problem would be solved. The 
primary difficulty with problem 0 is that there is a constraint for 
every extreme point in problem SK , K=1,...,n. However, by using a 
clever method these constraints can be generated sequentially. The 
new feature is that the generation scheme can be interpreted as an 
iterative exchange of information between the superordinate and each 
of the subordinates. The information communicated to each subordinate 
is a vector of goals which contains resource budgets and performance 
requirements. The information communicated upward from each subordinate 
is how dissatisfied the subordinate is with the goals which have been 
set for him, and how this discrepancy dissatisfaction would change if the 
goals assigned to him change. 
The iterative procedure begins with the selection of an initial 
set of goals, aK
1
, for each subordinate K=1,...,n. This selection 
is performed so that 
E P 	< 
K—K  g. K=1 
In an established organization the initial selection can be guided by 




 subordinate K solves problem SK to find zK (2K1 ) and 
1 	 * . Since zK*a 1 
	,lc ) = vK 	K) atthe optimum of problems S K and 
DK' the superordinate solves the following problem to find new goal 
 vectors, 2K
2 









 ) 	(a 1 ), 	
2 	2 	1 Tr_ +(a )'Tr. K —n K —K 
Z P
K 
	< —K 	g. 
K=1 
The entire process can be summarized in the following steps: 
(1) The superordinate initially chooses a set of a
K 1 's 
(K=1,...,n) such that 
n 
1 
P a < 
K —K — 
K=1 
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He then asks subordinate K: what would you do if you received the 
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vector of goals , ail ? , 
	 e., what would you do if you received the 
resource budgets and the requirements on your performance contained in 
a 1 ? 
(2) At stage t of the iterative information exchange process, 
subordinate K responds by solving the following problem for a fixed 
t 
► 
minimize 	zK(aKt ) = w 	




_ ► _ - 
subject to: (6-8) 
GK 	 - e + e -K -K = 
LK L 
	
2K , 21( 
> 0 




t and 7 	which is a vector of dual variables associated with the 
constraints in (6-8), to the superordinate. Note that the jth 
component of t , call it 	is a measure of how subordinate K's 
objective function would change if changes were made in the j th component 
of the goal vector a t . 
, (3) At stage t, the superordinate receives z K*(21.K
t 
 ) and 1K*t 






subject to: 	t 	t 	*. aK > z;(2 K )  -  (n 3), a 	( ff*j), 
at+1 	(6-9) 
-K -K -K 	-K 
for K=1,...,n and 
,t 





The solution to this problem is 2
t+1 
 for K=1,...,n which is a new set 
of goals for the subordinates. Thus, 2 K
t+1 
 is transmitted to subordinate 
K, and the iterative process of steps 2 and 3 continue until say at 







. If the subordinates find a solution such that 
E . a1)
K




K=1 	 K=1 
then 2rl is the optimal goal vector for subordinate K. 
Figure 9 depicts the iterative communication process associated 
with the procedure described above. 
The following theorem ensures that the procedure described 
above converges to an optimal solution. 
Theorem 6.1  
If one assumes that the set of a (K=1,...,n) which satisfy 
n 
E PK 2K < a is closed and bounded, then the iterative procedure 
K=1 
described above converges to the optimal solution for the organization's 
problem in a finite number of iterations. 
3_64 
Superordinate: Sets initial goals for each subordinate. 
Subordinate k: Evaluate projects in light of goals set by 
Stage 	 superordinate and tentatively select project 
1 activity levels. 









Subordinate k: Evaluates and selects project activity levels. 
p+1 Superordinate: Stop: E 	z*C1 - ) n K GP*• aP+1 is the optimal 
k=1 k —k 	.1 k ' 
goal vector for subordinate k. 
Figure 9. Iterative Process of Goal Partitioning Procedure. 
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The proof follows from a number of other works (see Benders 
[21, p. 245], Lasdon [72, p. 379], Zangwill [125]). This entire 
procedure has been developed for linear problems; however, the procedure 
can easily be generalized to the situation where the organization's 
problem is convex (see Kelley [62] and Zangwill [125]). 
Thus, the goal partitioning procedure stated earlier in this 
chapter avoids the difficulty of having to take convex combinations 
which is required with Ruefli's "generalized goal" decomposition 
algorithm. 
Lasdon [72, p. 381] discusses the similarity of the Bender's 
procedure from which the goal partitioning procedure presented 
earlier was derived and the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm. 
Lasdon concludes that for linear problems, Bender's algorithm and the 
Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm are really duals of one another. 
Some Properties of the Goal Partitioning Procedure  
The goal partitioning procedure has several appealing features. 
At each step of the iterative procedure, the current solution, a_ 
(K=1,...,n), satisfies the constraints imposed on the superordinate's 
behavior. Thus, the partitioning method can be considered as a primal 
feasible approach, and the iterative information exchange can stop 
anytime and still ensure that a feasible solution exists for 
implementation. 
As Bender [21, p. 249] and Zangwill [125] point out, an 
attractive feature of his algorithm (and therefore of the goal 
partitioning procedure) is the availability of upper and lower bounds 
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on the organization's optimal objective function value. In terms of 
the organization's problem, a solution is sought which minimizes the 
sum of the discrepancy dissatisfactions of all the subordinates. The 
following theorem shows how the superordinate can construct an upper 
and lower bound on the minimal amount of total dissatisfaction at 
each iteration of the information exchange process. 
Theorem 6.5  
Let the optimal objective function value of the organization's 
problem be given by 
n 	+' +* 	- 
D = E Lw clK + w 	
* 	 _* 
uK
+1 
 -K 	-K  K=1 









- - 	- K=1 	 K=1 K=1 
The proof for this theorem can be found in Benders [21, p. 249] 
and Lasdon [72, p. 380] and is immediate from duality theory. Thus, the 
superordinate always knows an upper estimate and a lower estimate for 
the total minimal dissatisfaction. In addition, the lower bound, 
n 	t 
E a, is monotonically increasing. Unfortunately, the upper 
K=1 	-"\-. 
n 
bound E zK*(aKt )' which represents a feasible solution does not K=1 
monotonically increase. This observation is unfortunate because it 
means that if the iterative exchange process begins with 
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E4(a,1) near the optimum, it may take several iterations to 
K.1 
decrease the current best upper bound for D. 
The difference between the current lower bound and the least 
upper bound gives the subordinate an idea of how far from optimality 
the current solution is because the upper and lower bounds will be 
equal at optimality. This is useful information for two reasons: 
(1) If the goal partitioning procedure is terminated before 
optimality is reached, it gives the superordinate an indication of 
how far from optimality the solution is. 
(2) It has been implicitly assumed that there is no cost 
(monetary or otherwise) associated with the iterative information exchange 
in the goal partitioning procedure. In actual practice there 
would be a cost in terms of money or time. Knowing how much the 
difference between the upper and lower bounds on the minimal subordinate 
dissatisfaction decreases from iteration to iteration can facilitate 
the determination of whether further iterative information exchanges 
are warranted. 
It should be noted that Theorem 6.5 provides information on 
bounds for the sum of all the subordinate's dissatisfactions, but it 
does not suggest anything about the bounds on an individual subordinate's 
dissatisfaction. In fact, a particular subordinate's dissatisfaction 
may increase or decrease from iteration to iteration. 
An Equivalent Formulation for the Superordinate's Problem  
It would appear that there is an alternative formulation for the 
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This alternative form is a surrogated version of (6-9) in the sense 
that all the inequalities on the subordinates have been summed to 
give one inequality. 29 Clearly, the above formulation appears to 
have fewer constraints. However, using the above form might require 
more iterations to reach optimality than that of (6-9). The trade 
off between the two formulations would have to be determined from 
a computational study. 
Discussion of the Goal Partitioning Procedure  
In this section several important features regarding the 
economic and behavioral interpretations and implications of the goal 
partitioning procedure are discussed. These include an exact inter-
pretation of what information is being transmitted and how it is used, 
an explanation of how the weights associated with goals are determined 
and affected, and why the goal partitioning procedure can be considered 
29
See Rardin and Unger [88] for some related work. 
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as a satisficing and compromising technique. 
Behavioral Interpretations  
The iterative procedure described earlier is envisioned as 
taking place at discrete time intervals. It is assumed that the 
organization is complex, and thus the superordinate does not know 
detailed information about the projects, problems, or constraints 
facing each subordinate decision making unit. The superordinate is 
unable to consider all the complexities which enter into the resource 
allocation decision process [70, p. 5l5]. Therefore, he concentrates 
on certain aggregate measures of performance for the organization. 
From his previous experience, his future expectations, and possibly 
pressure from factors external to the operating environment such as 
stockholders, the federal government, labor unions, etc., [35, p. 123] 
the superordinate forms certain goals. These goals are of three forms: 
(1) Goals which relate to the quantities of resources 
available for use by the organization. For example, he might know the 
operating budget and the capital expenditure budget. In addition, 
there any exist only limited supplies of certain skills, equipment, 
or facilities for the organization's use in carrying out its 
activities. These kinds of goals are directly related to limited 
supplies of resources. 
(2) Goals which relate to the performance of the organization. 
Thus, the superordinate sets certain quantifiable (and thus measurable) 
objectives which he feels the organization should attain. Examples 
of such goals might be "make a profit of a certain amount," "increase 
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the company's market share by 2 percent," "reduce major crime by 
5 percent," or "decrease traffic fatalities by 10 percent." The 
assumption of the goal partitioning procedure is that the super-
ordinate can set these objectives. The immediate interest is not 
with why or how these goals are set other than to hypothesize their 
existence. Goals of this type are referred to as performance goals. 
(3) Goals which relate to how either the resources or 
performance goals are divided among the subordinate decision units. 
Examples of this type might include "the police department budget 
should never exceed the fire department budget," "the libraries 
budget should be 10 percent of the sum of the department's budgets," 
and "any money spent on capital improvements should net a 25 percent 
return." 
The task facing the superordinate is how should he partition 
the goals among the subordinates. The assumption of the goal 
partitioning method is that the total resource and performance goals 
should be partitioned and assigned to the subordinate decision units 
so that the three types of restrictions mentioned above are met, and 
the total amount of subordinate discrepancy dissatisfaction is 
minimized. Thus, the three types of goals are reflected in the constraint 






K  is the vector of goals assigned to subordinate K. It is 
assumed that these three kinds of goals remain fixed throughout the 
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iterative process. 
Subordinate K's behavior is goal directed in the sense that 
each time a new set of goals is determined for him, he attempts to 
find a set of project activity levels which do not exceed the technological 
restrictions common to him, i. e., satisfy AKxK 	and which 
minimize a weighted deviation from the goals set by the superordinate and 
by the subordinate. There are several different interpretations that 
one may associate with a subordinate's weighted deviation. Collomb 
[33] refers to it as the "internal tension" of subordinate K. The 
implication is that if the subordinate arrives at a solution which 
does not deviate from the goals, then there will be no internal pressure 
within the subordinate's decision unit. On the other hand if the 
subordinate arrives at a solution which does deviate from the goals 
established by the superordinate, and the weight associated with these 
goals is positive, then there is pressure created within the sub-
ordinate's decision unit. This pressure can serve as an incentive 
to generate new alternatives or to reduce the organizational slack [35, 
p. 36]. 
A subordinate's weighted deviation also can be interpreted as 
the unit's discrepancy dissatisfaction. The qualifier "discrepancy" is 
used to emphasize that any dissatisfaction which results is because of 
the discrepancy between the goals set either by the superordinate or 
the subordinate and what the subordinate can accomplish. It is 
possible for the subordinate to meet the targets set by the super-
ordinate and still be dissatisfied. However, this dissatisfaction 
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is not a result of the deviation (discrepancy). 
Clearly, the weights associated with goal deviations have a 
significant role in the amount of internal tension or discrepancy 
dissatisfaction. It is explicitly assumed that these weights are 
determined by the subordinate himself. However, there is no reason 
to assume that the superordinate cannot set some of them or at least 
influence their value. One could interpret the amount of a subordinate's 
autonomy as the power or ability to set the weights by himself. Thus, 
the more power or authority that a superordinate has in setting or 
influencing a subordinate's weights, the less autonomy that the 
subordinate has. 
As an example of how the superordinate can influence the value 
that a subordinate associates with a weight, suppose the super-
ordinate tells the subordinate that if he selects a resource allocation 
program which requires more resources than he is budgeted for in the 
goal setting process, then he is fired. This would effect the priority 
that the subordinate attaches to meeting that goal. 
The superordinate's power to influence the subordinate's 
weights depends upon the type of organization and the reward structure. 
Although it is assumed that the weights associated with goal deviations 
are fixed throughout the goal partitioning procedure, it can be 
generalized so that the weights change during the iterative process, 
or that the weights are selected by the superordinate or the subordinate 
from some set. Changing the value of the weights during the partitioning 
process would have no effect on the convergence properties as long as 
after some point in time the weights do not change. Allowing the 
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superordinate to directly select all or some of the weights from a set 
would obviously provide the superordinate with another mechanism for 
influencing the subordinate's behavior. Note that such a provision 
would be a direct example of a goal intervention method because it 
involves the influence of the subordinate's objective function. 
Ijiri [59] discusses ways of arriving at numerical values for 
the weights given that the decision maker can order his priorities for 
goals. It should be apparent that the weight associated with a goal 
deviation depends somewhat on the magnitude of the goal level. Thus, 
the weight may change, depending upon the goal level. However, it 
seems reasonable to assume that over some domain of goal levels the 
weights are constant. Therefore, if an organization has some stability, 
the goal level domain could be easily defined. In a rapidly changing 
organization, it is much more difficult to specify a domain. 
The actual numerical value assigned to a weight depends on 
several factors. Two important considerations are the reward structure 
and the subordinate's perception of the superordinate's propensity to 
change assigned goal levels. 	Clearly, as the penalty associated with 
a goal deviation increases, the weight that a subordinate attaches 
to a deviation should increase. Also, the more receptive the super-
ordinate is to changing goals, the greater the value of the weight 
should be. This is true because the greater a given subordinate's 
discrepancy dissatisfaction, the more likely that an adjustment of the 
goals will decrease the sum of the subordinate's dissatisfactions. 
When the superordinate tentatively sets a vector of goals for 
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a subordinate, the subordinate solves his decision problem, problem S K , 
finding the resource allocation program he would undertake if in fact 
these were the goals set for him. In the process he also arrives at 
how dissatisfied he is with these goals. This discrepancy dissatisfaction 
is simply the optimal value of his objective function. Since a 
subordinate's problem is linear, the solution algorithm also gives the 
values of the dual multipliers associated with the constraints on 
goals, (6-8). The usual interpretation of the dual multipliers is the 
change in the value of the objective function per unit change in the 
right hand side. Thus, the j th component of 
—K
Ti' is the change in 
dissatisfaction per unit change in the j th goal. 
These two pieces of information, the amount of the subordinate's 
dissatisfaction, and an indication of how this dissatisfaction would 
change if the goals set by the superordinate were changed would 
intuitively be present in an actual allocation process. For example, 
the subordinate receives a resource budget and certain performance 
requirements and communicates to the superordinate information about 
how unreasonable the goals which were set for him are, and then makes 
an argument for changing them, explaining how much less dissatisfied 
he would be if they were changed in a certain way. 
The superordinate takes this information from each subordinate 
and uses it to determine if there exists some other partitioning of 
his goals which might decrease the current amount of subordinate 
discrepancy dissatisfaction. Specifically, at iteration t of the 
information exchange the superordinate knows the current best estimate 
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of the total subordinate dissatisfaction. This quantity ig given by 
n * t 
[ E z (a Kt )] K=1 K -K 
subordinate dissatisfaction. In the superordinate's problem, 
	K 
is a lower bound on the minimal amount of subordinate dissatisfaction. 
With the above interpretation for the optimal dual multipliers, 2 K*, 
one can interpret the constraints in (6-9). Given an 2Kt , the optimal 
solution for subordinate K's problem has the property that 
zK*(aKt) = 2K*I2K 	 EK* -K • 
Thus, subordinate K's internal dissatisfaction depends on two terms: 
2K*TaK and 2"i34( - LIK"CK . IK* 12K is discrepancy dissatisfaction 
which can be attributed to the goals set by the superordinate. 
2■K*1K - IK*CK is discrepancy dissatisfaction which results from the 
subordinate's goals and "local" constraints. The constraint, 
_K2K 	71. it t+1 
GK 	K 	 - 
z * eaK ) - 	j , 
- 	 K f 5 
states that the superordinate's current estimate on subordinate K's 
dissatisfaction must be greater than the subordinate's minimal 
dissatisfaction given goal, 2Kt , minus the portion of the subordinate's 
dissatisfaction, aKji 2Kj , which is directly attributable to the goals 
set by the superordinate at iteration j, plus an estimate of the 
dissatisfaction caused by the new goals which are to be determined 
at iteration t+1. The reason that several iterations are generally 
min 
t 
which is an upper bound on the minimal amount of 
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required, i. e., several constraints of the form (6-9) are generated 
before optimality is reached, is because 	+1 a is only an —K —K 




It is claimed that during the iterative information exchange 
the total discrepancy dissatisfaction of the subordinates will decrease. 
The superordinate facilitates this decrease by iteratively adjusting 
the goals 	. However, the goals determined by the subordinate also 
affect the amount of discrepancy dissatisfaction. It has been 
assumed that these goals remain fixed during the process. The amount 
of discrepancy dissatisfaction caused by deviating from the 	goals 
can change from iteration to iteration, but it is not possible to 
make any statements about whether it will increase or decrease 
during the goal partitioning procedure. March and Simon [80] note 
that if goals are not attainable they may be changed so that they can 
be reached. Such an assertion would imply that the LK 's may change 
through time. The convergence of the goal partitioning procedure is 
unaffected by these changes so long as after some point in time the 
—K IS is remain fixed. 
To summarize, the goal partitioning approach involves the 
communication of information between the superordinate and the 
subordinates. The superordinate is a policy setter in that he sets 
goals for each subordinate so that the available organization resources 
are not exceeded, the performance requirements are met, and any 
requirements on the relationship between the subordinate's resources 
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and performance requirements are satisfied. The information 
communicated from the subordinates upward, consists of the current 
amount of discrepancy dissatisfaction or internal tension, and how this 
dissatisfaction would change if the goals changed. The goal partitioning 
procedure shows that the information communicated between superordinate 
and subordinates is at least sufficient in order to find that 
partitioning of the superordinate's goals which minimizes the total 
subordinate dissatisfaction. 
The concept of goal setting is a form of constraint intervention 
in the sense that the superordinate passes down goal vectors which 
serve as the right hand side for constraints in the subordinate's 
problem. However, it has been pointed out how the superordinate could 
either directly or indirectly influence the weights in the subordinate's 
objective function, and thus could also be considered as a goal 
intervention method. Therefore, one can associate goal partitioning 
with both constraint and goal intervention methods. 
Compromising Final Solutions  
Proposition 9  
The goal partitioning procedure will likely result in the 
subordinates arriving at a resource allocation program which does not 
meet all of the superordinate's goals. 
A significant feature of the goal partitioning procedure is 
that although the superordinate sets the final target levels for 
resources and performance requirements, the final solution chosen by the 
subordinate may not meet the overall goals of the superordinate. 
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To illustrate this feature, suppose 	represents the optimal solution 
	
„ .. 
to subordinate K's problem given aK . Thus, aK = HKXK — 1K
+ 
+ clK_ . 
Substituting for aK in (6-10) yields 
E 
1 
 P {H 	— sj 
K
i < 9 
However, there is no assurance that 
E P
K
(HKXK ) < 
K=1 
is satisfied. Therefore, the solution to be implemented by the 
subordinates may not in fact satisfy the three types of goals 
mentioned earlier. This can be looked upon in two ways. In the first 
way, such a result can be envisioned as "enlighted" coordination. 
That is, the final solution reached is affected by the dissatisfactions 
of the subordinates. This effect shows that the superordinate is 
either unwilling or unable to force the subordinates to meet all of the 
superordinate's goals. It demonstrates that the superordinate is 
willing to "back off" or compromise on what goals are attained because 
of his concern over the subordinates' dissatisfaction. 
The second way of looking at this feature is that it is 
undesirable because there may be certain goals which the superordinate 
cannot compromise. In this case the superordinate must create a 
reward structure which ensures that if it is technologically possible, 
certain goals are met. This would involve influencing the subordinate's 
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weights attached to deviations from goals. 
Satisficing Behavior  
Ruefli [90, p. 28] argues that since the subordinate's 
problem in his goal decomposition approach has a goal programming 
formulation, then each subordinate is really not optimizing but is in 
fact "satisficing." If this statement is true, then of course it could 
be applied to the goal partitioning procedure presented in this chapter. 
However, this author would challenge the statement that goal programming 
is a satisficing approach in the sense of Simon, who first used the 
term. To be satisficing, March and Simon [80, p. 140] state that 
there must exist a set of criteria that describes minimally satisfactory 
alternatives, and a selected alternative must meet or exceed all these 
criteria. But, goal programming seeks to find a set of alternatives 
which minimizes some weighted deviation from certain goals. Therefore, 
to make a goal programming formulation represent satisficing, it is 
necessary to identify the satisficing region and then make the weights 
for deviating from this region very high. 
A slightly generalized concept of satisficing can be represented 
through goal interval programming [33, 42]. The basic idea of the 
approach is that for any goal, there is some interval of performance 
in which the decision maker is completely satisfied. As performance 
moves away from this interval, the decision maker becomes increasingly 
dissatisfied. 
In order to express such a scheme consider the following 
" amended" decision problem for subordinate K. 
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defines the jth interval for a positive deviation from the goals set 
by the superordinate. To demonstrate this approach, suppose the 
superordinate desires a profit level of between 6 and 8 units. If profit 
exceeds 8, the chances of government action increases, and if profit 
falls below 6, the stockholders will get aroused. A profit level outside 
this interval may be acceptable but is to be avoided if possible. In 
addition, as the profit level moves away from this interval the 
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dissatisfaction increases in a manner given by Figure 10. 
From Figure 10 the dissatisfaction could be written as: 








+ 3/2d-3 + 4d
-4  
where 	0 < d+1 8-7 = 1 
0,< d+2 < 10-8 = 2 
0 < d
+3 
0 < d-1  < 7-6 = 1 
0 < d-? < 6-5 = 1 
0 < d-3 < 5-3 = 2 
0 < d-4 
The constraint concerned with profit would be 
- -4 px, + p2x2 + 	+ pmxm-d+1  -d+2  -d+3  +d-1 +d-2 3 +d +d = 7 
Thus, the proposed model can easily be altered to reflect a satisficing 
type of behavior. The only restriction that must be made is that the 
dissatisfaction function be convex. This restriction is necessary to 
maintain the subordinate's problem as a convex programming problem. 
Computationally and in terms of interpretation, this approach creates 
no difficulty; however, the notation and mathematical representation is 
quite cumbersome. Therefore, the form of Problem S i will not be 
written, but instead the less complex form will be used where the 
piecewise approach is not used. 
12 3 
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Figure 10. Example of Dissatisfaction Function. 
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The goal partitioning procedure displays the characteristics 
of bounded rationality and can be considered as a generalized satisficing 
approach. According to Simon [103] for the organization to find an 
optimal set of project activity levels to undertake, it is necessary 
to have an exhaustive set of criteria which considers all factors 
that are influenced by different alternatives. The rational decision 
maker then optimizes with respect to these criteria. However, 
because of man's bounded rationality, he makes his choices based upon 
"a simple picture of the situation that takes into account just a 
few of the factors that he regards as most relevant and crucial" 
[104, p. XXVI]. This is exactly what the superordinate does when he 
selects his goals which are represented by in the constraint 
E P
K   < -K  
g. 
K=1 
Instead of trying to construct some overall grandiose utility function, 
the superordinate settles for a few measures of effectiveness, e. g., 
profit, market share, liquidity position, etc. In this sense the goal 
partitioning procedure recognizes the "bounded rationality" of man. 
Summary of Behavioral Aspects  
The goal partitioning procedure presented earlier in this 
chapter has several appealing aspects. One of the more important 
features is summarized in proposition 10. 
Proposition 10  
In a non-cooperative organization a goal partitioning procedure 
may lead to a resource allocation program which is lifferent from that 
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which would be selected by the superordinate or the subordinate acting 
in isolation, but it will be a program which reflects both the goals 
of the superordinate and the goals of the subordinates. 
Both the superordinate and the subordinates influence the 
resource allocation program selected by the organization. The super-
ordinate is a policy setting entity. He sets goals for each of the 
subordinates in such a way as to ensure that the resource supply is 
not exceeded,to ensure that certain measures of performance are met, 
and so that any other restrictions concerning the way resources or 
performance requirements are assigned to subordinates are met. The 
concept of goal setting for each subordinate is in some sense related 
to aspiration level theory, e. g., see Frank [45], Chapman and Volkman 
[26], Atkinson [11] and Charnes and Stedry [31], Probably the study most 
relevant to the goal setting displayed in the goal partitioning pro-
cedure is that of Stedry [110]. He used experiments to develop a 
mathematical model which showed that performance is better when the 
goals set by an external source are slightly higher (possibly even 
unattainable) than the subject's aspiration level. However, if the 
goals are set much higher than what can be attained, then performance 
is very poor. Thus, if the superordinate sets goals which are somewhat 
above what a subordinate can attain, the subordinate may perform better. 
The use of a goal programming formulation alleviates the mathematical 
difficulties associated with setting goals for which no feasible 
solution exists. 
The information which is exchanged by the superordinate and 
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the subordinates allows the organization to arrive at a set of project 
activity levels in a finite number of information exchanges. The 
procedure recognizes the "bounded rationality" of the organization, 
and it also explicitly allows for the superordinate to compromise 
on what goals are attained because of his concern over the discrepancy 
dissatisfaction of the subordinates. 
In the remaining two sections of this chapter two different 
types of negotiation models are presented. One form recognizes that the 
organization might be interested in minimizing the maximum dissatisfaction 
of any one subordinate rather than maximizing their total dissatisfaction. 
The second form, which has been proposed by Ruefli [92] and Collomb [33], 
allows for the superordinate to change the solution found because of 
his own dissatisfaction. 
Minimizing the Maximum Subordinate Dissatisfaction  
It seems reasonable that instead of the superordinate desiring 
to minimize the sum of the subordinates dissatisfaction, the super-
ordinate might be more concerned with keeping each subordinate's 
dissatisfaction as small as possible. In this section it is shown 
how such an objective can be handled mathematically via a partitioning 
procedure. Essentially it is shown that with the above objective 
the overall problem can still be stated in a linear form, and then 
Bender's partitioning can be applied. 
In the case at hand the overall organization's problem can 
be stated as: 30 
30
The same notation and interpretation is the terms as before. 
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K=1,.. .,n 
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As stated above the problem is nonlinear, but it can be given in an 
equivalent form which is linear. This formulation is given below: 
minimize z 
subject to: 	z > w 
+ 1 _I 	-0 4- 	_t 
w clK + 	e + e -K -K -K 
H4, 1± 4. 1K- 
	 —cxK = O 
= 






0 - 	 e 
> —5 5 Sc 5 	.--71c 
> 0 
It is possible to break this problem up and apply a procedure 
exactly like the goal partitioning process given on pages 161 to 163 
with the following exception. At iteration t the superordinate chooses 
+1 new goal vectors, 2K , by solving the following problem: 
minimize zt 
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subject to: zt > zK
t 
 )  —K iT 
t+1 
for K=1,...,n and 
k=1,...,t 
E P at+1 
K K=1 K-  
The iterative process continues until at some iteration p when the 




. If, given 
p+1 K , the subordinates find a solution such that 




then +1 is the optimal goal vector for subordinate K. 
The assertions that this scheme converges finitely and that 
there exist upper and lower bounds on the optimal value of the objective 
function can be shown using Bender's results [21]. The question of 
whether the formulation where the superordinate tries to minimize 
the maximum dissatisfaction is a better description than the super-
ordinate manimizing the total dissatisfaction is unanswered. Empirical 
studies are needed to resolve the issue. The purpose here is only to 
illustrate that alternative forms do exist and can be handled mathe- 
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matically. For a particular organization it would be interesting to 
determine how the solutions compare. 
A Negotiation Model Which Considers the Dissatisfaction  
of Beth the Superordinate and the Subordinates  
Returning to the mathematical model attributed to Ruefli in 
the beginning of the chapter, recall that the objective of the overall 
problem was to 
n 	+t + 
minimize 	E LwK 	+ wK  d-- ] K=1 
which can be interpreted as the minimization of the sum of the 
subordinates dissatisfaction. Collomb [33, p. 121] has suggested 
that such an objective would probably be representative of a government 
agency but not a progressive competitive organization. Two recent 
studies [33, 92] have relaxed this assumption. 
Collomb [33] in his Ph.D. dissertation states the organization's 
problem so that a solution is sought which minimizes the subordinates' 
weighted deviations from the goals and the superordinate's weighted 
deviation from his goals. Specifically, the superordinate finds si K , 
the goals for subordinate K, by solving the following problem: 
1 
minimize w+ d+ + w 
subject to: 	E Pk[21( + 1K
+ 	
+ d= G 
K=1 	 —o 
d, d• > 0 
sere d+ d are m
b x 1 vectors of deviations, and 
+ - 
w , w are mo x 1 vectors of weights associated with the 
deviations. 
The other terms are defined as before. For a fixed 2K subordinate K 
solved his problem which is given by: 
minimize' 	EK + +  
subject to: 	H2s - dK + dK = 21K 
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> 0. 
Collomb shows' [32, p. 9] how to write these problems 
as the following overall problem: 
Collomb's Problem  
minimize w
+' 
d+ + w 
subject to: 	E [P 	+
+ 
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, 1K  > 0, d
+
, d* > 0 
Next, he points out [32, p. 146] that this problem is non-convex and 
nonlinear (7-K is a variable) and then applies an appropriate algorithm to 
solve the problem. He concludes that any ordinary approximation process 
by which the superordinate would proceed by incremental changes in 
accordance with the deviations observed is most likely to lead to a 
local suboptimum. 
After a careful analysis the following observations can be 
made regarding Collomb's approach: 
(1) The superordinate does explicitly consider the possibility 
that the subordinate may not attain the goals set for him through 
relationship (6-12). 
(2) Although it is not apparent, the overall objective of 
Collomb's problem is to find goal levels, 2K , K=1,...,n, and activity 
levels xK' K=1,...,n, so that the sum of the superordinate's weighted 
deviations and the subordinate's weighted deviations is minimized. This 
is true because the objective function, (6-11), is to minimize the 
weighted deviations from the superordinate's goals and the constraints in 
(6-13) are simply the constraints for the primal and dual of the 
subordinates' problems. Constraint (6-14) states that the value of 
the dual objective function must be greater than or equal to the value 
of the primal objective function for each subordinate's problem. 
However, from duality theory it is known that for any feasible primal 
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and dual solution, i. e., one which satisfies (6-13), that 
_t 
wd_ 	w 	> Tr'a -K - -K7-K ' 





= 7 a -K -K' 
which is the optimality condition for each subordinate's problem. Thus, 
Collomb is assuming that the overall objective function is to minimize 
the sum of the superordinate's dissatisfaction and the subordinate's 
dissatisfaction, and these objectives are equally weighted. The 
superordinate's dissatisfaction (a term used by this author) is given 
by the weighted deviation from the superordinate's goals, i. e., 
_t- 
wd 	w d is the superordinate's dissatisfaction. 
Ruefli [92] has made two extensions to Collomb's work. First, 
he allows the superordinate to trade off the two main components of 
dissatisfaction, i. e., the superordinate's dissatisfaction and the 
subordinate's total dissatisfaction. Second, he avoids the difficulties 
incurred by Collomb by suggesting the use of generalized linear pro-
gramming as a solution procedure. Specifically, using Ruefli's 
approach the overall problem facing the organization is 
1 - , 	-Et 	+ 	_t 	_t 
minimize w d+ w d 	 Lw w'(E -1- w 1K ])  
K=1 
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K[HK2sK - clK + clic ] -d
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Thus, by studying the overall problem in the above form shows that the 
superordinate is weighting the importance of the subordinate's 
dissatisfaction and his own dissatisfaction. Ruefli proposes that 
this problem can be solved in a decentralized fashion using generalized 
linear programming. However, the usual problem of choosing convex 
combinations is still present. However, this problem could be overcome 
by using a partitioning scheme. 
To summarize, both Collomb and Ruefli have attempted to relax 
the assumption that the superordinate seeks to partition out his goals 
so as minimize only the subordinates' discrepancy dissatisfactions. 
Ruefli's extension is more general because he allows the superordinate 
to trade off his dissatisfaction with that of the subordinates. 
Summary  
The objective in this chapter has been to investigate the use 
of negotiation models for conceptualizing the coordination of resource 
allocation decisions in a two level hierarchical organization where 
there is conflict between the superordinate and the subordinates 
over what objectives ought to be pursued. The primary contribution is 
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the presentation and analysis of a goal partitioning procedure based on 
the earlier work of Benders [21], Kelley [62], Dantzig [36], Zangwill [125] 
and Ruefli [91]. This procedure explicitly recognizes the conflict 
over objectives as well as the competition among subordinates for 
limited resources. These conflicts are resolved via a bargaining 
process in which both the superordinate and the subordinates participate. 
The goal partitioning procedure resembles a constraint intervention 
mechanism, but it also can be shown to relate to a goal intervention 
mechanism. 
The chapter began with a description of Ruefli's work. It was 
shown how the use of generalized linear programming as a representation 
of the solution procedure assumes that the subordinates solve their 
problem as a group, and that the subordinates may select any combination 
of the goal levels which are assigned to them during the iterative 
process. Ruefli's concepts were then extended by considering a slightly 
more general model, and by using a partitioning procedure derived from 
previous work of Kelley, Benders, Dantzig, and Zangwill. The properties 
of the goal partitioning method were discussed. The information which 
is communicated during the exchange process was analyzed, and the 
economic and behavioral interpretations and implications associated with 
the mathematical representation of both the superordinate's and the 
subordinates' decision problems were given. Finally, two alternative 
objectives for the coordination process were presented. 
The negotiation models discussed in this chapter exemplify 
Simon's concept of bounded rationality. That is, instead of trying to 
optimize some overall grandiose organizational utility function, a 
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resource allocation program is sought which gets "as close as possible" 
to meeting some goals which are fixed by the superordinate, the 
subordinate himself, and by external factors. How close the organization 
comes to accomplishing these goals is influenced by the weights 
associated with the deviations by subordinates. There are several 
different interpretations that one may associate with this weighted 
deviation such as discrepancy dissatisfaction and inte/ 	al tension. 
The goal partitioning procedure which is described in this 
chapter is an iterative scheme whereby the superordinate and the 
subordinates exchange information. However, both the superordinate 
and the subordinates maintain their informational autonomy in the 
sense that neither unit must communicate information about its 
objective function or its constraint set. The iterative information 
exchange procedure converges in a finite number of exchanges to a 
solution which minimizes the sum of the weighted deviations of the 
subordinates from goals set by both the superordinate and the sub- 
ordinate himself. The final program reached does depend on the structure 
of the organization. The final solution arrived at is not necessarily 
the one which the superordinate might have selected had he made all the 
allocation decisions himself. Thus, the goal partitioning procedure is a 
relative coordination mechanism. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The primary focus of this research study has been on the 
development, interpretation, and analysis of analytical models for 
conceptualizing the resource allocation decision process in a hierarchical 
decentralized organization. The three main classes of results are: 
(1) The integration under a common framework (from the 
viewpoint of someone interested in structuring information flow in 
organizations) of existing mathematical techniques for characterizing 
the resource allocation decision process in a hierarchical decentralized 
organization. 
(2) Using the theory of mathematical programming as a tool for 
analysis a number of propositions regarding behavior in organizations were 
stated. These could serve as the basis for future empirical studies. 
(3) The development of negotiation models for coordinating 
resource allocation decisions when there exists conflict between 
levels over objectives. 
The integrating framework recognizes that there are two 
potential sources of conflict within a hierarchical decentralized 
organizations. There may exist conflict between subordinate decision 
making units over sharing limited resources. An organization where 
this is the only source of conflict is referred to as a "cooperative 
organization." On the other hand, the breaking up of the organization 
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into several different decision making entities can cause conflict 
between levels in the hierarchy over what objectives should be pursued. 
An organization which has both kinds of conflict is referred to as a 
"non-cooperative organization." 
To overcome these conflicts there exists two main classes of 
coordination mechanisms: coordination through goal intervention and 
coordination through constraint intervention. Although both classes of 
mechanisms have the same motive, viz., to influence the subordinate 
decision making units to undertake a resource allocation plan which 
does not exceed the available resources and which furthers the objectives 
of the superordinate, there are some significant differences in 
interpretation and application. 
The analysis portion of the study was divided into two sections: 
the study of goal and constraint intervention coordination mechanisms 
in a cooperative organization and the study of negotiation models for 
coordination in a non-cooperative organization. While most of the 
results in Chapters III and IV are not novel, e. g., see the mathematical 
programming literature [16, 47, 54, 72], they have never been synthesized 
in the framework of the resource allocation decision process in a 
hierarchical decentralized organization. The models presented for the 
analysis of goal and constraint intervention coordination mechanisms 
in cooperative organizations were normative, i. e., they were concerned 
with how decision making units ought to behave. However, in many 
instances these models are descriptive of typical resource allocation 
coordination processes. Chapters III and IV investigated the adequacy 
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and appropriateness of the existing models as descriptions of the 
coordination process in typical organizations. 
When goal and constraint intervention techniques are applied in 
a cooperative organization, they are often called pricing and resource 
budgeting techniques. The primary motivation for most existing analytical 
models of pricing and budgeting has come from mathematical decomposition 
theory. In Chapters III and IV, the pricing and budgeting mechanisms 
were derived from the general mathematical model of resource allocation 
decision making suggested in Chapter II. In Proposition 2 it was claimed 
that resource budgeting techniques are preferable to pricing techniques 
for coordinating in a cooperative organization because they work under 
more general conditions and the solutions are always feasible. 
Proposition 1 suggested the conditions under which pricing methods 
could not be used to find the overall optimal solution. 
The analysis of resource budgeting methods in Chapter IV 
suggested that if management allocates resources based on information 
about just one alternative, e. g., its allocation last period, then it is 
quite unlikely that the overall optimal solution can be found. This 
seems particularly relevant since many organizations perform the 
budgeting activity with prime consideration being a subordinate's 
budget last period. 
Chapter V described some of the behavioral implications inherent 
in the coordination mechanisms for cooperative organizations. Specific-
ally, it was shown that: 
(1) The only conflict is a result of the subordinates competing 
for limited organizational resources. 
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(2) The structure of the organization has no effect on the 
final solution reached (Proposition 4). 
(3) The subordinate decision making units have no autonomy. 
(4) The allocation decision reflects only the objectives of 
the superordinate. 
Chapter V also investigated the result when a pricing or 
resource budgeting procedure is used to coordinate in a non-cooperative 
organization. Such an investigation is relevant because it is quite 
conceivable that in a decentralized organization the superordinate might 
believe that his subordinates have the same utility function that he 
does, i. e., the superordinate might believe the organization is 
cooperative. Propositions 5 to 8 indicate that neither pricing 
mechanisms nor budgeting procedures are suitable for coordinating in 
non-cooperative organizations. An example is used to illustrate how 
the use of coordination mechanisms which work in cooperative organizations 
may result in a poor solution being found with respect to both the 
superordinate's and the subordinates' utility functions. 
In Chapter V it was also shown that even if the superordinate 
has complete information about the subordinate's constraint sets, it may 
be impossible to use a pricing scheme to influence the subordinate to 
find the superordinate's optimum. These results indicate that neither 
pricing nor budgeting approaches are satisfactory coordination mechanisms 
in a non-cooperative organization. 
In Chapter VI a class of coordination mechanisms called 
negotiation models which allow the resource allocation decision to be 
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influenced by both the superordinate and the subordinates was 
introduced. The important aspects of these models are: 
(1) They allow for informational autonomy on the part of both 
the superordinate and the subordinate. 
(2) The structure of the organization can affect the final 
decision. In other words, the final resource allocation program 
selected may be different under different organization structures. 
For example, the decisions made under a centralized structure may differ 
from those made under a decentralized structure. 
(3) The goal setting behavior of the superordinate and the 
subordinates explicitly takes into account the "bounded rationality" of 
man, i. e., the decision makers concentrate only on certain aggregate 
measures of performance rather than trying to optimize' some grandiose 
utility function. 
'(1) The models explicitly allow for both the superordinate 
and the subordinates to have their own set of goals. 
(5) In the case of the goal partitioning procedure the 
iterative information exchange process between superordinate and 
subordinates converges in a finite number of information exchanges to 
a solution which minimizes the total weighted deviation from the goals 
set by the superordinate and the subordinates. 
(6) The goal partitioning procedure may lead to a resource 
allocation plan being selected which is different from one which would be 
selected by the superordinate or the subordinates acting in isolation; 
however, it will lead to a program which reflects both the goals of 
the superordinate and the goals of the subordinates. 
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It is felt that the concepts used in this research have wide 
applicability: in industry, government, profit seeking enterprises, etc. 
While the analytical models discussed throughout the dissertation are 
theoretical, they do lend validity to the use of certain kinds of 
coordination mechanisms in certain environments. Hopefully, the frame-
work used in this research provides a basis by which various coordination 
mechanisms can be contrasted and compared. Finally, the results 
suggest a starting point for empirical studies. 
Recommendations for Further Study  
During the course of this research study several areas for 
future investigation were uncovered. These can be grouped into 
three classifications: empirical, mathematical, and supplementary. 
The extensions in the empirical area include: 
(1) For different kinds of - organizations test the propositions 
which were stated,in Chapters III to VI. 
(2) Which objective is more appropriate as a description of 
goal seeking behavior: minimizing the sum of weighted deviations for 
all subordinates or minimizing the maximum weighted deviation for the 
subordinates. Possibly, a more important question to investigate is: 
how do the solutions differ under each of the two criteria? 
(3) Investigate whether there are any organizations within which 
quantifiable measures exist which correspond to the information which 
is assumed to be communicated during the iterative procedure associated 
with the goal partitioning method. 
(4) In a typical organization how many iterative exchanges of 
201 
infbrmation is normal before a resource allocation program is settled 
on for implementation. 
(5) The goal partitioning procedure suggests that no one 
participant dominates the resource allocation decision process. Some 
empirical studies substantiate this, e. g., see Baker, et al.' [14], 
Connolly [34], and Shumway, et al. [101]. Additional studies should 
investigate this hypothesis more fully. 
(6) The possibility of running the goal partitioning procedure 
as a shadow model could be investigated, i. e., while tha actual 
decision process is going on, the partitioning procedure could also be 
utilized. This might indicate discrepancies in the actual planning 
process or in the partitioning procedure. 
(7) In a sense the use of coordination mechanisms can cause an 
organization to become more centralized. The differences between 
centralization acts and coordination acts should be investigated. The 
author conjectures that coordination mechanisms are really centralizing 
processes even though they allow for decentralized decision making. 
It seems important to analyze the long term effect of different 
coordination mechanisms on the degree of centralization. 
The recommendations for further study in the area of mathematical 
analysis are: 
(1) Investigate ways to consider communications and dependencies 
(externalities) between subordinate decision making units. 
(2) As Geoffrion [46] noted there are many unanswered questions 
regarding the computational efficiency of different algorithms. There 
is a definite need for extensive testing of various algorithms for 
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describing the iterative decision process in a hierarchical decentralized 
organization. 
(3) The computational efficiency of the goal partitioning 
procedure should be investigated. Ways in which the procedure could be made 
more efficient such as dropping some of the non-binding constraints in 
the superordinate's problem (see Geoffrion [46, p. 382]) should be 
studied. The question of how quickly the goal partitioning procedure 
converges to a "near" optimum should be answered. 
(4) The goal partitioning procedure could be used to investigate 
the effect of interdependencies between time periods and the effect of 
incremental increases in the superordinate's performance targets through 
time. 
Supplementary research could study measurement problems. For 
example, the problem of how to determine the goals of the superordinate 
and the subordinates, and how to assign weights to deviations from goal 
 levels, should be investigated. In addition, the relationships between 
the negotiation models discussed in Chapter VI and the theory of 
teams' [81] should be investigated. Also, the basic concepts of the 
negotiation models could be used to study non-hierarchical organizations 
such as funder-user-servicer type organizations [13]. 
The possibility of developing a metric for gauging the 
centralization-decentralization properties of different types of 
organizations and organizational structures should be pursued. In 
Chapter V it was shown how the superordinate and the subordinates 
may have different optimal solutions. That discussion might provide 
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the foundation for the metric. 
One of the -)ruposes of this research has been to use analytical 
models to conceptualize the resource allocation decision process in 
hierarchical decentralized organizations. Most of the models discussed 
in the dissertation have limited usefulness from an operational view-
point. There is a need for the development of mathematical procedures 
which recognize the inabilities of decision makers to specify multi—
criterion utility functions. Recently, Geoffrion [49] and Geoffrion and 
Hogan [50] have presented interactive models which do not require the 
explicit statement of utility functions. Their work should be extended 
to a hierarchical decentralized organization where there are several 
decision making units. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. Abadie, J. and Sakarovitch, M., "Two Methods of Decomposition for 
Linear Programs", presented at the International Symposium on 
Mathematical Programming, Princeton University, August, (1967). 
2. Ackoff, Russell L., "Frontiers of Management Science", The Bulletin  
of the Institute of Management Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 2, February, 
(1971). 
3. Ackoff, Russell L., "Rounding Out the Management Sciences", Columbia 
Journal of World Business, Winter, (1966). 
4. Albosta, Chester A. and Holzman, Albert G., "Optimal Funding of an 
R&D Project Portfolio", presented at 11 th Institute of Management 
Sciences Meeting, Los Angeles, October, (1970). 
5. Alcaly, Roger E. and Klevorick, Alvin K. , "A Note of the Dual Prices 
of Integer Programs", Econometrica, Vol. 34, No. 1, January, (1966). 
6. Anshen, Melvin, "The Program Budget in Operation", Chapter 12 in 
Novick, David, Efficiency and Economy in Government Throush New  
Budgeting and Accounting Procedures, The RAND Corporation, Report 
R-254, February 1, (1954). 
7. Ansoff, H. Igor and Brandenburg, Richard C., "A Program of Research 
in Business Planning", Management Science, Vol. 13, No. 6, February, 
(1967). 
8. Argyris, Chris, "Management Information Systems: The Challenge to 
Rationality and Emotionality", Management Science, Vol. 17, No. 6, 
February, (1971). 
9. Arrow, Kenneth J., "Control in Large Organizations", Management  
Science, Vol. lo, No. 3, April, (1964). 
10. Arrow, Kenneth J. and Hurwicz, L., "Decentralization and Computation 
in Resource Allocation", in Pfouts, R. (editor), Essays in Economics  
and Econometrics, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 
N.C., (1960). 
11. Atkinson, et al, "The Achievement Motive, Goal Setting and Probability 




12. Bailey, Elizabeth E. and Malone, John C., "Resource Allocation and 
the Regulated Firm", The Bell Journal of Economics and Management  
Science, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring, (1970). 
13. Baker, Norman R., "Toward an Analytical Framework for Service Organi-
zations", presented at XIV International Meeting of TIMS, Mexico 
City, August, (1967). 
14. Baker, Norman R., Shumway, C.R., Maher, P.M., Souder, W.E., and 
Rubenstein, A.H., "An R&D Project Selection and Budget Allocation 
Model for Large, Decentralized Research Organizations", Department 
of Industrial Engineering and Management Sciences, Northwestern 
University, January, (1972). 
15. Balas, Egon, "An Infeasibility Pricing Decomposition Method for 
Linear Programs", Operations Research, Vol. 14, No. 5, September-
October, (1966). 
16. Balas, Egon, "Duality in Discrete Programming", Technical Report 
67-5, Department of Operations Research, Stanford University, (1967). 
17. Barone, E., "The Ministry of Production in the Collective State", 
translated by F.A. von Hayek, L'Economie Dirigee en Regime Collecti-
viste, Librairie de Medicis, Paris, (1939). 
18. Bass, B.B. and Leavitt, H.J., "Some Experiments in Planning 
and Operating", Management Science, April, (1963). 
19. Baumol. W.J. and Fabian, T., "Decomposition, Pricing for Decentraliza-
tion and External Economies", Management Science, Vol. 11, No. 1, 
September, (1964). 
20. Bazaraa, Mokhtar S., "An Infeasibility Pricing Algorithm For the 
Multicommodity Minimum Cost Flow Problem" unpublished paper, Industrial 
and Systems Engineering Department, Georgia Institute of Technology, 
Atlanta, Georgia, (1973). 
21. Benders, J.F., "Partitioning Procedures for Solving Mixed Variables 
Programming Problems", Numerische Mathematik, Vol. 4, (1962). 
22. Brooks, R. and Geoffrion, A., "Finding Everett's Lagrange Multipliers 
by Linear Programming", Operations Research, Vol. 14, No. 6, 
November-December, (1966). 
23. Brosilow, C.B., Lasdon, L.S., and Pearson, J.D., "Feasible Optimiza-
tion Methods for Interconnected Systems, "Proceedings of the 1965 
Joint Automatic Control Conference, Troy, New York, June, (1965). 
206 
24. Cassidy, R.G., Kirby, M.J.L., and Raike, W.M., "Efficient Distribu- 
tion of Resources Through Three Levels of Government", Management  
Science, Vol. 17, No. 8, April, (1971). 
25. Chamberlain, N., The Firm: Microeconomic Planning and Action, McGraw 
Hill, New York, (1972). 
26. Chapman, D.W. and Volkmann, J., "A Social Determinant of the Level of 
Aspiration", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 34, 
(1959). 
27. Charnes, A. and Collomb, B., "Optimal Economic Stabilization Policy: 
Linear-Interval Programming Models", Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 
Vol. 6, No. 4, August, (1972). 
28. Charnes, A. and Collomb, B., "A Non-Convex Goal Programming Model 
For Decentralizing a Firm", presented at the 1971 International IEEE 
Conference, Oaxtepec, Mexico, January, (1971). 
29. Charnes, A. and Cooper, W.W., Management Models and Industrial  
Applications of Linear Programming, Volumes 1 and 2, John Wiley & 
Sons, New York, (1961). 
30. Charnes, A., Clower, R.W., and Kortanek, K.O., "Effective Control 
through Coherent Decentralization with Preemptive Goals", Econometrica, 
Vol. 35, No. 2, April, (1967). 
31. Charnes, A. and Stedry, A., "Exploratory Models in Theory of Budget 
Control" in New Perspectives in Organization Research, John Wiley & 
Sons, (1962). 
32. Chidambaram, T., "Coordination Problems in Competitive Situations", 
Systems Research Center Report 101-A-67-43, Case Institute of 
Technology, (1967). 
33. Collumb, Bertrand P., "Goal Interval Approaches to Intertemporal 
Analysis and Decentralization in Management", unpublished Ph. D. 
Dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, (1971). 
34. Connolly, Terry, "The Diffuse Decision: An Integrating Focus", 
presented at TIMS/ORSA/AIIE Joint National Meeting, Atlantic City, 
New Jersey, November, (1972). 
Firm, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, (1964). 
36. Dantzig, George B., Linear Programming and Extensions, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, (1963). 
37. Dantzig, George B. and Wolfe, Phillip, "Decomposition Principles for 
Linear Programs", Operations Research, Vol. 8, No. 1, (1960). 
35. Cyert, Richard M. and March, James G., A Behavorial Theory of the  
207 
38. Dantzig, George B. and Wolfe, Phillip, "The Decomposition Algorithm 
for Linear Programs", Econometrica, Vol. 29, No. 4, October, (1961). 
39. Dean, J., "Decentralization and Intracompany Pricing", Harvard  
Business Review, Vol. 33, July-August, (1955). 
40. Dorn, W.S., "Duality in Quadratic Programming", Quarterly Journal  
of Applied Mathematics, Vol. 18, (1960). 
41. Eilon, Samuel, "Goals and Constraints in Decision Making", Opera-
tional Research Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, (1971). 
42. Eilon, Samuel, "Goals and Constraints", The Journal of Management  
Studies, October, (1971). 
43. Everett, H., "Generalized Lagrange Multiplier Method for Solving 
Problems of Optumum Allocation of Resources", Operations Research, 
Vol. 11, No. 3, May-June, (1963). 
44. Falk, James E., "Lagrange Multipliers and Nonlinear Programming", 
Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 19, (1967). 
45. Frank, J.D., "Individual Differences in Certain Aspects of the 
Level of Aspiration", American Journal of Ps1chology, Vol. 47, 
No. 3, (1935). 
46. Geoffrion. A.M., "Primal Resource-Directive Approaches for Optimizing 
Nonlinear Decomposable Systems", Operations Research, Vol. 18, No. 
3, May-June, (1970). 
47. Geoffrion, A.M., "Elements of Large Scale Mathematical Programming", 
Management Science, Vol. 16, No. 11, July, (1970). 
48. Geoffrion, A.M., "Resource Allocation in Decentralized Non-Market 
Organizations With Multiple Objectives", presented at Second World 
Congress of Econometric Society, Cambridge, England, September, 
(1970). 
49. Geoffrion, A.M., Dyer, J.S., and Feinberg, A., "An Interactive 
Approach for Multi-Criterion Optimization With an Application to the 
Operation of an Academic Department", Management Science, Vol. 19, 
No. 4, December, (1972). 
50. Geoffrion, A.M. and Hogan, 	"Coordination of Two Level Organi- 
zations With Multiple Objectives", in Balakrishnan, A.V. (editor), 
Techniques of Optimization, Academic Press, (1972). 
51. Geoffrion, A.M., "Generalized Benders Decomposition", Journal of  
Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 10, No. 4, (1972). 
208 
52. Gomory, Ralph E. and Baumol, William J., "Integer Programming and 
Pricing", Econometrica, Vol. 28, No. 3, July, (1960). 
53. Gould, J.R., "Internal Pricing in Firms When There are Costs of 
Using an Outside Market", Journal of Business,  (1964). 
54. Grinold, Richard C., "Steepest Ascent for Large Scale Linear 
Programs", SIAM Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, July, (1972). 
55. Hass, Jerome E., "A Decomposition Algorithm for Non-Linear Programm-
ing", unpublished paper, Graduate School of Business and Public 
Administration, Cornell University, (1967). 
56. Hass, Jerome E., "Transfer Pricing in a Decentralized Firm", 
Management Science,  Voi. 14, No. 6, February, (1968). 
57. Hertz, David B., New Power for Management,  McGraw Hill, New York, 
(1969). 
58. Hirshleifer, J., "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing", Journal 
of Business, Vol. 29, No. 3, July, (1956). 
59. Ijiri, Yuji, Management Goals and Accounting for Control,  North-
Holland, (1965). 
60. Jennergren, L.P., "Studies in Mathematical Theory of Decentralized 
Resource Allocation", unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Stanford 
University, (1971). 
61. Jennergren, L.P., "Decentralization on the Basis of Price Schedules 
in Linear Decomposable Resource Allocation Problems", Journal of  
Financial and Quantitative Analysis,  January, (1972). 
62. Kelley, J.E., "The Cutting-Plane Method for Solving Convex Programs", 
SIAM Journal, Vol. 8, No. 4, December, (1960). 
63. Kohler, David A., "A Projection of Convex Polyhedral Sets", 
unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of California at 
Berkeley, August, (1967). 
64. Koopmans, T.C., Three Essays on the State of Economic Science, 
McGraw Hill, (1957). 
65. Koopmans, T.C., "Analysis of Production as an Efficient Combination 
of Activities", in Koopmans, T.C. (editor), Activity Analysis of  
Production and Allocation,  John Wiley, New York, (1951). 
66. Kornai, J. and Liptak, T., "Two Level Planning", Econometrica, 
 Vol. 33, No. 1, January, (1965). 
209 
67. Kriebel, C.H. and Lave, L.B., "Conflict Resolution within Economic 
Organizations", Behavorial Science, Vol. 14, No. 3, May, (1969). 
68. Kronsjo, T.O.M., "Centralisation and Decentralisation of Decision 
Making", Revue Francais Informatique et Recherche ORerationelle, 
(1968). 
69. Kronsjo, T.O.M., "Optimal Coordination of a Large Convex Economic 
System", Jahrbucher fur Nationalokonomic and Statistik, Band 183, 
Heft 5, (1968). 
70. Krouse, Clement G., "Complex Objectives, Decentralization, and the 
Decision Process of the Organization", Administrative Science  
Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, December, (1972). 
71. Lange, 0., "on the Economic Theory of Socialism", in Lippincott, B., 
On the Economic Theory of Socialism, Minnesota Press, (1938). 
72. Lasdon, L.S., Optimization Theory for Large Systems, Macmillan, New 
York, (1970). 
73. Lasdon, L.S. and Schoeffler, J.D., "Decentralized Plant Control", 
ISA Transactions, Vol. 5, No. 2, April, (1966). 
74. Lerner, A., The Economics of Control, Macmillan, (1946). 
75. Likert, Rensis, The Human Organization: Its Management and Value, 
McGraw Hill, (1957). 
76. Luce, R. Duncan and Raiffa, Howard, Games and Decisions, John Wiley 
& Sons, New York, (1966). 
77. Machlup, Fritz, "Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavorial, 
Managerial", The American Economic Review, Vol. LVII, No. 1, March, 
(1967). 
78. Malinvaud, E., "Decentralization Procedures for Planning", in 
Malinvaud, E. and Bacharach, M.O.L., Activity Analysis in the  
Theory of Growth and Planning, Macmillan, (1967). 
79. Mangasarian, Olvi L., Nonlinear Projramming, McGraw Hill, New York, 
(1969). 
80. March, J. and Simon, H., Organizations, Wiley, New York, (1958). 
81. Marschak, J. and Radnor, R., The Economic Theory of Teams, Cowles 
Foundation Monograph 22, Yale University, (1969). 
82. Marschak, Thomas, "Centralization and Decentralization in Economic 
Organizations", Econometrica, Vol. 27, No. 3, July, (1959). 
210 
83. Messarovic, M.D., Sanders, J.L., and Sprague, C.F., "An Axiomatic 
Approach to Organizations from a General Systems Viewpoint", in 
Cooper, W.W., Leavitt, H., and Shelly, M.W., New Perspectives in  
Organization Research, Wiley, (1962). 
84. Messarovic, M.D., Macko, D., and Takahara, Y., Theory of Hierarchical  
Multilevel Systems, Academic Press, New York, (1970). 
85. Moeseke, P.V. and de Ghellinck, G., "Decentralization in Separable 
Programming", Econometrica, Vol. 37, No. 1, January, (1969). 
86. Morris, William T., Decentralization in Management Systems, Ohio 
State University Press, (1968). 
87. Pareto, V., Manuel d' Economie Politique, 
Giard, M., Paris, (1927). 
French Translation, 
88. Rardin, R.L. and Unger, V.E., "A Surrogate 
Mixed Integer Programs", presented at 43rd 
Milwaukee, April, (1973). 
Constraint for 0-1 
National ORSA Meeting, 
89. Rosen, J.B., "Primal Partition Programming for Block Diagonal 
Matrices", Numerische Mathematik, Vol. 6, (1964). 
90. Ruefli, T., "Planning in Decentralized Organizations", unpublished 
Ph. D. Dissertation, Carnegie-Mellon University, May, (1969). 
91, Ruefli, T. 7 "A Generalized Goal Decomposition Model", Management  
Science, Vol. 17, No. 9, April, (1971). 
92. Ruefli, T., "Linked Multi-Criterion Decision Models", presented at 
seminar on Multiple Criteria Decision Making, University of South 
Carolina, Ocotober, (1972). 
93. Ruefli, T., "PPBS-An Analytical Approach", in Byrne, R.F., Charnes, 
A., Cooper, W.W., Davis, 0.A., and Gilford, Dorothy, Studies in  
Budgeting, North Holland, (1971). 
94. Ruefli, T., "Behavorial Externalities in Decentralized Organi-
zantions", Management Science, Vol. 9, No. 5, June, (1971). 
95. Sanders, Jerry L., "A Nonlinear Decomposition Principle", Operations  
Research, Vol. 13, No. 2, March-April, (1965). 
96. Sanders, Jerry L., "The Application of a Theory of Multi-Level 
Systems to Optimization Problems", Systems Research Center, SRC 
24-A-63-12, Case Institute of Technology, February, (1963). 
211 
97. Sengupta, S.S. and Ackoff, R.L., "Systems Theory from an Operations 
Research Point of View", IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and  
Cybernetics, Vol. SSE-1, No. 1, November, (1965). 
98. Sengupta, Jati and Fox, Karl A., Optimization Techniques in  
Quantitative Economic Models, North-Holland, London, (1971). 
99. Schloeffler, J.D., "Static Multilevle Systems", in Wismer, D.A. 
(editor), Optimization Methods in Large Scale Systems, (1971). 
100. Shubik, M., "Incentives, Decentralized Control, The Assignment of 
Joint Costs and Internal Pricing", Management Science, Vol. 8, No. 
3, April, (1962). 
101. Shumway, C.R., Maher, P.M., Baker, N.R., Souder, W.E., and 
Rubenstein, A., "Diffuse Decision Making: An Empirical Examina- 
tion", unpublished paper, Department of Industrial Engineering and 
Management Sciences, Northwestern University, July, (1972). 
102. Silverman, G.J., "Primal Decomposition of Mathematical Programs by 
Resource Allocation", Operations Research, Vol. 20, No. 1, 
January-February, (1972). 
103. Simon, H.A., "On the Concept of Organizational Goal", Administrative  
Science Quarterly, June, (1964). 
104. Simon, H.A., Kozmetsky, G., and Tyndall, G., Centralization vs.  
Decentralization in Organizing the Controller's Department, The 
Controllership Foundation, (1954). 
105. Simon, H.A., Administrative Behavior, The Free Press, New York, 
(1957). 
106. Simon, H.A., The New Science of Management Decision, Harper & 
Brothers, (1960). 
107. Simon, H.A., Models of Man, John Wiley, (1957). 
108. Smithies, Arthur, "PPBS, Suboptimization and Decentralization", 
Rand Memorandum, RM-6178-PR, April, (1970). 
109. Speck, Daniel, "A Study of the Impact of Risk Tolerance on Multi-
Level R&D Decision Processes", unpublished Master's Thesis, Georgia 
Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, January, (1973). 
110. Stedry, Andrew C., Budget Control and Cost Behavior, Prentice Hall 
Inc., New Jersey, (1960). 
111. Tannenbaum, Robert and Massarik, Fred, "Participation by Subor-
dinates in the Managerial Decision Making Process", Canadian  
Journal of Economics and Political Science, (1950). 
212 
112. tenKate, A., "Decomposition of Linear Programs by Direct Distri-
bution", Discussion Paper No. 4, Netherlands School of Economics, 
Rotterdam, to appear in Econometrica, (1969). 
113. tenKate, A., "A Comparison Between Two Kinds of Decentralized 
Optimality Conditions in Nonconvex Programming", Management  
Science, Vol. 18, No. 12, August, (1972). 
114. Uzawa, H., "Iterative Methods for Concave Programming", in Arrow, 
K.J., Hurwicz, L., and Uzawa, H., Studies in Linear and Nonlinear  
Programming, Stanford University Press, (1958). 
115. Varaiya, P., Decomposition of Large Scale Systems", Journal of 
SIAM Control, Vol. 4, (1966). 
116. Wagner, Harvey M., "The ABC's of OR", Operations Research, Vol. 
19, No. 6, October, (1971). 
117. Wagner, Harvey M., "Multiple Utility Functions in Organizations", 
presented at the Seminar on Multiple Criteria Decision Making, 
University of South Carolina, October, (1972). 
118. Weitzman, M., "Iterative Multilevel Planning with Production 
Targets", Econometrica, Vol. 38, No. 1, January, (1970). 
119. Whinston, A., "Price Guides in Decentralized Institutions", 
unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Carnegie Institute of Technology, 
(1962). 
120. Whinston, A., "Price Guides in Decentralized Organizations", in 
Cooper, W.W., Leavitt, H., and Shelly, M.W. (editors), New 
Perspectives in Organization Research, Wiley, New York, (1964). 
121. Whisler, T.L., Meyer, H., Baum, B.H., and Sorenson, P.F., 
"Centralization of Organizational Control: An Empirical Study 
of Its Meaning and Its Measurement", The Journal of Business, 
Vol. 40, January, (1967). 
122. Wildaysky, Aaron, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, Little, 
Brown and Company, Boston, (1964). 
123. Williamson, Oliver E., The Economics of Discretionary Behavior:  
Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm, Prentice Hall, (1964). 
124. Wolfe, P., "The Simplex Method for Quadratic Programming", 
Econometrica, Vol. 27, (1959). 
125. Zangwill, W.I., Nonlinear Programming: A Unified Approach, Prentice 
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, (1969). 
213 
126. Zannetos, Zenon S., "On the Theory of Divisional Structures: Some 
Aspects of Centralization and Decentralization of Control and 
Decision Making", Management Science, Vol. 12, No. 4, December, 
(1965). 
127. Zschau, E.V.W., "A Primal Decomposition Algorithm for Linear 
Programming", unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 
(1967). 
VITA 
James Ross Freeland, son of Mr. and Mrs. James L. Freeland, 
was born in Kansas City, Missouri on March 31, 1946. He was graduated 
from Southeast High School in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1964. 
He received his B. S. Degree in industrial engineering from 
Bradley University in Peoria, Illinois, in June, 1968. During his 
undergraduate career the author was listed in "Who's Who Among Students 
in American Universities and Colleges, 1966-67 and 1967-68" and was 
awarded the Bradley University AllE Outstanding Student Award in 1968. 
He also served as president of the national leadership honorary, 
Omicron Delta Kappa; president of Alpha Pi Mu; president of AllE; and 
president of Lambda Chi Alpha social fraternity. He was elected vice 
president of the sophomore and senior classes and served as president 
of the junior class. 
Mr. Freeland was awarded a NDEA fellowship for graduate studies 
in the Industrial and Systems Engineering School at the Georgia 
Institute of Technology in September, 1968. He completed the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Science in Industrial Engineering in June, 
1970. His thesis was entitled, "A Model for Determining Skill 
Requirements in a Research Organization." 
The author entered the doctoral program at Georgia Tech in 
June, 1970. From September, 1971, until June, 1973, Mr. Freeland was 
a part time Instructor in the School of Industrial and Systems 
214 
215 
Engineering. He completed the degree requirements in the doctoral 
program at Georgia Tech in the Spring of 1973. He will join the 
faculty of the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University in 
August, 1973, as an Assistant Professor of Decision Sciences. 
The author is a member of Omicron Delta Kappa, Alpha Pi Mu, 
the Operations Research Society of America, The Institute of Management 
Sciences, The Mathematical Programming Society, and the American 
Society of Engineering Education. 
Mr. Freeland married the former Janis Ann Northdurft of 
Peoria, Illinois in May, 1968. 
